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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to examine several aspects of 
situation semantics and to evaluate the contribution which the theory 
makes to our understanding of language, in particular whether it 
brings us nearer to a solution of some traditional puzzles with 
attitude reports. 
The presentation is in three parts. The first part, comprising 
chapters one and two, consists of a general introduction to the 
issues involved and tackles the question of where situation semantics 
places the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. The second and 
main part, chapters three to six, is devoted to demonstrating the 
language- dependent status of abstract situations. The 
interpretations of expressions and the role of the setting in 
composition are analysed in chapter three. In chapter four I 
consider Russell's views on propositions and the Russellian semantics 
Richards has given. Chapter five examines in detail the suggestion 
of chapter three that the level of abstract situations is not 
independent of language, recasts situation semantics accordingly as 
an interpreted language, and lastly considers an extension of 
situation semantics to include molecular facts. In chapter six 
situation semantics is related to direct reference semantics. 
Finally, chapters seven and eight treat attitude reports, analysing 
firstly the ingredients of Barwise and Perry's approach to the 
semantics of the attitudes, and secondly setting out some traditional 
puzzles and considering how situation semantics deals with them. 
The goal throughout is to clarify and understand what the ideas 
and insights behind situation semantics are and to determine their 
importance for semantic theory. 
Preface 
Although situation semantics burst upon the world only a few 
years ago, it has been, and continues to be, the subject of much 
interest and inquiry. Consequently, the theory has developed 
rapidly, having already assumed several forms. This state of 
affairs, in which the theory is constantly shifting, proves 
problematical for anyone attempting to write a major work on the 
theory; the situation has been intensified with the institution of 
the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford 
University and the concentrated inquiry into situation semantics and 
its applications which the Center fosters. 
Although contemporary theory has already moved beyond 
Situations and Attitudes, published in 1983, which will be the main 
source for most interested people, I chose to base my analysis upon 
that version. The aspects of situation semantics that I am concerned 
with are fortunately less variable, and the points which I make, 
though made with respect to that formulation, are not restricted to 
it. References are made to more recent versions of the theory where 
it seemed appropriate. 
Remarks on terminology, abbreviation and notation: following 
more recent usage, I use 'situation' and 'situation type' for what 
are called respectively 'course of events' and 'event type' in 
Barwise and Perry (1983). I use the abbreviation S &A for Situations 
and Attitudes in the notes; references to this book are also made in 
this form. The conventional mode of reference (author and date) is 
used in the main text. Indeterminates are printed in bold type, 
thus: x , and not in bold with a period, thus: x, as in Barwise and 
Perry (1983). Finally, I have adopted the convention of underlining 
algebraic symbols, except when they occur as superscripts or 
subscripts. Bold characters are not underlined. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 General 
Situation semantics is a newcomer as far as semantic theories 
are concerned, but it is also a rather controversial theory, being 
radical in many, interconnected respects. In this thesis, by 
examining some of the aspects which set situation semantics aside 
from traditional, mainline theories in formal semantics, I shall try 
to determine what these novel features mean for situation semantics 
in terms of being able to contribute towards our understanding of 
language and, in particular, towards solving some difficult and 
longstanding problems in the semantics of propositional attitudinal 
reports. 
Our examination of situation semantics has three main aspects: 
(i) partiality in the semantics: the use of situations for the 
references of sentences (strictly, utterances), thereby purchasing 
for the theory more finely differentiated references than is the case 
with its main rivals; (ii) the concept of information and its place 
(if any) in semantics. This question has two subsidiary facets; 
firstly, in a semantic theory which appeals to the notion of 
information, the meaning of semantic innocence needs to be re- 
evaluated, for if information is given a semantic role, the semantic 
value has a rival. Secondly and relatedly, there is the problem of 
the location of the boundary between semantics and pragmatics, and 
the question of whether this boundary has been moved with situation 
semantics. Finally, and of central concern, there are (iii) the 
related questions, What and where is meaning? and, What is the status 
of the entities in the semantics? Is meaning in the world as Barwise 
and Perry claim, or does a quasi - linguistic status infuse various 
actors that are placed on the situation semantics stage? 
These issues are linked in an interesting way. The attempt to 
locate meaning in the world relies on the notions of information 
advocated for some time by J. J. Gibson and recently by Fred Dretske 
- 2 - 
to provide structures in the world; thus the issues under (iii) are 
connected with those under (ii). Moreover, despite the very entities 
that purchase the partiality, the use of situations and the 
assignment of structured interpretations to utterances, language 
infiltrates the semantics and a quasi - linguistic status attaches to 
situations (as I shall show). 
In choosing to focus upon these questions, I am neglecting 
other interesting aspects of situation semantics, some of which ought 
to receive mention in this introduction. Firstly, I shall not be 
examining the underlying set theory, Kripke -Platek admissible set 
theory with urelements (KPU), as the particular axiomatised theory of 
sets chosen for situation semantics, which would be a topic for a 
comprehensive investigation of the foundations of the theory. Our 
interest in the foundations of situation semantics concerns rather 
the use to which the set theory is put. 
Another issue we shall not pursue is the question of which 
logic inheres situation semantics. The assignment of classes of 
situations to utterances of sentences as their references means that 
not one, but two implicational relations can be defined between 
utterances: strong and weak consequence. Weak consequence is more 
familiar as material implication, but it is strong consequence that 
encapsulates the logic of situations. I shall make a few remarks 
about the underlying logic below in connection with partiality, but 
it is not a question I treat in any depth. 
Situation semantics places emphasis upon considering language 
as actually used, by finite agents in situations, to communicate 
partial information about their environments. The questions of what 
it means to understand a language, and of what a speaker needs to 
know in order to understand an expression, would therefore seem to 
arise more naturally in the theoretical surroundings of Barwise and 
Perry's semantics than they do in others. It has been argued, 
notably by Michael Dummett (1975, 1976), that the study of meaning is 
precisely the study of understanding;1 however, work in formal 
semantics (eg. Montague Grammar) has built upon classical model 
theory and logic, and deals with questions about the relation of 
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language to the world, to the detriment of questions about the 
relation of language to speakers. Unfortunately, this whole range of 
issues must be omitted, since it would deserve a separate treatment. 
The main effort is devoted to establishing the language - 
dependent or quasi -linguistic status of abstract situations: chapters 
three to six are concerned with this question in one way or another. 
In these chapters I examine how meaning determines interpretation in 
situation semantics and argue that while the interpretations of some 
expressions, such as 'Jackie' and 'biting', may be things in the 
world, the interpretations of utterances cannot. This issue of what 
the references or utterances are has been considered by Russell and 
more recently by Richards, so in chapter four I look at these 
writers. The Russellian approach has been revitalised by David 
Kaplan and goes under the name of direct reference semantics, which I 
look at in chapter six. The main chapter discussing the status of 
abstract situations is chapter five. The issue of information is 
treated in chapter seven in connection with attitude reports and the 
role of the agent's cognitive state. 
In the remainder of this introduction I shall outline the 
issues involved with all three main areas and clarify the content of 
this work. 
1.2 Aspects of situation semantics 
1.2.1 Partiality 
Partiality is a characteristic and crucial aspect of situation 
semantics. Although partial functions have been studied thoroughly 
in recursion theory, their use in model theoretic semantics is more 
recent and rare. One thinks of Hintikka's use of model sets and van 
Fraassen's use of supervaluations in the semantics of formal 
languages.2 Partial functions are just what Barwise and Perry need 
to represent their concept of information. Grounded in Gibson's 
ecological realism and with insights arising out of Dretske's theory 
- 4 - 
of information, Barwise and Perry's semantics locates linguistic 
meaning within the wider context of ecological meaning and 
information. Its starting point is the detection of limited amounts 
of information about the world; for an organism always picks up 
partial information from its environment. Situations are the 
conceptual and formal tools that have been appropriated to embed 
partiality within the theory. 
In an early paper (Barwise and Perry, 1980) we find two 
arguments against construing situations as sets of possible worlds. 
I want to examine these arguments, since they bear on the issue of 
whether partiality as it appears in situation semantics really is an 
advance over standard theory or not. The proposal for defining a 
situation in terms of possible worlds is as follows. We shall assume 
that the set A of individuals is fixed for both representations. Let 
I be the set of all possible worlds, R be the set of relations in the 
situation analysis, and for each r e R, let r' be the predicate 
(relation symbol) in the possible worlds analysis which denotes r. 
For simplicity we shall omit reference to locations.3 Let J Ç I be 
any nonempty set of possible worlds; the situation corresponding to J 
is 
s = { <r,41,...,411,1> I Vi e J, <41,...,4I.1> e V(r',i) } 
U { <r,01,...,4n,0> 
I 
Vi e J, <á1,...,á1,1> V V(r',i) 
The inverse operation can also be defined: if s is a situation, then 
the set of possible worlds corresponding to s is that subset Is of I 
defined as follows: 
if <r,41,...,4.1,1> e s then Vi e Is, <11,...,a,1> e V(r',i) 
if <1,á1,...,41,1,0> e s then Vi e Is, <41,...,4t.i> 0 V(r',i) 
The arguments against this reduction of situation to sets of 
possible worlds consist of an example from mathematics followed by 
the application to possible world semantics. We shall look mainly at 
the mathematical examples and evaluate those. The first argument 
revolves around the premise that a property may be said to hold of 
- 5 - 
a set just in case § holds of every member in the set. Identifying 
the partial function with the set of extensions means that the 
partial function has a property .) just in case every total function 
extending it has the property T. 
The mathematical example is the function ,,/ on the set Q of 
rational numbers, SR being the set of all extensions. Now, for every 
f e SR, f(2) is defined; hence, on the above mentioned premise, the 
partial function, identified as the set of all extensions, is defined 
for the argument 2. But since A/2 is irrational, the real partial 
function is not defined in Q for the argument 2, and this, Barwise 
and Perry argue, shows the absurdity of identifying the partial 
function with the set of all extensions of it. 
This argument is unconvincing, because the premise upon which 
it is based is not plausible. One cannot generally attribute a 
property to a set because every member of the set has the property. 
Suppose we have a set, each member of which is a man; does this set 
therefore have the property of being a man? The argument Barwise and 
Perry give shows rather the absurdity of this premise than the 
absurdity of identifying a partial function with the set of all 
extensions of it. 
The second argument concerns what happens to this 
identification when the domain is enlarged from Q to R, the set of 
reals, which has the result that each f e SR has now itself become a 
partial function. 
Are we going to identify f with the set of all its 
extensions and then good old -j with this set of sets of 
functions on R? And how can we do this so that ^/2 comes 
out to be what it ought? Problems like this have 
convinced mathematicians that partial functions are a way 
of life, not to be identified with sets of total 
functions. (Barwise and Perry, 1980, p. 54) 
The problem highlighted here involves the basis upon which functions 
are defined: if we believe that total functions are prior to partial 
functions, then the definition of partial functions in terms of sets 
of total functions becomes problematic when there is a shift in the 
domain -- the total functions are no longer total, and themselves 
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need founding. If they are construed as sets of yet other functions, 
then the original partial function is a set of sets of total 
functions -- until the domain shifts again. 
This problem appears in possible world semantics as the problem 
of fixing at the outset which primitives there are -- which are all 
the possible worlds and which are all the possible individuals. 
Reluctance to accept such an a priori and deterministic view are 
laudable; Barwise and Perry are right when they say 'partial 
functions are a way of life'. This argument convinces us that we 
ought not to banish partiality from mathematics, but it does not bear 
upon the separate argument of whether partiality in situation 
semantics adds something new to semantics -- that question will be 
decided by the use to which the mathematical tools (whether partial 
or not) are put. 
One difference that strikes one between Hintikka's and van 
Fraassen's representation of partiality on the one hand, and Barwise 
and Perry's on the other is that the latter build partiality into the 
entities used in the semantics without reference at this stage to 
language, whereas for Hintikka and van Fraassen, the partiality 
cannot be exhibited unless the object language is taken into 
consideration -- indeed, we can see very little of the semantics at 
all without making reference to the language. This difference is the 
result of Barwise and Perry's strategy of pursuing semantics 
independently of language and locating meaning in the world, bound up 
with an ecological conception of information, to which issues we turn 
below (section 1.2.3). However, I should like to examine Hintikka's 
and van Fraassen's semantics here, under the rubric of partiality, 
and in section 1.3 to raise the issue of whether Barwise and Perry's 
semantics in fact satisfies the claims made for it. 
Hintikka (1962) takes a very different approach to logic from 
most theorists. He takes as his basic notion the consistency of a 
set of sentences of the language, not the truth of a sentence. A set 
of sentences Q is consistent just in case there is a state of 
affairs that would make each sentence in true under a suitable 
interpretation. A model set, the key concept in Hintikka's approach, 
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is a consistent set 4, but not every consistent set of sentences L 
is a model set. The concept of a model set represents a further 
tightening up of the notion of a consistent set of sentences. 
Hintikka's model set is a consistent set of sentences P that 
satisfies certain conditions, specifying which sentences Ci must 
contain on the basis of which sentences are already in fi. For 
example, if a sentence A & B is in tr, then A must be in Ì' and B 
must be in '', and if A v B is in Ì,, then either A is in fl or B is 
in r'. Smullyan calls these downward saturated sets and proves that 
such sets are satisfiable (Smullyan, 1968, pp. 27,28). 
Use of the language is therefore crucial to the embedding of 
partiality in Hintikka's semantics: there are no situations (partial 
worlds) in the theory, only partial descriptions of a possible state 
of the world in terms of the object language, for model sets are sets 
of sentences. 
For van Fraassen, a formal language L consists of a syntactic 
component, which generates the set of sentences of the language, and 
a semantic component, a set VL of admissible valuations, each of 
which assigns a truth value to some, but not necessarily all, 
sentences of the language.4 A supervaluation is defined as follows: 
Definition. A valuation s is a supervaluation for L iff 
there is a nonempty set K of admissible valuations for L 
such that, for all sentences A of L, 
s(A) = T < => v(A) = T for all v e K; 
s(A) = F < => v(A) = F for all v E K; 
s(A) is not defined otherwise.5 
The state of the world, and, as inspection of this definition of 
supervaluation shows, parts of the world too, are not defined 
independently of language. The way the world is, is fixed only by 
fixing which sentences about it are true, and which are false. 
This definition of a supervaluation is given in van Fraassen 
(1971) before the author has provided a semantics for 
quantificational languages. When he does provide such a semantics, 
it is in terms of the usual model theory, with a domain D and an 
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interpretation function f, and an assignment function d from 
variables to elements of D. The relation of satisfaction I= is 
defined as usual, the only interesting clause for our purpose being 
M f=- (Pnx1...x1,1)[d] iff <d(x1), ..., d(xn)> e f(Pn). 
Van Fraassen then goes on to define valuations in terms of model 
satisfaction: 
If M is a model for a QCS [quantificational syntax] and d 
an assignment function for M, then a valuation of that 
QCS induced by M and d is a valuation v of that QCS such 
that 
v(A) e { T, F ) 
v(A) = T iff M A[d] 
for all sentences A of that QCS (see p. 109). The admissible 
valuations of a language L are those induced by the models and 
assignments for the QCS of L. 
There is now a domain of individuals underwriting the truth 
value that the admissible valuations assign to sentences; yet at the 
level of the valuations themselves, reference to individuals is 
hidden. Because the model theory is standard, it shares with the 
standard theory that theory's language- dependent definition of the 
semantic concepts of reference, truth and logical consequence. Once 
he has defined the valuations induced by a model and an assignment, 
van Fraassen takes his leave of the world: the semantics revolves 
around the language, and the property of being true, which sentences 
may or may not possess. Since there is no pressure to interpret 
truth as correspondence with the world, there is no essential 
reference to the world in van Fraassen's semantics. 
In contrast, Barwise and Perry clearly want to do realist 
semantics and to bring the world into their theory. The question is 
whether they actually succeed, whether this is what they have 
actually done with situation semantics. But we are trespassing on 
issue (iii). 
I shall interpose one brief comment about the underlying logic 
of situation semantics. An interesting comparison can be made of the 
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role of partiality in Hintikka's and van Fraassen's systems with its 
role in situation semantics. For Hintikka, model sets are useful, 
because they have a certain structure and can be more easily handled 
than complete models. If the analogy be allowed, they are like nth 
partial sums of a series. Van Fraassen employs supervaluations to 
preserve classical logic in dealing with languages which fail to be 
bivalent (van Fraassen, 1971, pp. 163 -172). Thus partiality for both 
these writers is a methodological partiality. Barwise and Perry on 
the contrary make more radical claims about the role and importance 
of partiality for language and information. Yet it is not clear that 
the model theory they actually provide reflects these claims. 
Questions arise as to whether their logic is classical or weaker, 
perhaps a relevance logic, but cannot be dealt with here. 
1.2.2 Information 
The second group of issues I am concerned with centres on the 
conception of information: is there a semantic role for information, 
and what place does the notion have in situation semantics? The 
concept of information that Barwise and Perry employ is substantially 
derived from the work of J. J. Gibson and Fred Dretske, but has also 
been developed by Barwise and Perry themselves. Since the concept is 
non - standard and, indeed, somewhat controversial, something needs to 
be said about it in this introduction. 
What is the province of semantics and how should semantics be 
located within the more general theory of language and language use? 
More precisely, what is the relation of semantics to pragmatics in 
situation semantics? One issue to be discussed under the present 
rubric is the location of the boundary between "semantics" and 
"pragmatics "; the other issue is the meaning of semantic innocence 
within the emerging structure of the theory. 
Gibson has proposed a theory of information that differs 
radically from the standard notion; it is the concept of information 
he needed as a psychologist to elaborate and defend his basic 
position. His approach to cognition has flourished and has come to 
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be known as the ecological approach. While claiming that situation 
semantics is an attempt to develop a theory of language and meaning 
within the school of ecological realism, 
6 
Barwise and Perry also 
derive inspiration from Dretske's work and his attempt to develop a 
qualitative account of information. 
Strictly speaking, ecological realism does not locate meaning 
in the world alone, but rather information arises out of the 
interaction between living things and their environment. On the 
ecological approach, information is objectively there in the 
environment for organisms to detect, and therefore exists separate 
from the animal. The approach is ecological realism, not ecological 
idealism. However, information is not altogether independent of the 
animal. The ecological psychologists express this by saying that 
information, and indeed all the phenomena of psychology, "reside" at 
the level of the ecosystem, and can only be properly understood at 
the ecological grain of analysis, when both the animal and its 
environment are taken into consideration. The important point is 
that the sense in which information is dependent, or better, relative 
to the animal is not the sense in which for the idealist aspects of 
the world are dependent on the perceiver. In ecological psychology 
the perceiver does not confer existence upon certain qualities or 
aspects of the world; instead the idea is that the animal's being 
present in the overall picture is conceptually necessary for a 
coherent and accurate notion of information. 
Gibson's position is based on the claim that there is objective 
information in the world. This is part of his answer to the 
question, What exists? The ecological approach is not reductionist, 
seeing reality ultimately as a "dance of quarks ", or even for 
practical purposes (since subatomic physics may continue 
indefinitely) thinking of atoms as the building blocks of all that 
there is. The ecological approach accepts that there are different 
grains of analysis, and espouses two principles, which help to govern 
what is to be regarded as real: 
(i) The phenomenon at issue must exist within the grain of 
analysis investigated by the science. 
(ii) The reality to be described must reside wholly within 
the system over which the description is to be 
written. 
(Michaels and Carello, 1981, p. 98) Atoms and molecules do not have 
a privileged ontological status for theorists in the ecological 
school; all things that there are, at whatever grain of analysis, are 
ontologically equal. 
Dretske's work represents an attempt to go beyond the 
mathematical theory of information of Shannon and Weaver (1949), 
which is a theory of amounts of information, and to reach a 
qualitative account of the notion of information, which will 
hopefully be able to specify the informational content of messages in 
some way. The way Dretske proposes to do this is by setting out 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a signal to carry the 
information that a source s is F. Clearly, this is not the place to 
go into Dretske's theory in much detail. I shall therefore simply 
state and explain the condition he finally arrives at and then go on 
to remark on the influence his work has had on Barwise and Perry. 
Informational content: A signal r carries the information 
that s if F = The conditional probability of s's being F, 
given r (and k), is 1 (but given k alone, less than 1). 
(Dretske, 1981, p. 65) The occurrence of k here is intended to 
relativise the definition to what the receiver already knows about 
the source. 
This is a de re account of the informational content of a 
signal; the information transmitted is about the source s, to the 
effect that it is F, as Dretske emphasises.7 In situation semantics, 
similarly, a situation represents an individual's being thus and so 
(at a location). For example, 
In e: at 1: barking, Jackie; yes 
involves Jackie herself. Since individuals are themselves 
constituents of situations,8 Barwise and Perry have given us a de re 
specification of situations. 
Some remarks are necessary on the two issues surrounding 
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information that I want to concentrate on; I shall deal first with 
the meaning of semantic innocence. Much was made, especially when 
the theory was first being publicised, of the fact that situation 
semantics represented a return to innocent semantics. Fregean 
dominance was being challenged, and all of semantics, it was claimed, 
would be done within the innocent framework. Even before the book 
Situations and Attitudes was published, it was becoming clear that 
working out the semantics of the attitudes was presenting some quite 
difficult and resistant problems for innocent semantics. Barwise and 
Perry seem to have gone through some rather acrobatic manoeuvres and 
contortions in trying to solve, or failing that, to bypass these 
problems. The reader who examines Situations and Attitudes from an 
archaeological perspective will find numerous fossils pointing to 
this meandering history of situation semantics. 
The doctrine of semantic innocence is that expressions have the 
same kinds of reference when they occur in intensional contexts 
(specifically, we are interested in propositional attitude contexts) 
as when they occur in extensional contexts. This is what Donald 
Davidson meant when he used the expression 'innocence': 
If we could but recover our pre -Fregean semantic 
innocence, I think it would seem to us plainly incredible 
that the words 'The earth moves', uttered after the words 
'Galileo said that', mean anything different, or refer to 
anything else, than is their wont when they come in other 
environments. (Davidson, 1968, p. 144) 
Barwise and Perry mean the same thing when they use the term. They 
place the following three conditions on an innocent semantics: 
(i) Embedded sentences in attitude reports are syntactic 
units, parts of the embedding report, and expressions 
in them work just as they do elsewhere. 
(ii) Names, pronouns, and referential and (outer) 
attributive uses of definite descriptions have 
individuals, not senses or meanings or functions, as 
their semantics values. 
(iii) The principle of substitution of logical equivalents 
fails. 
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(Barwise and Perry, 1983, p. 176)9 
An innocent semantics cannot long avoid confronting the basic 
problem that motivated Frege to abandon innocence: how can the 
semantics handle cases, which can easily arise (as Barwise and Perry 
would agree), where there is a single object in the world that agents 
have met on two or more occasions, and of which we suppose they have 
two different ideas or concepts? The agent would be disposed in such 
cases to make different judgements on the truth or falsity of 
sentences which differ only in that they contain distinct 
coreferential expressions designating the object, but which express 
different concepts. Consider the following example: 
(1) The ancient Egyptians believed that the Morning Star was 
visible in the morning. 
(2) The ancient Egyptians believed that the Evening Star was 
visible in the morning. 
Since the ancient Egyptians did not realise that 'the Morning Star' 
and 'the Evening Star' designate the same object,10 we want to say 
that (1) is true, but (2) false. An innocent semantics, committed to 
the view that 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star' always have 
the same reference (interpretation) cannot explain this change in 
judgement of truth value. There is a direct conflict between the 
formal semantics and our intuitive judgement, which has to be 
explained, if not resolved. 
Barwise and Perry's response to this problematic state of 
affairs is not to abandon innocence, but to restructure their overall 
theory, altering the role of the interpretation, and, apparently -- 
though we shall have to clarify this, -- shifting the boundary 
between semantics and pragmatics in the sense that pragmatics takes 
on some of the tasks that were formerly regarded as within the 
province of semantics. The concept of information plays a prominent 
part in this upheaval. When Barwise and Perry introduce the concept 
into their theory (see the first chapter of Barwise and Perry, 1983), 
they ensure that at least some information involved in an utterance 
is separated from the semantic value or interpretation of expressions 
by their explicit rejection of what they call the fallacy of 
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misplaced information: 
The Fallacy of Misplaced Information: the idea that all 
the information in an utterance must come from its 
interpretation. 
One wants to know just what the role being given to (inverse) 
information is, and in particular, whether it might be said that 
(inverse) information has a semantic role in situation semantics. 
Barwise and Perry are, I think, confused about this point, and the 
fallacy of misplaced information is one manifestation of their 
confusion. 
If information does have a place in the theory, and some of 
this information is inverse information, ie. it is separate from the 
interpretation of an expression, then we must ask what the 
consequences of this are for our understanding of the concept of 
semantic innocence. If the role of the interpretation is not the 
usual role of the semantic value, because information has entered the 
picture, is situation semantics then an innocent theory in the sense 
defined above? 
This brings us to the first aspect of this second constellation 
of issues, the putative semantics /pragmatics boundary shift and the 
accompanying upheaval in the structure of the theory. We shall be 
concerned to find out just what has happened in situation semantics; 
for at times it seems that little has changed, that the relation 
between semantics and pragmatics is as it is ordinarily conceived to 
be, that, for example, truth conditions are still determined in the 
semantics and all the additions to the standard theory that have been 
introduced in situation semantics have simply to do with how the 
theory fits into the wider context of a theory of language use, or 
perhaps a theory of human psychology. On this view the changes are 
concerned with factors which had previously been mostly ignored, but 
are now treated by the pragmatic part of the theory. At other times, 
certain remarks suggest that a more radical restructuring of the 
standard kind of semantic theory has taken place, with many semantic 
factors, as they would be regarded traditionally, now being 
influenced, if not determined, by traditionally pragmatic features. 
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The confusion surrounding this point is extremely unsatisfactory and 
some clarification is necessary.11 
1.2.3 Meaning in the world 
The third constellation of issues concerns our understanding of 
meaning -- what kind of a thing is meaning? Barwise and Perry 
declare their affiliation to the ecological realism of J. J. Gibson 
and those psychologists who have followed him in locating meaning and 
information firmly in the world. (This accords nicely with the 
doctrine of semantic innocence.) In the last section I explained 
briefly what was involved in Gibson's and Dretske's notions of 
information. From that it will be clear that Barwise and Perry, 
following these writers, want to characterise a notion of meaning and 
information that is objective, in the world. Under the present 
rubric our concern is to evaluate their work with respect to this 
goal. 
Let us for a moment consider a related issue, discussed by 
Leonard Linsky in the introduction to his (1971). The question of 
whether necessary or contingent properties belong to objects 
absolutely or according to how the object is specified. The view 
that such properties are possessed absolutely by objects Linsky calls 
'Aristotelian essentialism'; this view is counter to our 
understanding of language. Given the premise that there are nine 
planets, existential generalisation leads from 
to 
(3) Nine is necessarily greater than seven. 
(4) (]x)(x is necessarily greater than seven) 
Yet, if we specify this number (or a particular one of them) by 'the 
number of planets', the sentence 
(5) The number of planets is necessarily greater than seven. 
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is regarded as false. It appears that certain kinds of properties 
are not possessed by objects simpliciter, ie. independently of 
language. Or at least so one could argue. 
The problem is more prevalent than the discussion of necessary 
and contingent properties perhaps suggests. consider and example 
discussed by Quine (1953). Tegucigalpa is the capital of Honduras, 
but from 
(6) Philip believes that Tegucigalpa is in Nicaragua. 
we may not conclude that 
(7) Philip believes that the capital of Honduras is in 
Nicaragua. 
Does the city have or not have the property of being believed by 
Philip to be in Nicaragua? 
We need to distinguish carefully in situation semantics between 
meaning and interpretation, and between meaning and information. The 
meaning of a sentence is a relation between discourse situations and 
what the sentence says in those discourse situations -- its 
interpretation with respect to each discourse situation. The 
interpretation of an utterance is a part of the information conveyed 
by the utterance. Following Gibson, Barwise and Perry claim that 
meaning and information are in the world; Dretske agrees that 
information exists objectively in the world, but believes meaning 
does not. We must examine more carefully what the concept of 
information amounts to in situation semantics. 
We have referred to Gibson's and Dretske's ideas about 
information, and focused on one aspect of their conceptions -- the 
objectivity of information. This is basically how Barwise and Perry 
think of information in the early chapters of Situations and 
Attitudes; and is how they want us to think of information throughout 
the book. But this is to extend that conception of information to 
cover additionally information as it is normally thought of -- that 
is, information in a 'linguistic' or propositional sense, information 
as specified by means of language. I wish to make a distinction here 
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between what I shall call ecological information (information as 
conceived by Gibson) and linguistic information (information as we 
normally think of it, information that can easily be expressed 
linguistically).12 
Barwise and Perry justify this extension of their view from 
ecological to linguistic information on the grounds, explicitly 
stated, that they want to assimilate linguistic meaning to meaning 
more generally (ecological meaning), and thereby assimilate 
linguistic information to ecological information. Essentially they 
want to reconceptualise linguistic information as the conventional 
parallel to information in Gibson's sense. The linguistic meaning of 
an expression, we are told, is a relation between situations in which 
the expression is uttered and described situations (or parts thereof, 
if the expression is not a sentence13). This relation is out there 
in the world, just as Gibson wanted to see his notion of information. 
On the other hand, Barwise and Perry also want to retain the 
ordinary, propositional sense of information. Linguistic information 
is still to be understood in the usual way, for unlike Gibson they 
are not defining a new notion. All this has the result of creating a 
tension in the way the term is used in situation semantics.14 
Many theorists have sought to preserve at least some kind of 
parallelism, if not an isomorphism, between syntax and semantics, so 
that when two or more syntactic units are composed into one compound 
piece of syntax, on the semantic level the semantic values of these 
syntactic units are composed into the semantic value of the compound 
expression. (Montague, 1973, is a prime example.) The principle of 
compositionality holds that if each atomic expression is assigned a 
semantic value by the interpretation function, then the semantic 
value of compound or molecular expressions is determined by the 
semantic values of their constituents. However, it is generally 
recognised that we need to allow the syntactic rules to influence 
what kind of structure the corresponding semantic rules build. 
Barbara Partee, in a recent paper on compositionality, formulates the 
general principle as follows: 
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The meaning of an expression is a function of the 
meanings of its parts and of the way they are 
syntactically combined. (Partee, 1983, p. 1) 
We are willing to tolerate semantics appealing to syntax: I shall 
call this 'weak compositionality'. 
One claim of situation semantics is that expressions of natural 
language refer to things in the world -- situations, individuals, 
properties, and spatio- temporal locations. This claim that the 
interpretations of expressions are things in the world independent of 
language means that the operation of semantic composition must 
operate over parts of the real world, and this situation has 
implications for the precise statement of compositionality as it 
applies to situation semantics. Should the construction of semantic 
structure in situation semantics take place autonomously, without 
reference to the syntax for guidance in building the semantic value 
of the compound expression being composed? Barwise and Perry's claim 
that meaning is in the world entails that situation semantics should 
satisfy what I shall call 'strong compositionality': 
The meaning (interpretation) of an expression is a 
function of the meanings (interpretations) of its parts. 
What would be the consequences of some kind of access to syntax for 
semantics, if this were necessary in situation semantics, for the 
claimed language- independent status of the semantic entities? 
If the answer to this question of whether the entities on 
Barwise and Perry's semantic stage have not acquired a quasi - 
linguistic status from the way they are actually used in the 
semantics turns out to be affirmative, then the original claim that 
situation semantics treats meaning as existing in the world 
independently of language will be invalidated. 
I hope to show that Barwise and Perry cannot do all of 
semantics without allowing a kind of access to the syntactic level 
that confers a quasi- linguistic status upon some of the semantic 
entities in situation semantics. So the question then arises as to 
what this means for the semantic entities and for the semantics as a 
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whole; what is the significance of this quasi- linguistic status? If 
the interpretations of some kinds of expressions are not parts of the 
world, what are they? They are not pieces of (natural) language 
either, of course. Even an approach sympathetic to semantic 
innocence, it seems, one that sees language as talking about the 
world and communicating information about states of the world, must 
recognise that semantics cannot dispense entirely with some kind of 
intermediate level, a level of representation between language and 
the world. 
These, then, are the three constellations of issues that we 
shall principally be concerned with in this thesis. The heart of the 
matter is Barwise and Perry's conviction that meaning is located in 
the world. The other issues are interconnected with the way in which 
their work develops from this basic presupposition. Attempting to 
locating meaning in the world requires structured interpretations for 
utterances of indicative sentences, whence the partiality; makes 
semantic innocence attractive; and necessitates a restructuring of 
the place of semantics within a total theory of language. 
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Chapter Two: Semantics and Pragmatics 
2.0 Introduction 
The relationship between semantics and pragmatics has been and 
remains the subject of considerable debate. In situation semantics 
it is not easy to separate the two disciplines and to see what 
belongs to which, for Barwise and Perry do not always clearly 
distinguish them, and much of what would traditionally be regarded as 
pragmatics seems to be incorporated into "semantics" in their theory. 
Thus primarily semantic problems (as they have been regarded) are 
solved, or perhaps dissolved, pragmatically -- particularly the 
propositional attitude puzzles. 
There is a strong conviction that semantics deals with the 
truth conditional part of meaning. When natural and other efficient 
languages are examined, this guiding principle fails to delimit the 
province of semantics, for it is possible to regard semantics as 
having either a restricted or extensive subject matter. The 
distinction Barwise and Perry draw between meaning and interpretation 
is important for this issue, particularly as interpretations are more 
structured in situation semantics. The role given to information in 
situation semantics helps to obscure the semantics /pragmatics 
boundary, for information is traditionally held not to be a semantic 
concept (although Barwise would like to change this), yet is 
interwoven with the meaning of expressions. 
After considering these points, I shall pursue in detail the 
question of exactly where in the theory truth conditions of 
utterances are determined. It is hoped by this method to reveal the 
relation between semantics and pragmatics in Barwise and Perry's 
theory. 
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2.1 Defining the relation between semantics and pragmatics 
Our first task is to attempt a characterisation of semantics 
and pragmatics which will delimit the concerns of these branches of 
the study of language. The problem of just where to place the 
boundary between semantics and pragmatics is a difficult one, and a 
substantial body of thought has been given to the issue, sadly 
without resolving it. In his excellent book Pragmatics, Stephen 
Levinson devotes a considerable amount of space to discussion of this 
question. He adopts the division of a theory of language and 
language use into the three areas of syntax, semantics and 
pragmatics, after Charles Morris. Carnap used the term pragmatics to 
refer to any study of language which required explicit reference to 
be made to the language users. Since this reference is necessary in 
the case of natural language (and indeed Barwise and Perry talk of 
speakers and hearers more than most other theorists who would 
describe themselves as doing formal semantics), the Carnapian 
conception of pragmatics means that natural languages have only a 
syntax and a pragmatics -- but no semantics. If Morris' trichotomy 
is to be of value, we need an alternative definition of pragmatics; 
in particular, we need to free ourselves from being excessively 
influenced (as the Carnapian conception is) by the origins of model 
theoretic semantics and the general shape or form of the semantics of 
formal languages, where speakers, and language users more generally, 
hardly enter the picture. This is part of what Barwise and Perry 
have attempted to do in situation semantics. 
Geoffrey Leech characterises two kinds of meaning, exemplified 
as follows: 
(1) Donkey means 'ass'. 
(2) When Miss Trotwood said Janet! Donkeys! she meant by 
this remark that Janet was to drive the donkeys off 
the lawn. 
(Leech, 1974, p. 320) The sentence (1) involves "semantic meaning ", 
while (2) involves "pragmatic meaning ". Leech then depicts three 
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possible views of the relation between semantics and pragmatics: 
(i) Semantics subsumes pragmatics. 
(ii) Pragmatics subsumes semantics. 
(iii) Semantics and pragmatics are complementary. 
The programme of generative semantics was an instance of (i), the 
work of Austin (1961, 1962), Grice (1957, 1975) and Searle (1969) 
comes under (ii),1 but most work in formal semantics adopts the third 
approach. 
One feature of natural languages that is crucial to the issue 
of where the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is located is 
indexicality. The occurrence of expressions like 'I', 'you' and 
'this' (or their equivalents) in natural languages requires the 
theory to make explicit reference to speakers, hearers, and the 
context of utterance more generally. This means that to do 
semantics, which concerns the relation of language to the world, we 
need more material to work with than simply the sentences of the 
language on their own. Natural language sentences only make contact 
with the world when they are used; consequently our unit of analysis 
is not the sentence, but the utterance, usually represented by the 
ordered pair of sentence and context in which the sentence is 
considered to be spoken. 
2.1.1 Two views of the province of semantics 
There are two views to be taken of the province of semantics: 
firstly, we can see semantics as concerned exclusively with what is 
said when a sentence is uttered on an occasion; that is, semantics is 
about what is called the proposition expressed, some kind of 
theoretical entity that is the product of eliminating all connections 
with and dependence upon the context of utterance. Thus, whereas the 
word 'I' occurs in the sentence uttered and refers to the speaker, at 
the semantic level only that individual himself will be the 
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corresponding constituent of the proposition; the "bare" individual, 
not the individual qua speaker, is the constituent. In this way we 
obtain propositions, which are tenseless, self- contained entities, 
having no connection either to the particular context in which 
sentences can be uttered to express that proposition, or to the 
sentences themselves. This view of semantics, which I shall call 
'narrow semantics', is concerned only with propositions -- their 
relations to the world and to one another, -- and emphatically not 
with how propositions get expressed -- the relation between sentences 
used to express propositions in contexts and the propositions thus 
expressed. The second and alternative view, which regards this other 
domain of relations as an integral part of semantics, I shall call 
'wide semantics'. 
To illustrate the difference with a specific example, consider 
an arbitrary singular term t in some language. With good reason we 
expect t to refer to an individual (modulo an occasion of use) and 
that individual to be its semantic value or reference. The semantics 
of the term t on the narrow view concerns only the fact that the 
designation of t, on that occasion, is the individual in question. 
Any other questions, such as how it designates the individual, or 
which individual it might designate on another occasion -- in 
general, how an utterance of t on an arbitrary occasion determines 
which individual it designates on that occasion -- are pragmatic 
questions, and as such are not part of semantics. Narrow semantics 
thus emphasises the notion of the reference of an expression. A 
clear exposition of this view is to be found in Richards (1974, 
1976), where something is part of semantics only if it has 
consequences at the level of logical form.2 Consider also the 
passage: 
The pragmatic features of a sentence are those whose 
semantic import is determined only relative to an 
utterance or context of use. Indexicals, such as that 
and here, are among the familiar examples. Unless 
relativized to an utterance, a sentence containing an 
indexical is neither true nor false, for the indexical by 
itself has no definite referent and thus the sentence 
expresses no determinate proposition. (Richards, 1976, p. 
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355) 
In contrast Barwise and Perry emphasise, not the 
interpretation, but the linguistic meaning of an expression in their 
theory. Linguistic meaning, broadly construed, relates the utterance 
situation and the described situation. In a particular instance, the 
meaning of a sentence is a relation between the discourse situation d 
and speaker connections ç, both of which are used to represent the 
utterance situation, and the interpretation of the sentence with 
respect to that d and c, the described situation. 
Before we become too deeply absorbed in this issue of narrow 
versus wide semantics, I want to consider other aspects of the 
problem of separating semantics and pragmatics, to put the issue into 
perspective and to provide evidence on which to decide the correct 
view. 
One way to attempt to tease apart semantics and pragmatics is 
to regard semantics as concerned with the truth conditional component 
of meaning, and all else as belonging in pragmatics. This is a very 
powerful criterion for drawing the boundary between semantics and 
pragmatics at a convenient and useful place. It cuts across the 
deictic /non -deictic boundary, which is just what we want. Some 
aspects of deixis are clearly desirable elements of semantics: the 
examples of indexicality mentioned briefly above (personal pronouns 
and demonstratives) are in this category. It is worth citing 
Levinson at length. 
The many facets of deixis are so pervasive in natural 
languages, and so deeply grammaticalized, that it is hard 
to think of them as anything other than an essential part 
of semantics. If semantics is taken to include all 
conventional aspects of meaning, then perhaps most 
deictic phenomena are properly considered semantic. 
However, by at least some ... views ... deixis belongs 
within the domain of pragmatics, because it directly 
concerns the relationship between the structure of 
languages and the contexts in which they are used. But 
all such categorizations are theory- dependent, and on the 
view that we have adopted for convenience, namely that 
pragmatics concerns those aspects of meaning and 
language- structure that cannot be captured in a truth - 
conditional semantics, the grammatical category of deixis 
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will probably be found to straddle the 
semantics /pragmatics border. (Levinson, 1983, p. 55) 
Other aspects of deixis are clearly not the sorts of things we 
want to have to deal with in semantics: I have in mind here such 
things as gestures, social and discourse deixis, and examples such as 
(3) Odysseus shouted this loud at Polyphemus as he sailed 
away. 
where the italicised expression is itself spoken loudly to indicate 
how loudly Odysseus is asserted to have shouted. (See Levinson, 
1983, p. 95) Citing Fillmore (1975), Levinson says that social 
deixis concerns 'that aspect of sentences which reflect or establish 
or are determined by certain realities of the social situation in 
which the speech act occurs' (p. 89), but decides to consider only 
'those aspects of language structure that encode the social 
identities of participants (properly, incumbents of participant - 
roles), or the social relationship between them, or between one of 
them and persons and entities referred to.' (p. 89) Discourse 
deixis, to be distinguished from anaphoric reference, is reference to 
a linguistic expression or a text of discourse itself, by means of 
'but', 'however', 'besides', 'to the contrary', and other 
expressions. 
The value of Morris' trichotomy lies in preventing us from 
compelling all the phenomena having to do with meaning into a single 
level of our theory, and instead allowing their division between 
semantics and pragmatics, in effect distinguishing "semantic meaning" 
from "pragmatic meaning ". This is a point that Levinson makes 
particularly well in relation to the notion and theory of 
implicature: the separation contemplated allows us to unload into 
pragmatics numerous phenomena and shades of meaning that would 
otherwise only complicate the semantics to the point of making it 
obscure and useless. By locating treatment of these phenomena in 
pragmatics we are left with the core meaning of expressions in 
semantics, thus having the opportunity to construct a framework for 
this core or skeletal meaning, upon which to hang the more flexible 
pragmatic meanings expressions can have on occasions. 
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Now from this set of dilemmas [the multiplicity of 
pragmatic meanings] the notion of implicature offers a 
way out, for it allows one to claim that natural language 
expressions do tend to have simple, stable and unitary 
senses (in many cases anyway), but that this stable 
semantics core often has an unstable, context -specific 
pragmatic overlay -- namely a set of implicatures. 
(Levinson, 1983, p. 99) 
Of relevance to this issue of narrow or wide semantics is the 
interesting debate between Hartry Field (1972) and John McDowell 
(1978) on the status of Tarskian truth theories. Field argues that 
Tarski did not reduce the notion of truth to physicalistically 
acceptable concepts; rather, he reduced the notion to that of 
primitive denotation, or primitive reference -- terms Field uses to 
cover the three notions of what it is for a term to designate an 
object, a predicate to be satisfied by, or apply to objects, and a 
function symbol to be fulfilled by a pair of objects. For Field, 
there remains a certain kind of work to be done to make truth 
physicalistically acceptable -- work towards which he sees Kripke's 
efforts on a causal theory of names as contributing. (Notably, 
Kripke's work is about how a name designates its referent.) 
Field draws an interesting parallel with the concept of valence 
in chemistry, and its reduction to physical concepts. The point is 
that if this reduction were achieved only in the manner of (3), it 
would not be a real reduction at all. 
(4) (VE)(V n)(E has valence n = E is potassium and n is +1, 
or ... or E is sulphur and n is -2) 
The corresponding "reduction" for primative denotation would take the 
form: 
(5) (Ve)(Vá)(e is a name that designates á = (e is 'ç1' and 
a is ç1) or (e is 'ç2' and á is ) or ...) 
(Here çj is the translation of the name 'ç j' in the object language 
into the metalanguage (English). There are similar formulae for 
predicate and function symbols.) Mere extensional equivalence of the 
left hand side with the right hand side is not sufficient for real 
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reduction; we require a theory that not only relates e and á, but 
that has some explanatory value with respect to that relation. 
Tarski's definition leaves this relationship as mysterious as ever, 
because, like narrow semantics, it simply states the bare fact that 
the designation of e is á, or more precisely, that the pair <e,á> 
satisfies the designation relation. 
Narrow semantics has the form (S): it merely states, for 
example, that a term t designates (on the occasion in question) an 
individual a, and regards semantics as not involved with questions 
such as how it is that t designates a, or what t might designate on 
another occasion. However, to be content with a narrow theory is to 
have low standards for semantics, as Putnam summarises Field's 
argument (Putnam, 1976, p. 15). (3) is not a satisfying explanation 
of the concept of valence in physical terms -- we have some sense of 
an explanatory reduction that goes beyond extensional equivalence, 
and we are not satisfied by a theory which does not provide such an 
explanation. The same requirement applies, or should apply, Field 
argues, to semantics. Either a semantic theory must explain 
primitive reference, or it must have a good reason why it does not. 
Michael Devitt holds a similar view (Devitt, 1974, 1981); 
indeed, Devitt acknowledges the influence of Field's article on his 
own thinking). For Devitt, the main problem in semantics is to 
explain the semantic notions that occur in a semantic theory: truth 
and reference (meaning can be explained in terms of these two, Devitt 
says). A theory would have three parts: (i) a generative grammar to 
relate indicative sentences to base sentences; (ii) a Tarski -Field 
truth theory to deliver the truth conditions of the base sentences; 
(iii) an explanatory theory of primitive reference. Devitt regards 
his own work on designation as part of (iii). 
McDowell disagrees with Field as to how semantics and physics 
are related: Field thinks that semantics and physics are related at 
the level of primitive reference, that is, at the level of the axioms 
of the truth characterisation. McDowell teases apart the level at 
which language is related to the world within the semantic theory 
(namely, at the level of the axioms or of primitive reference) and 
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the level at which the semantic theory itself is primarily connected 
to the physical facts upon which its acceptably depends (namely, at 
the level of the theorems, the level at which the truth theory is 
holistically compared with the physical facts). The physical facts, 
for McDowell, are: (a) the structural properties of physical 
utterance - events which permit the language to be given a syntactic 
description; and (b) the complex relations between behaviour and 
environment which permit (some of) the behaviour to be described and 
understood in intentional terms. 
McDowell points out that the acceptability of a proposed truth 
characterisation depends on its meshing suitably with the hard 
physical facts. This mesh must be achieved while at the same time 
satisfying two requirements: (i) parts of utterances must contribute 
systematically to the content of the whole; and (ii) the truth 
characterisation should be psychologically adequate, that is, it 
should make behaviour intelligible. 
A proposed truth theory for the language should recursively 
characterise as true all true sentences in the language through 
entailing suitable theorems. The acceptability of a theory is 
judged, holistically, on how well all of its theorems mesh with the 
physical facts that it has to explain and account for. Field 
believes we can question the underpinings of the mesh; McDowell takes 
the view that there need be no underpining to the mesh: if the theory 
were such that it did not fit with the physical facts, we would 
simply reject the theory. 
The views of Field and McDowell are concerned with the status 
of primitive denotation: are there real relations of this kind there 
in the world, or not? If Field is right, and we develop a theory of 
primitive denotation, then wide semantics would dominate the field; 
if McDowell is right, narrow semantics will probably predominate. 
2.1.2 Stalnaker's scheme 
Stalnaker (1972) tackles this problem of dividing semantics 
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from pragmatics. On the one hand, Stalnaker attempts to make a clear 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics: at the abstract level 
there is a definition of each: 'Semantics studies propositions. 
Pragmatics is the study of linguistic acts and the contexts in which 
they are performed.' (Stalnaker, 1972, p. 383) Yet in practice it is 
not always easy to separate them out. Propositions, which Stalnaker 
regards as the subject matter of semantics, are entities independent 
of the language(s) whose sentences can be used to express them; as 
Stalnaker realises, semantics, on this narrow conception, 'has no 
essential connection with language at all, either natural or 
artificial.' (p. 382) Like Carnap's conception of the respective 
provinces of semantics and pragmatics, this is neither useful nor 
intuitively satisfactory; still, Stalnaker does say: 
Though one may study propositions apart from language, 
accounting for the relation between language and 
propositions still falls partly within the domain of 
semantics. One of the jobs of natural language is to 
express propositions, and it is a semantical problem to 
specify the rules for matching up sentences of a natural 
language with the propositions that they express. In 
most cases, however, the rules will not match sentences 
directly with propositions, but will match sentences with 
propositions relative to features of the context in which 
the sentence is used. These contextual features are a 
part of the subject matter of pragmatics ... (Stalnaker, 
1972, p. 383) 
This passage suggests that Stalnaker himself espouses a version of 
wide semantics, for he sees the specification of rules that match 
sentences of a language with propositions expressed as partly within 
semantics. 
A scheme similar to that Stalnaker envisages is formalised in 
Kaplan's (1979) Logic of Demonstratives. For Stalnaker, an 
interpreted sentence, the output of the syntax and semantics and the 
correlate of Kaplan's character, together with certain aspects of the 
context determines a proposition; in turn the proposition (Kaplan's 
content) together with a possible world determines a truth value. 
This scheme underlies Stalnaker's conception of the relation between 
language and the world: the problem of what is semantics and what 
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pragmatics, is not to draw a line somewhere such that semantics is 
what lies on one side of the line and pragmatics is what lies on the 
other side. For example, we might be tempted, especially given the 
history of the subject, to say that getting from contexts to 
propositions is part of pragmatics, but that getting from 
propositions to truth values is part of semantics. Rather, to 
understand the remarks Stalnaker has made, we must see this scheme as 
underlying the total theory, and semantics and pragmatics as 
approaching it asking different questions. 
Semantics is essentially truth conditional for Stalnaker, and 
hence semantics must make reference to contexts as well, for some 
aspects of the context can be determinants of truth value. In the 
past, too, theories in formal semantics have sometimes made reference 
to contextual facts or coordinates (Kamp, 1971, and most notably 
Kaplan, 1977, 1979). For Stalnaker, two questions are asked at the 
semantic level: (a) Which proposition was expressed? and (b) What is 
the world like? ie. is the proposition true? Both of the areas or 
tasks sketched in the previous paragraph are therefore in the domain 
of semantics. 
At the pragmatic level there are also two questions to be 
asked, according to Stalnaker's analysis: (a) What are the 
interesting types of speech acts and speech products? and (b) Which 
features of the speech context help determine which proposition is 
expressed when a given sentence is uttered? Whereas semantics is 
concerned with how the various parameters of the context may be 
determinants of truth conditions, pragmatics is concerned to 
explicate the relation of these parameters to each other and to 
identifiable features of linguistic contexts. Hence, although both 
semantics and pragmatics are dealing with the same subject matter to 
some extent, and both are operating within the same scheme or 
conception of how language functions, they are asking different 
questions about it. 
Much of Stalnaker's article is aimed at defending his basic 
conception of the relation of language to the world (the scheme 
sketched above) against a rival scheme which combines the two steps 
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into one. The two schemes may be set out diagrammatically: 
interpreted sentence 
(6) Ç propositions 
w trtQ, VaKk-e. 
(7) 
propositions 
C x W truth value 
In the diagrams Ç is the set of contexts and W the set of possible 
worlds. We shall not consider Stalnaker's arguments for (6); instead 
I want to point out that (6) seems to foster the growth of a narrow 
view of semantics more than (7). Although Stalnaker himself, who 
accepts (6), does not do this, it is easy to regard the first step in 
(6), from contexts to propositions, as part of pragmatics and only 
the second step as semantics. The scheme (7), though formally 
equivalent to (6) -- since (6) is a version of (`7) in which the 
function has been curried, -- does not lend itself so easily to that 
interpretation of the formal apparatus. 
In case the reader is worried that these points lack relevance 
to situation semantics as the discussion is couched in the possible 
worlds framework, he should recognise that the abstract points are 
relevant, notwithstanding the differences in the formal theories (and 
by considering partial possible worlds instead of total worlds, he 
can make the possible worlds formalism more like the situation 
semantics formalismi). The context c corresponds to the discourse 
situation and speaker connections; propositions correspond to the 
interpretations of sentences uttered at those situations; and the 
conception of the interpretation as a class of abstract situations is 
formally equivalent to the conception of it as a function from 
abstract situations to a truth value. Recast in situation semantics 
terminology, the discussion about where to place the boundary between 
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semantics and pragmatics is about whether semantics is concerned just 
with the interpretations of sentences and other expressions, and the 
things that we want to say about them -- whether what is said is 
true, and what follows from what is said; or whether semantics should 
be concerned additionally with how the meaning of an expression 
determines its interpretation on a given occasion. Thus, the debate 
recounted above raises questions clearly appropriate for situation 
semantics too. 
2.1.3 Barwise and Perry's view of semantics 
We may represent the two views of narrow and wide semantics, 
which deal with the question of where to draw the boundary between 
semantics and pragmatics, in the following manner. Semantics, it is 
agreed, is the study of the relation of language to the world. The 
narrow semantic view, rooted in the origins of model theoretic 
semantics where the object language is a formal language, crucially 
non -indexical and where speakers do not enter the picture, begins by 
seeing the domain, or province, of semantics as the mapping of 
expressions of a language to the world. Its concern is getting from 
a particular expression to its reference, which is something in the 
world. Thus the focus of the narrow view is, admirably, getting from 
the linguistic to the non -linguistic. However, the domain of this 
mapping can be the expressions of a language only when those 
expressions always determine the same semantic content, irrespective 
of when, how or by whom they are used, for it is always the level of 
semantic content that is actually related to the world in a theory. 
If the expressions are indexical in any way, then the domain of the 
mapping must be the semantic contents expressions have on particular 
occasions of use. With many of the simpler languages in logic, the 
expressions determine a unique semantic content so that the domain 
can straightforwardly be the expressions themselves. When attention 
was focused on natural language and the prevalence of indexicality 
inherent in so many natural language expressions was realised, 
emphasis had to be laid on the semantic content of expressions on 
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occasions of use, and not on expressions themselves. In summary, 
narrow semantics is really concerned only with the relation of fixed 
semantic content to the world. 
Barwise and Perry, on the other hand, have been much impressed 
with the extent to which natural language possesses the property, 
which they call efficiency, that an expression can be used on 
different occasions to express different things -- its semantic 
content varies with occasion of use. So impressed are they, that 
they see this as a major aspect of natural language that must be 
given a central position. Consider the following passages from their 
book, taken from chapter two, which is entitled 'Evidence for a 
Theory of Linguistic Meaning': 
In this chapter we argue that there is much more evidence 
than just entailments for which a semantic theory must 
account, evidence that in fact causes us to look with 
some scepticism on the very idea of entailments between 
sentences. The evidence consists of insights of 
philosophers of language and linguists into the way 
natural languages work. We call these insights six 
semantic universals of human languages. Most of these 
universals are at odds with assumptions built into 
standard model theory. We take these phenomena as 
central to an adequate semantic theory, not just minor 
headaches to be explained by amending the semantics of 
first -order logic, a theory that evolved before their 
ubiquity was recognized. (S &A, p. 28) 
[...] what is important, after all, is the fact that 
expressions, whether simple or complex, can be recycled, 
can be used over and over again in different ways, places 
and times, and by different people, to say different 
things. This is what we mean by the efficiency of 
language. (p. 32) 
The dependence of the interpretation of an utterance on 
facts about the discourse situation is usually referred 
to as indexicality. For historical reasons, it is often 
suggested that indexicality is not really a semantic 
phenomenon but belongs instead to the "pragmatic" side of 
language use. [...] Indexicality is extremely important 
to the information- carrying capacity of language. (pp. 
33,34) 
Unfortunately, Barwise and Perry do not say very much more explicitly 
about why they think indexicality should be regarded as part of 
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semantics instead of as part of pragmatics. However, they regard 
indexicality both as one source of the efficiency of natural language 
and as having a crucial role in the communication of information. 
Barwise and Perry want to include some traditionally pragmatic 
factors in the semantics because of their conception of the role of 
language: the primary use of language is to convey information about 
the world. Thus, if semantics, the study of the relation between 
language and the world, is to be concerned with anything, it should 
be concerned with this information -communicating function of 
language. Since much of the information communicated by an utterance 
has to do with who the speaker is, the time and place of utterance, 
and so on -- that is, it is inverse information -- semantics should 
be concerned with these things. All this can be handled, they 
believe, by a relational view of meaning, which relates the 
expression 
has there. 
used in an utterance situation with the interpretation it 
Linguistic meaning must be an integral part of semantics. 
Semantics is more than interpretations and situation structures 
(models); it must provide the framework or backbone around which 
information, including inverse information, can be organised. 
As the title of their second chapter indicates, Barwise and 
Perry want to specify just what the evidence is that the theory must 
explain and account for. This task is especially important for them, 
because they want to say that there is much more evidence than the 
narrow view allows. I have already outlined the sorts of things that 
this approach to semantics is interested in -- not just the 
interpretation of an expression (on an occasion), but all the factors 
involved in linguistic meaning, as this notion is understood in 
situation semantics. And it is clear that Barwise and Perry see all 
of this as within the province of semantics; for their second chapter 
begins: 'Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning, of the 
relationships that hold between expressions of language and things is 
the world.' (S &A, p. 27) 
If Barwise and Perry have adopted the enlarged view of the 
province of semantics, and I believe that they have, then they have 
done so because of the principal place they give to the concept of 
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information in language use and the consequent upheaval in semantics. 
This enlarged conception of semantics -- wide semantics -- is not 
concerned only with getting from an expression, or a semantic 
content, to the world, but also with going the other way, back to the 
expression used. Importance is given to locating a speaker in a 
context of utterance because attention must be paid to how what is 
said is determined jointly by the context of utterance and the 
sentence uttered. In situation semantics terms, we are concerned 
with the relation between the discourse situation and the 
interpretation, as well as obtaining the truth value from the 
interpretation. 
It is interesting to remember at this point that David Kaplan 
sees his distinction between the character of an expression and its 
content (on an occasion of use) as an extension of Frege's theory of 
sense (Kaplan, 1979, p. 83), and it would therefore appear that both 
of these notions are part of semantics. Kaplan remarks that the 
distinction 'was unlikely to be noticed before demonstratives came 
under consideration, because demonstrative -free expressions have a 
constant character' (p. 85). Treatments of indexicality today tend 
to include it within semantics. We are reminded again, as Barwise 
and Perry also point out, that we should be careful before applying a 
concept of what semantics is, developed in the study of logical 
calculi and mathematical languages, to natural languages, which 
contain demonstratives and indexicals. 
Another indication that Kaplan sees character as an integral 
part of semantics, is his assertion, in the context of comparing his 
distinction with Kripke's distinction between the a- priori and the 
necessary, that his (ie. Kaplan's) distinction between character and 
content 'lies more purely within logic and semantics' (Kaplan, 1979, 
p. 85). In view of the similarities between Kaplanian character and 
meaning in situation semantics, Kaplan, I take it, espouses the wide 
view of semantics. 
More recently Barwise has come to include in semantics, in a 
more radical way, all the information an utterance of a sentence can 
convey. In a recent paper he writes: 
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In our book, Perry and I concentrate on what the 
utterance means about the described situation, because we 
are primarily interested in the straightforward use of 
language to convey information. Thus, we identify the 
linguistic meaning of declarative sentences with the 
specific constraint that holds between utterances of the 
sentence and situations described by such utterances. By 
picking out one constraint, the one that holds between 
the types of utterances of sentence (7) [(3) = 'It's 4 
p.m.] and the types of situations it describes, and 
calling that the linguistic meaning of (7), we are 
betraying the fact that our primary concern is for the 
subject matter of the sentence, for finding out what it 
is talking about and what it is saying about that subject 
matter. (Barwise, 1983b, pp. 24,25) 
From this passage, it seems that Barwise wants to 'set that entity 
which in the book is the interpretation, namely what the expression 
denotes, on a par with all the other sources of information for the 
listener. 
Barwise and Perry have unfortunately not argued convincingly 
that information should be regarded 
semantics. They are surely free to 
approach to the philosophy of language 
as having a place in their 
adopt an information -based 
more generally; but the issue 
is whether that part of their theory that deals with information 
properly semantics, or should rather be regarded as pragmatics. 





approach situation semantics or situation pragmatics- semantics? 
We must be careful not to let this point degenerate into a 
terminological disagreement: instead of taking issue with the terms 
'semantics' and 'pragmatics', we must penetrate behind these labels 
to the theoretical areas they are used to denote and ask how these 
areas are related and which tasks are performed where. For example, 
we can ask whether the informational part of the theory is something 
that should be invoked to solve traditional problems such as the 
failure of the principle of substitutivity of coreferential terms in 
propositional attitude contexts. The difficulties in explaining this 
failure of substitution have created a pressure to which some 
theorists have responded by challenging our intuitive judgements (eg. 
Ralph does believe that the man seen at the beach is a spy), and 
others by seeking an "epistemological" solution (eg. Hintikka, 1969a, 
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1969b; Partee, 1979; Saarinen, 1982). Barwise and Perry's approach, 
which at least raises new questions about how our total theory of 
language confronts the data, is, I think, an interesting variant from 
this perspective.4 
2.2 The determination of truth conditions 
In this section I shall examine the structural relations 
between semantics and pragmatics as found in Barwise and Perry's 
theory, where the concept of information is given á central place. 
My central concern in this section is the relationship between 
information and semantics; in particular, I shall concentrate on how 
information and the interpretation are each related to the truth 
conditions of an utterance. The expressions that I shall look at are 
names and definite descriptions. 
First, to put what follows in perspective, it should be said 
that Barwise and Perry do provide situation semantics with a model or 
structure of situations: a structure is a pair 41L = <M,M0> of factual 
and actual situations. An utterance is true in 4C. if its 
interpretation contains an actual situation: 
'1!'t ct° iff e 
PLio 
& e e 
d,c I[cQ ]I ) 
In the sequel we investigate whether this truth definition applies 
universally. 
2.2.1 Information and truth conditions: a puzzle 
To begin with, consider the following paragraph, in which 
Barwise and Perry say some interesting things about the relationship 
between information, interpretation and truth conditions: 
The name used is often crucial to the information that is 
intended to be conveyed. Suppose Jim walks up to Melanie 
-38- 
and says, "I'm Jim ", intending to "tell her his name ". 
The interpretation of this will be trivially actual, the 
course of events in which Jim is Jim. What Melanie will 
learn is that the person speaking to her is called "Jim ". 
This is part of the truth condition of the utterance, and 
the information made available to Melanie, although it is 
not part of the interpretation of the utterance. (S &A, 
p. 264; emphasis added) 
Jim utters the sentence 'I'm Jim', and this sentence, as uttered on 
that occasion, has a certain interpretation. Not to be confused with 
the interpretation is that which Melanie learns as a result of 
hearing and understanding the utterance -- the information that is 
available, and which Melanie will pick up, provided she is not 
daydreaming or otherwise not paying attention. Barwise and Perry 
have taken considerable care to point out that the information that 
is conveyed by an utterance is distinct from, and often very 
different from, the interpretation of the utterance: interpretation 
underdetermines information. Indeed, they have emphasised this point 
by speaking of the fallacy of misplaced information, the error of 
those views which locate all the information in the semantic value of 
the uttered sentence. 
What are the consequences of their approach for the relation 
between truth conditions and interpretation? From what they say in 
the passage above, Barwise and Perry appear to be shifting the 
determination of the truth conditions on utterances away from the 
exclusive control of interpretations of those utterances in 
conjunction with the model (or situation structure, as it is called). 
Thus: '[That the person speaking to Melanie is called 'Jim'] is part 
of the truth conditions of the utterance, ... although it is not part 
of the interpretation of the utterance.' If Barwise and Perry really 
mean what they say in this passage, then some radical revision or 
restructuring of semantic theory is being carried out; but is this 
possible? Can they really do this? 
The interpretation of Jim's utterance is quite simply that Jim 
is Jim; more formally, it is the class of all those (abstract) 
situations in which, at the discourse location ld, the identity 
relation is said to hold between Jim and Jim. 
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In e: at ld: identical, Jim, Jim; yes 
Now, although in developing situation semantics, Barwise and Perry 
have given it a general structure different from the usual model 
theoretic accounts of semantics, it is supposed to be still the case 
that the truth or falsity of an utterance is determined with respect 
to a model or situation structure. Indeed, this is what happens, or 
should happen, according to the formal semantic definitions Barwise 
and Perry have given at one point in the book (S &A, pp. 60,61). A 
sentence qp , uttered in a discourse situation d with speaker 
connections c, is true in the situation structure ' = <M,MO> iff 
there is a situation e e MO such that e e 
d,c 
]. According to 
this understanding of situation semantics, the truth conditions of a 
sentence as uttered on a particular occasion d with certain 
connections ç, are semantically determined relative to a situation 
structure, via the interpretation 
d,c 
Up of the sentence. Contrary 
to this, however, in the passage cited above, it appears that the 
truth conditions of Jim's utterance are determined to some extent 
independently of the interpretation and situation structure: it is 
explicitly stated there that the truth conditions involve the 
requirement that the person speaking to Melanie be called 'Jim', 
something which is not part of the interpretation. 
If what has been sketched out here is true, Barwise and Perry 
have a puzzle right at the heart of their semantics. Truth 
conditions are universally regarded as very much part of semantics; 
however, it would seem that the concept of meaning in situation 
semantics, and the consequent role of inverse information, result in 
truth conditions being pulled away from that part of the theory which 
involves interpretations and the situation structure. Yet this seems 
to be precisely what they are suggesting in this passage, and it is 
connected with the whole structure of their semantics as developed in 
the book, with its emphasis on information. 
2.2.2 Names and inverse information 
-40- 
When Barwise and Perry define the semantics of names, they say 
that the simplest definition would be to consider the meaning of a 
name A as a relation between and the individuals it can be used 
to name: 
d,ç I[(3 áee iff ç( ) = á6. (5&A, p. 131)5 
They go on to say that this simple definition is unsatisfactory, 
because part of the (inverse) information that we can pick up from 
the utterance of a name is that the bearer has the property of being 
a ( , and they want to build this into the semantics of names. Thus, 
when they return to complete their account of names later in the 
book, an account which takes notice of the role information plays in 
communication, they suggest the following definition: 
iff (1) g.(0 ) = ás, and 
(2) 4_0. is a (g . (p. 167) 
The second condition is actually spelled out in terms of the speaker 
having the information that á is a (, that is, that the individual 
to whom he refers has the name he uses. The final specification 
looks like this: 
d,g ]¡ á6,e iff (t) = ác, and 
(2) in d: at Id: inf, ád, E; yes 
of, b, áa, yes 
where inf stands for the relation of having the information that, and 
E:= at 1: being-a-(, b; yes (p. 168). 
We shall use this semantics for names to look at Jim's 
utterance of 'I'm Jim' in the above scenario in more detail than we 
have so far. Let us suppose that d and c are respectively the 
discourse situation and the speaker connections associated with the 
utterance, and let us write 'j' for Jim himself. Jim's utterance of 
'Jim' (as part of his utterance of 'I'm Jim') refers to j iff d,ç 
I[Jim] j , e, where 
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e:= at ld: identical, j, j; yes.6 
That Jim is called 'Jim' is not part of the interpretation, and thus 
cannot be a factor in the determination of the truth or falsity of 
Jim's utterance solely from its interpretation and a situation 
structure 411 in the way defined in situation semantics. On the other 
hand, the truth conditions of the utterance, as understood 
informally, do involve Jim's being called 'Jim' (his utterance of 
'I'm Jim' would be false if he were not a Jim), and this is borne out 
by the semantics of names, as it should be. If he were not called 
'Jim', neither Jim nor anyone else could have the information that he 
were, no matter how much they were convinced of it. This requirement 
acts on the derivation of j as the referent for 'Jim' or, to put the 
point in accordance with a less dynamic conception of the relation 
between meaning and interpretation, we may regard the requirement as 
an integral part of the meaning of the name, constraining those 
entities among which the relation of meaning holds. 
In determining truth conditions, should we, in innocent 
semantics, be allowed to look at the utterance and take account of 
the expressions used ?7 It is not surprising that the information 
content of an utterance should be sensitive to the expressions used, 
but ought the truth conditions in innocent semantics to be sensitive 
in this way? We shall return to this point to clarify our 
understanding of just what is going on in this matter; but first we 
shall look at how another type of expression fares. 
2.2.3 Referential uses of definite descriptions 
The same problem arises with the referential use of definite 
descriptions, since the definition of meaning for definite 
descriptions allows the same pulling apart of truth conditions from 
interpretation. The semantics for a definite description is: 
d, ç I[the re]I 
iff d,ç I[Tt ]I ás,e 
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and there is at most one b such that d,cI[f ]fb,e. (p. 149)8 
The meaning of the description 'the -it' is a relation between d, c, 
an individual á ó and a course of events e, the resource situation. 
When the description is used referentially, the resource situation, 
er say, is being used to identify an individual who then becomes part 
of the interpretation of the utterance. The same problem arises as 
with names because the individual denoted by a definite description 
used referentially to the interpretation of the smallest sentence 
containing the description must possess, in the resource situation, 
those properties according to which the description picks it out. 
(This condition is analogous to the requirement that the individual 
have the name used.) 
As an example, let us look at a sentence Barwise and Perry use 
to illustrate their theory of descriptions, 'The man in a red vest is 
a fool'. Let us suppose that I utter the sentence in an utterance 
situation d,ç and let the resource situation be er = c('the man in a 
red vest'). Further, let the description pick out the individual m = 
d,cf[the 
man in a red vest]( (e ). Then we have: 
d,c(['the man in a red vest'](m,er. 
Let ep be an arbitrary situation in the interpretation of the 
utterance: 
d,c (['the man in a red vest is a fool']( eo. 
Now e0 may specify that a number of things are the case, but we must 
at least have that in e at the discourse location ld, the property 
of being a fool is predicated of the individual m. 
In e0: at ld: fool, m; yes. 
As Barwise and Perry themselves emphasise, only the individual m 
himself is part of the interpretation of the utterance, and hence 
really only m is relevant to a determination of the truth conditions 
of the utterance as calculated by by whether the interpretation, as a 
class of situations, contains an actual situation. 
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However, in conflict with this is the fact that, in situation 
semantics, for m to be a man in a red vest (in er) is crucial to the 
truth conditions of the utterance, just as that Jim is called 'Jim' 
was crucial in the previous example. Firstly, according to Barwise 
and Perry, a description cannot pick out an individual unless that 
individual satisfies the describing conditions. 
Definite descriptions can be used to identify an object 
by the properties he, she or it has in some situation. 
That is, they exploit what is going on in one situation 
to identify an object. One situation, what we call a 
resource situation, is exploited. In order to serve as a 
resource situation for a definite description, a 
situation must have an object satisfying, the defining 
condition. (S &A, p. 146) 
So m must be a man in a red vest in er if my utterance of the 
description is to pick him out. But even more appropriately, Barwise 
and Perry claim that if this condition is not fulfilled, then the 
utterance cannot be true -- hence it is false:9 
The situation down the road is constrained by my 
utterance to have such a man in it, however; only if it 
does, can my utterance turn out to be true. (S &A, p. 154) 
This case is perhaps not so strong as the previous one 
involving Jim and Melanie; there it is clear that if Jim is not 
called 'Jim', his utterance is false. With descriptions, however, it 
has been said that although m is not a man in a red vest in er, in 
certain circumstances my utterance is nonetheless true, or at least 
is not clearly false. After all, did not Donnellan (1966) show us 
that one can refer to something by means of a definite description 
which is not satisfied (Donnellan's 'referential' use of 
descriptions, not to be confused with Barwise and Perry's use of 
'referential')? 
Suppose the throne is occupied by a man I firmly believe 
to be not the king, but a usurper. Imagine also that his 
followers as firmly believe that he is the king. Suppose 
I wish to see this man. I might say to his minions, "Is 
the king in his counting house ?" I succeed in referring 
to the man I wish to refer to without myself believing 
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that he fits the description. It is not even necessary, 
moreover, to believe that his followers believe him to be 
the king. If they are cynical about the whole thing, 
know he is not the king, I may still succeed in referring 
to the man I wish to refer to. Similarly, neither I nor 
the people I speak to may suppose that anyone is the king 
and, finally, each party may know that the other does not 
so suppose and yet the reference may go through. 
(Donnellan, 1966, p. 52) 
Donnellan's view is that in some such cases we may suppose that the 
speaker has referred to some individual, and predicated something of 
that person; whether this de re attribution of a property is true or 
false is something that is objectively determinable, and hence the 
utterance is either true or false, depending on whether the 
individual has or has not the property. 
However, Barwise and Perry have altered the semantics of 
definite descriptions, so that the utterance cannot be true unless 
the individual referred to satisfies the describing conditions in 
some situation. With referential uses, or value -laden uses as I 
shall call them to distinguish them from Donnellan's referential 
uses, this situation is the resource situation. Just as with names, 
there are conditions on the referent of the definite description 
which do not end up as part of the interpretation, and hence the same 
puzzle arises. 
Finally, before returning to the central issue, let us look at 
what happens when the identity of the referent is problematical. 
Whenever a value -laden use of the description 'the man in a red vest' 
does not pick out a (unique) referent, this may be because there is 
in er more than one b such that d,c ['the man in a red vest'] b,er, 
or because there is no b such that d,çl['the man in a red vest']t 
b,er. In both cases there is no individual donated to the 
interpretation of the smallest containing sentence, and we are left 
with the problem of what to say about the utterance: is it false, 
neither true nor false, or perhaps infelicitous? Is there still a 
semantic problem, or not? 
Donnellan's influential article (Donnellan, 1966) claimed that 
definite descriptions could be used referentially, simply as a means 
of enabling one's audience to pick out who or what one was talking 
about. 
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Where the definite description is simply a means of 
identifying the person we want to talk about, it is quite 
possible for the correct identification to be made even 
though no one fits the description we used. (Donnellan, 
1966, p. 47) 
Consider also Donnellan's celebrated example of the person who asks 
at a party, 'Who is the man drinking a martini ?' That there is only 
water in the man's glass does not preclude the questioner's having 
referred to the man and asked who he is. When the speaker intends to 
refer to a particular individual, but uses a definite description 
which the individual does not uniquely satisfy, Donnellan's view is 
that (in most cases) the speaker clearly refers to that individual 
and predicates something of him.10 
In contrast to this, in the case of a name uttered falsely, our 
reaction is clear. Suppose the person, j, who walks up to Melanie 
and says, 'I'm Jim' is not called 'Jim', but 'John'. We have the 
same semantic problem in this case as with the description: we are 
looking for a referent for 'Jim' with which to construct the 
interpretation; 'I' will donate John, but who does 'Jim' donate? The 
contribution of this utterance of 'Jim' seems intuitively to be a Jim 
(but which Jim ?); at any rate we do not hesitate to say that John's 
utterance is false. Whereas there is a formal parallelism in the 
semantics for names and referential uses of definite descriptions in 
so far as both impose a condition that is not reflected at the level 
of the interpretation, on an informal level this parallelism is 
lacking: in the case of names, our intuitions are clear that the 
utterance is false if the condition is not met, but we are not so 
sure what to say, in the case of descriptions.11 
2.2.4 Which factors determine truth conditions? 
My main concern is the location, or locations, where work is 
done in determining truth conditions, and the possibility of a 
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discrepancy between our intuitive judgement of the truth conditions 
of an utterance on the one hand, and the truth conditions as 
determined by the interpretation of the utterance in conjunction with 
the model on the other. Barwise and Perry's definition of the 
meaning of names reflects aspects of our informal judgement of truth 
conditions, which, however, do not show up in the interpretation. I 
have said that this at least raises the question of whether Barwise 
and Perry are transferring the location where truth conditions are 
determined from the central semantic part of their theory to 
pragmatics. 
However, one might argue that, although inverse information 
such as Jim's being called 'Jim' is not part of the interpretation, 
it is not totally unconnected with the interpretation either, for the 
following reason. If Jim were not called 'Jim', then, given the 
semantics for names that Barwise and Perry define, how could the 
interpretation of Jim's utterance 'I'm Jim' be that Jim is Jim? The 
name has to contribute an individual to the interpretation, and that 
individual could not be Jim himself, if he were not thus named. 
Thus, does not the interpretation contain some information about 
which expression was used, if only in this rather tenuous and fragile 
way? We might say that the interpretation contains a fossil of the 
name. 
Yet this cannot be exactly right. There are numerous ways to 
designate Jim: using demonstratives, pronouns, and descriptions, all 
of which would contribute Jim to the interpretation of the smallest 
sentence containing the expression used, and the interpretation does 
not distinguish between them: there are no traces, no fossils, of 
which one of these many possible expressions was used. 
To continue our inquiry, let us ask how Barwise and Perry 
envisage the various factors determining the truth conditions. 
Consider the following interesting passage: 
When Joe says 'Jackie is biting Molly', the situations in 
the interpretation of his utterance all have Jackie 
biting Molly, but they don't all have Jackie being a 
Jackie, and Molly being a Molly. Some of them may have 
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Jackie named 'Molly' and Molly named 'Jackie'. If they 
were actual, what Joe said would be true, but to say it 
he would have had to say 'Molly is biting Jackie'. (S &A, 
p. 166; emphasis added) 
According to this passage, which occurs in the same section as their 
final definition of the meaning of names, Joe can utter the sentence 
'Jackie is biting Molly' and refer to situations in which Jackie is 
not called 'Jackie', i.e. such situations are members of the 
interpretation of the utterance. How is this possible, if Jackie 
must be a Jackie in order to be the referent of the name 'Jackie'? 
If Jackie is a Jackie, then the utterance of 'Jackie' designates the 
individual Jackie, and this individual goes to build up the 
interpretation of the whole utterance, but, quite simply, the fact 
that Jackie is a Jackie is not part of that interpretation. So, even 
situations in which Jackie explicitly has another name can be part of 
the interpretation. Thus the interpretation of an utterance of 
'Jackie is barking' would contain 
e:= at 1: barking, j,; yes 
name -of, j, 'Molly'; yes 
where 1 = c(is). However, none of these situations in which Jackie 
is not a Jackie can be factual. Although they are in the 
interpretation, the interpretation is just this particular class of 
courses of events, only because Jackie is actually called 'Jackie'. 
A statement is true if the interpretation contains an actual 
situation. Since none of these situations in which Jackie is not a 
Jackie, can be factual, they make no difference to truth conditions. 
If the interpretation contains an actual situation, the utterance is 
true; if it does not, that these strange situations are also included 
in the interpretation cannot add an actual situation to the 
interpretation, and the utterance is false. 
But there is another twist to come. Nothing Barwise and Perry 
have said prohibits non - factual discourse situations and speaker 
connections being involved in meaning. Supposed is a non -factual 
discourse situation and c non - factual speaker connections, and 
suppose further that a name Psyche uttered in d,c refers to Jackie, 
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although Jackie is not called Psyche. This is possible since in d 
the speaker ád can be asserted to have the information that Jackie is 
called Psyche.12 The abstract situation d consists of set theoretic 
objects which are interpreted as specifying who the speaker is and 
various other things, among which is the assertion that the speaker 
has the information that Jackie is called Psyche -- even if this is 
not true (which it is not, by hypothesis). Now what is true is 
determined, as far as the semantics is concerned, by the model iYZ = 
<M,Mo >, and we shall suppose that according to /I/ Jackie is called 
Jackie and not Psyche. Then an utterance of 
(8) Psyche is biting Molly. 
at d,ç will describe situations in which Jackie is biting Molly, and 
we shall further suppose that among these is at least one actual 
situation, so the utterance is true. 
Can we tolerate such a state of affairs? Situation semantics 
is rescued by the fact that it takes efficiency seriously. In 
comparing our intuitive judgement with the pronouncement by the 
semantic theory that the utterance of (8) is true, we must take into 
consideration not only the sentence uttered, but also the discourse 
situation d. Since d is non-factual, the sentence cannot be uttered 
at that discourse situation, and hence cannot actually be used to 
make this statement. The last sentence of the passage from Barwise 
and Perry (1983) cited above and repeated here highlights an 
important point. 
If they were actual, what Joe said would be true, but to 
say it he would have had to say 'Molly is biting Jackie'. 
Barwise and Perry distinguish between what Joe said and saving it (or 
saying what is said). The interpretation represents only what is 
said. At the level of interpretation any inverse information has 
been lost, whereas the statement, represented as a triple <d,ç,g7 >, 
retains all the information. 
Barwise and Perry regard as a virtue of their theory the fact 
that it contains structured interpretations, which allows them to 
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pull language off the world. 
We must have a way of representing the way the world is, 
one that is independent of the language whose meanings we 
are trying to study. In this regard, standard model 
theory is woefully inadequate, for the structures it uses 
to represent the world all presuppose some specific 
language. (S &A, p. 29) 
But structured interpretations and this distance between language and 
the world have another result, namely, that interpretations gain 
independence from language. For example, there are interpretations 
of 'Jackie is biting Molly' in which Jackie is called 'Molly', even 
interpretations in which Jackie is a cat. This particularly happens 
where the utterance involves information that does not end up in the 
interpretation --- particularly the cases of names and referential 
uses of definite descriptions which we have been considering. To 
write interpretations in the form d,cKr0]) is misleading, for the 
sentence uttered occurs in this notation; but the interpretation 
itself is simply a class of abstract situations, from which all 
reference to the sentence has disappeared. Therefore in situation 
semantics meaning must assume a more important role in relating 
structured interpretations to discourse situations. Linguistic 
meaning has been made a crucial and integral element of semantics. 
Let us recount the progress we have made. We began with a 
passage which suggested that in Barwise and Perry's theory the truth 
conditions of some utterances appeared to be determined partly by 
factors, which interfered with the usual truth definition in terms of 
the interpretation of an utterance and a model. In investigating 
this issue, we saw that these factors were accommodated within the 
semantics by means of restrictions on the meanings of expressions, 
notably names and descriptions. These factors, which in situation 
semantics are finally not part of the interpretations of utterances, 
nonetheless operate within the semantics at a different level, 
mediating as part of meaning of certain expressions between those 
very expressions and their interpretations on occasions. The 
interpretation considered alone is "distant" from language and needs 
meaning to link it with sentences and discourse situations. The 
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result is a strain on the mesh between truth conditions as judged 
intuitively and as determined by interpretations and the model. 
Where are the truth conditions of statements determined? Does 
meaning pull truth conditions off the interpretation, involving other 
factors? 
There are some clear statements that truth conditions are 
distinct from any pragmatic factors. Discussing Jonny's beliefs 
about Cicero, they say, 'This [that the relevant anchoring facts are 
those that anchor a concept of Jonny's that comprehends 'Tully'] is 
an implicature, or suggestion, not something that is part of the 
truth conditions of my report' (S &A, p. 264). At this point, the 
pragmatic factor, which plays a considerable role in the discussion 
by Barwise and Perry, does not help to determine the truth conditions 
of the report. Semantics and pragmatics are held separate. 
A problem facing the innocent semantic theorist is to account 
for the gap between our intuitive judgements of truth conditions and 
the truth conditions as they are actually determined by the semantics 
(interpretation and situation structure). Barwise and Perry's 
response is to trace the grounds for our intuitions on some matters 
to pragmatics, specifically Gricean principles that govern what we 
say in which kinds of circumstances. For example, we are constrained 
in which expressions we use on occasions by Maxim A, which is: 
Speaker: When using an attitude report to explain a 
person's actions (as opposed to using it as evidence of 
what the world is like) do not use terms describing or 
suggesting the agent's unapplied concepts or irrelevant 
anchors or other modes of recognition not used by the 
listener. Listener: Assume that the speaker is referring 
to the agent's applied concepts, relevant anchors and 
other modes of recognition used by the agent. (S &A, p. 
258) 
This is so, even though the semantics accords truth to utterances 
which we would intuitively consider false and which employ 
expressions we are pragmatically constrained from using. Again, 
semantics and pragmatics are held separate, but the price is a 
tension between the semantics and our intuitions. 
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On the other hand, there are passages in the book where the 
truth conditions appear not to be determined exclusively in terms of 
the interpretation and the situation structure. In addition to the 
passage in which we began our inquiry, consider the scenario where 
one day Melanie sees Jim at a distance eating an anchovy, and the 
following day is introduced to him without recognising that he is the 
same person that she saw the previous day. Does she believe, of Jim, 
that he was eating an anchovy or not, for she has, in situation 
semantics terminology, two unmerged concepts of Jim? Barwise and 
Perry say of this case: 
[...] we think that in certain circumstances, it would be 
appropriate and true for Jim to say, "She didn't believe 
that I had eaten an anchovy ", and in other circumstances, 
appropriate and true for him to say, "She believed that I 
did eat an anchovy ". (S &A, p. 255; emphasis added) 
Semantics and pragmatics merge in this kind of case. 
Finally, let us return to the case where someone speaks 
falsely. Suppose that Peter approaches Melanie and utters 'Hi! I'm 
Jim', when his name is not 'Jim'. His utterance is true if the 
interpretation contains an actual situation, and false otherwise. 
That is, the utterance is false if the interpretation does not 
contain an actual situation, or if for some reason we are unable to 
construct an interpretation -- if some subsentential expression does 
not contribute what is expected of it. 'I' will designate the 
individual p (Peter), but which individual does 'Jim' designate? 
There are two conditions for a name (L to designate an individual á 
on an occasion d,ç: 
(1) ç(1) = ác 
(2) ád has the information that a a_is a @. 
Now the individual to whom Peter is referring by means of 'Jim' is 
c(Jim), but we are not told how to establish who this is. Is he 
referring to himself, or to someone else, and if the latter, who ?13 
Thinking of the two conditions as constraints on which 
individuals may be contributed by the name, anyone who is such that 
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he is a Jim and Peter is referring to him is contributed to the 
overall interpretation. In any case, if an individual x, x # p, were 
contributed, the situation built up using x would not be factual and 
therefore could not help to make the utterance true. But, indeed, no 
one may thus be contributed, and the interpretation of the name, 
strictly speaking, would be the empty set. Since this is likely, the 
name fails to donate any individual to the interpretation of the 
whole utterance. 
The truth definition is such that an utterance is false in the 
event, either of the interpretation not containing an actual 
situation, or of the utterance having no interpretation. Something 
more than the interpretation and the situation structure has a role 
in determining the truth conditions of utterances. More 
specifically, when the utterance is false, this can be the result of 
something breaking down among the relata of the meaning of the 
expression uttered -- the sentence, the utterance situation <d,ç >, 
and the interpretation. Thus, on the occasion when the utterance is 
true, part of the work done in making this so is carried out at this 
point. That the speaker of 'I'in Jim' be called 'Jim' is part of the 
truth conditions of the utterance simply in virtue of the fact that 
if he is not, then the semantics determines the utterance as false. 
We have now clearly crossed over the boundary into pragmatics: 
these sorts of issues are part of pragmatics, not semantics. Even 
according to the wide view of semantics, if there is a "performance 
failure" with an utterance, it is a pragmatic failure and not 
something within the province of semantics. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion is that meaning 
has a central role in situation semantics. The consequence of 
admitting structured interpretations for utterances is that meaning 
must be involved in relating these interpretations to the sentences 
and situations in which they are asserted. Linguistic meaning 
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concerns the relation between expressions and their references -- how 
this expression comes to have that as its reference -- and all this 
is an integral part of semantics. Barwise and Perry therefore accept 
that characterisation of the province of semantics which I have 
called wide semantics. However, pragmatics is not swallowed up by 
wide semantics, for it has its own distinctive domain of questions. 
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Chapter Three: Meaning, Interpretation, and the Setting 
3.0 Introduction 
In the last chapter we looked at some of the issues involved in 
the question of where to draw the line between semantics and 
pragmatics in an attempt to see what was happening in this area with 
situation semantics and whether there were any (radical) changes to 
the traditional theory. In the present chapter, in a further attempt 
to find out what the situation is with the new theory, I shall 
examine meaning, interpretation and setting closely, and try to see 
just how these concepts are to be understood in situation semantics. 
More precisely, I shall look first at the important concept of 
the interpretation of an expression on an occasion of utterance. To 
make this analysis as precise as possible, I shall base it on the 
formulation of the theory as found in Aliass, although we shall 
consider only Determiner -free Aliass, which will allow us to keep the 
analysis simpler and perhaps see more clearly the essential structure 
of situation semantics. I shall ask what the interpretations of 
expressions, basic and compound, are. Barwise and Perry claim that 
meaning exists in the world, relating different parts of the world; 
yet their semantics introduces numerous abstract entities, which 
assume the major theoretical roles. It is necessary to ask, 
therefore, of the various kinds of expressions, whether their 
references are in the world, whether it is important that they are, 
and whether they might equally well be considered as abstract 
theoretical entities. 
The analysis of meaning as it is conceived in situation 
semantics will bring us to focus on the notion of a setting, around 
which this chapter revolves. We shall be concerned to discover what 
settings are and what their theoretical role is. Barwise and Perry 
formalise their version of settings in the appendices on Aliass, but 
some passages in the main text of their book motivate a significantly 
different, yet formally equivalent, conception of settings, one which 
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I shall explore and formalise in this chapter. To conclude with, we 
shall consider the implications of this notion of the setting for the 
concept of meaning. 
3.1 Meaning and interpretation in situation semantics 
In Determiner -free Aliass there are three lexical categories: 
relation symbols (RS's), individual terms (IT's), and tense markers 
(TM's). We are told that 'The lexicon comes with an interpretation 
function that associates objects with some of these items.' (S &A, 
p. 301) In fact, if R is a relation symbol, (R) is a relation (a 
property if R is unary); relations and properties are primitives of 
the theory and urelements for the set theory. If J is a name, V (J) 
is an individual.1 Individuals, too, are also both primitives and 
urelements. Tense markers, the only other lexical category, however, 
are not in the domain of the interpretation function. 
There are various expression - forming rules which build other 
grammatical categories out of these basic, lexical categories. In 
Determiner -free Aliass, there are three intermediate or, as Barwise 
and Perry call them, syntactic categories (categories between lexical 
categories and the category of sentence). From an IT we can 
construct a noun phrase (NP); from a RS and a TM we can construct a 
located relation phrase (LRP); and from an LRP and an optional NP we 
can construct a property phrase (PrPh). Finally, the category of 
sentence (S) is constructed out of an NP and a PrPh. 
Expressions of each of these categories have a meaning, which 
is consistently a four place relation d,cG[ö']I & e, where A is an 
expression of arbitrary category. Thus, although the setting 6 will 
provide or contribute different entities depending on the category of 
the expression of , we have a uniform concept of meaning in 
Determiner -free Aliass. The issues at the level of reference, or 
interpretation, are not so simple, however, and constitute our main 
concern at present. 
What are the interpretations on an occasion, of expressions of 
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each grammatical category in turn? Throughout the development of 
situation semantics, the main guiding idea of the semantics as 
innocent has been interpreted as meaning that a singular term should 
be seen as referring to an individual, and a predicate as referring 
to a relation, so that a sentence consisting of a predicate and terms 
refers to just those situations in which the relation holds among the 
designated individuals -- this whether the sentence is embedded in 
another or not. (This simple picture is soon complicated slightly by 
the entry of locations.) Individuals and relations are taken to be 
parts of the real world, as are situations; in the construction of 
the formal theory, however, whereas singular terms and predicates do 
refer to these real world individuals and relations, sentences refer 
to abstract situations -- a significant move, which means that 
henceforth we shall have to be careful in distinguishing real 
situations from abstract situations. 
A sentence uttered on an occasion (a discourse situation d and 
speaker connections c) refers to an abstract situation. Strictly, 
the meaning of a sentence CQ is the relation d,cl[cf]I S,e, but as the 
setting is empty this can be written d,c(EcpIe.2 The interpretation 
is the class of situations which can appear as the rightmost relatum 
when the relation is written down. Although singular terms and 
predicates refer to individuals and relations respectively, and this 
is certainly how we think of their references, it does seem strange 
that the meaning of these expressions is the relation 
d,c [Jackie]jir,e and not d,c [Jackie]Ij, for example. The sentential 
case suggests that we could reinterpret situation semantics and take 
the interpretation of an arbitrary subsentential expression as the 
class of the entities that appear on the right hand side of the 
meaning relation as this is written down (ie. the interpretation 
would be a class of pairs <0-,e>). 
This idea seems to be related to what Barwise and Perry have in 
mind when they define what they call the value -free interpretation -- 
what we get out of meaning when we fix the discourse situation and 
speaker connections. (S &A, p. 150) Since their distinction between 
value -free and value -laden interpretations applies principally to 
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descriptions (it is when they define the semantics of descriptions 
that they make the distinction, although they intend it to apply to 
all kinds of expression), and since we do not have to deal with 
descriptions in Determiner -free Aliass, the two notions of 
interpretation collapse into one. Still, Barwise and Perry avoid 
altogether considering the class of pairs < cr,e> as the references 
(on occasions) of expressions. However, I wish to pursue this idea. 
3.1.1 The interpretations of basic expressions 
Both NP's and IT's refer to the same kinds of entities, for the 
meaning of a given expression of type IT remains the same when that 
expression is promoted to type NP. In fact there is very little 
difference between the two categories. There are two rules for 
forming NP's: (a) every IT is an NP, with the same SCat and meaning; 
and (b) a more complex rule, which allows an IT to be indexed so that 
it can function as the antecedent of some variable (ie. pronoun). 
Semantically, this makes no difference to the meaning or the 
reference of an NP, whichever way it is constructed from an IT.3 
The referents of NPs and ITs are essentially individuals. 
However, the interpretation of an NP 0( according to this novel 
notion of interpretation I have suggested would be a class of pairs 
<6",e >, where 3 is a setting (on Barwise and Perry's conception of a 
setting, a function from the distinguished indeterminate a to an 
actual individual; the rival conception of the setting which I will 
advocate will be explained below), and .e is a situation -- any 
situation, as it turns out. Is it important whether we say that the 
meaning of 'Jackie' is the relation d,cl[Jackie]Ij and the 
interpretation is j (not distinguishing between j and (j)), or that 
the meaning is d,cl[Jackie]16,e and the interpretation is the class 
of all pairs < a' ,e> such that the relation holds? Or should we 
follow Barwise and Perry, who seem to regard the meaning of the term 
as the relation d,c1[Jackie116,e, yet want to say that an utterance 
of it designates Jackie, and that the interpretation is Jackie 
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herself? 
There seems to be little motivation for thinking of the 
interpretation of 'Jackie' as the class of pairs < ,e> such that 
d,c 1JackieNc,e when we consider a sentence in which 'Jackie' 
occurs, and ponder on the role of that term in the sentence, and what 
it might contribute to the interpretation of the sentence (ie. its 
own interpretation). The interpretation of 'Jackie is barking' is 
the class of abstract situations in which Jackie is barking at some 
contemporary location: it is that simple; there are no abstractions 
involved. All the components of this situation, excepting the truth 
value are parts of the real world on the situation semantics 
ontology.4 Amending a well known remark of Donald Davidson's, it is 
plainly incredible that 'Jackie' means anything different, or refers 
to anything other than Jackie. 
The interpretation of a relation symbol R is a relation (also 
called 'property'), exactly the relation which 6 maps R to. The 
kinds of relations that are involved here are what we might call 
'unlocated' relations, borrowing some terminology from Barwise and 
Perry; that is, they are relations r(x1,...,x11), none of whose relata 
are space -time locations with the import that another relation 
r'011,...,xj_1,xj+1,...,xn) (for 1 j < n) holds at that location 
(the location having occurred as the jth relatum). Given that we are 
accustomed to think of both located and unlocated relations in 
situation semantics, the relations that predicates refer to are of 
the unlocated kind.5 The novel conception of the interpretation, 
never seems to have the same appeal with relation symbols as with the 
other kinds of basic expression -- the interpretation is just the 
relation itself, or perhaps the relation in a "situation frame" <1, 
r, a, b, i> (for r e R2), where the indeterminates are to be 
regarded as place holders.6 
Tense markers refer to locations; this is intuitively what a TM 
contributes to the described situation being built up as the 
interpretation of the sentence. But in what sense can we say that, 
in the semantics of Aliass as given, a TM refers to or designates a 
location? We have the following clause in connection with TM's: 
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L3. TM: There are tense markers n1,n2,... (present 
tense) and w, w2,... (past tense), with SCat = (1). 
Their meanings are given by: 
d,ç I[n]]j s,e iff 1 = c(ni) and ls_o ld. 
d,c I[w]]16,e iff l = c(Ki) and lc < (S&A, p. 302) 
The location we are interested in -- and the location which the TM, 
if any expression, contributes to the described situation -- is lc, 
but it does not appear on the right hand side of the meaning relation 
as written out. We have a situation very similar to that with terms: 
the right hand side is a pair <6,e>, of which the situation e is 
arbitrary, and what we are really interested in is the entity to 
which 6 maps a particular indeterminate in SCat(t) (where t is the 
TM) -- namely, the indeterminate 1. 
The puzzling thing is that Barwise and Perry view the meaning 
of Ol as the relation d, c l [oC ]) 6, e, and yet consider the 
interpretation of o< as either an individual, a relation, or a 
location. Perhaps the relation between meaning and interpretation is 
not quite the straightforward one presented in the main text of 
Situations and Attitudes: the interpretation is not what is left, or 
what we obtain from the meaning, when we fix the discourse situation 
and speaker connections. Perhaps we ought not to regard meaning in 
the way Barwise and Perry do in the book, and instead think of the 
meaning of a TM t, for example, as the relation d,c([t]t1, where 1 = 
c(t) and 1 is appropriately related to 111 (what the appropriate 
relation is would be determined by what kind of marker t is). The 
alternative is to think of meaning as Barwise and Perry do -- the 
relation d,c1[ a ]1 ó,e -- but to allow interpretations to be classes 
of pairs <6-,e>. 
The two approaches -- Barwise and Perry's and the alternative 
one I am currently considering -- are perhaps more similar than they 
appear: given < ä, e> such that d,c ([ oC ]( 6, e, we can find the 
reference of OC, x (I shall use 'x' as a variable ranging over 
interpretations of expressions from any grammatical category), and 
thus assert that d,c )[o(]) x holds. (This assumes, of course, that 
we are always able to decide which indeterminate x C SCat(dY) is the 
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relevant one, ie. the one which r maps to the interpretation of 0C; 
but this is easy to find once we read off the grammatical category of 
oC.7) As I shall show below, we can represent the relations between 
x, a , and e in a calculus. (From these relations, we can calculate 
the right class of pairs of cs and e, given x; or we can find the 
reference, given a pair < s,e >; and given an event and the reference, 
we can calculate a class of settings.) Although there is a great 
difference between the interpretation of an NP as an individual and 
as a class of pairs <6-,e>, the two notions of interpretation are 
formally equivalent. 
We have now considered sentences and all the basic lexical 
categories of Aliass: IT's, RS's and TM's, and also the category of 
NP (which I have assimilated to the basic lexical categories, because 
it is not significantly different from IT's). Their designations are 
(abstract) situations for sentences, and for the other cases, 
respectively individuals, relations and locations (and individuals 
for NPs). I have also begun to sketch the alternative conception of 
the semantics, on which the interpretations of non -sentential 
expressions are classes of pairs. We now turn to the remaining 
syntactic categories. 
3.1.2 The interpretations of compound categories 
Given an RS and a TM, we can construct an LRP; what do such 
expressions designate? The grammar of Aliass is so constructed that 
for a sentence x1Rtx2, R a RS, t a TM, and the xi NP's (j = 1,2), we 
first "pull out" the NP's to get an LRP, next we "pull out" the TM 
(and the negation symbol - in those cases where it occurs) to leave 
the RS. The LRP is a category that appears at an intermediate stage 
(the extremes being the whole sentence and the basic lexical 
categories). Our intuitions suggest that we can understand the LRP 
as standing for a relation's holding (or not holding) among a certain 
number of objects (the objects being as yet unspecified) at á 
definite and given location. That is, it stands for a relation at a 
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fixed location -- a located relation (hence the name located relation 
phrase). But what kind of entity is a located relation? In the 
context of our aims in the present work, we are interested in whether 
it is something out there in the world, as individuals and unlocated 
relations and properties are (on the situation semantics ontology), 
or just something we have constructed in the set theory. We clearly 
have abstract, constructed entities which we could regard as the 
interpretations of LRP's, analogously with the case of basic 
expressions -- classes of pairs <6,e> such that d,c l[R016,e -- as 
candidates for the interpretation on the occasion d,c; but is there 
an alternative? 
The problem with conceiving of located relations as things in 
the world is that they do not seem to be parts of the world in the 
same way as individuals and relations, because they are both located 
(that is, tied down to a particular region of space -time) and 
unspecific (that is, there is no mention of precisely which objects 
are involved and how). They fall halfway between situations -- 
located, but also specific as to which objects are involved and in 
which relations they stand in that situation -- and relations, which 
are neither located nor specific, possessing a full generality. 
It is a simple matter to construct a set theoretic entity, or 
kind of entity, particular instances of which can function as the 
references of LRP's. We could simply take as the interpretation the 
class of pairs < s,e >. Alternatively, we could try and put together 
just those entities we want -- the relation r = (R), the location 
1r, and the truth value tyc. We would get a set theoretic entity 
that we might represent as: 
<ls,r,_,tvs.>, or: <15.,r,_,_,tvó> 
where the '_' is a place holder. Because Aliass has only one- and 
two -place relations we need only consider these cases. In the more 
general case it would be better to deal with the increased 
variability by treating all the relata as constituting a single 
sequence, so that in the representation they always take up one 
place. Thus the entity we might use to represent the interpretation 
would be: <ls,r,_,tvó >. 
formally equivalent. 
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Again, these several possibilities are 
The other category in Aliass is that of the PrPh. I need say 
no more about it than that the remarks above in respect of LRPs also 
apply mutatis mutandis to it. The PrPh is similar to the LRP; in 
fact, some PrPh's just are LRP's. The structure of the other PrPh's 
is that of an LRP with an NP filling the 'object' position, the 
'subject' position remaining empty. As far as our present interests 
are concerned, no new points arise with PrPhs. 
3.1.3 The structure of abstract situations 
Barwise and Perry speak of both real and abstract situations, 
but since sentences designate abstract situations, and no expression 
designates real situations, I shall be concerned for the most part 
only with the abstract variety. 
Abstract situations are set theoretic entities; they are 
identified as sets constructed in the generation of the universe of 
sets from the urelements of the theory. A situation is a set of zero 
or more situational sequences (as I shall call them to distinguish 
them from constituent sequences) of the form <1,y,i> where 1 is a 
location, y is a constituent sequence <rn,a1,. .,an>, with rn an n- 
place relation and the a. individuals, and .i is either 0 or 1 
(intuitively a truth value). Thus, a situation is a set of sequences 
whose members are urelements or sequences of urelements; the only 
exception is the number, 0 or 1, which is neither an urelement nor a 
sequence of urelements. Nonetheless, its presence is 
unobjectionable: we would expect the natural numbers8 to be available 
in any case -- suppose them to have been identified with certain sets 
generated in the usual manner. 
Notice that all the entities that are put together set 
theoretically to construct the sequences that are members of the 
abstract situation are, excepting the truth value, designated by 
expressions that are elementary, that is, ones which are not 
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resolvable into other basic expressions. (Mostly, this is to say 
that they are lexical categories; but there is also the case of the 
negation operator or negation symbol -, which is not a member of any 
lexical category; it is connected with -- we cannot say it designates 
-- the truth value.) If every situation in the interpretation of an 
utterance of a sentence y = 0(1Rt4k 2...aen contains the situational 
sequence <1, <rn,a1,...,a >,1 >, then the TM designates 1, the relation 
symbol designates rn, the n individual terms designate the a1, ..., 
an, and the 1 arises from the absence of a - in (P.9 
We have a slight complication here in the manner in which the 
truth value is determined., It is, as I have said, determined by the 
presence or absence of -. Let us put aside any worries that the 
absence of a symbol can determine something that is contributed to 
the construction of the situation described, or designated, by the 
whole sentence. Our concern is with designation rather than being 
contributed to the described situation. It is not correct to speak 
of - designating the truth value 0 (or its absence designating the 
truth value 1): as an inspection of the LRP rule will show, the 
definition of the meaning of -It is such that - has a role rather 
like that of & in the definition of the meaning of Si & The 
symbol - does not have a meaning definable on its own (nor does &), 
and like & it is not an entry in the lexicon: it has a 
syncategorematic status. 
We can easily find abstract set theoretic entities to serve as 
references expressions of intermediate category; but if we want to 
regard their references as existing in the real world, there is a 
problem in making the resulting semantics conform to the principle of 
compositionality. Suppose, to take a concrete example, we are 
dealing with a RS R and a TM t at the stage when they are combined to 
yield the LRP Rt. The RS designates a relation r, the TM designates 
a location 1, and let us suppose that we have not yet chosen the 
designation of the LRP: all we have fixed is that it is something 
which the theory presupposes is a part of the real world, and which I 
shall denote by 'x'. The principle of compositionality holds that 
the designation of a complex expression is a function of the 
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designations of its parts. However, we cannot show that x is 
composed out of r and 1, for these three are all real world entities, 
and all must be primitive objects from the point of view of the 
theory; we cannot relate them, although we could if some or all of 
them were set theoretic objects. (Our problem is not solved simply 
by writing x as 'rl' or 'r(1)' or something like that.) The entity x 
simply does not have the appropriate structure: it is not related to 
1 and r in a way which displays the fact that it is designated by an 
expression composed in a certain way out of the expressions which are 
designate 1 and r. 
If we decide upon some abstract, set theoretic entity as the 
designation of Et, which would solve the technical problem associated 
with compositionality, we have embarked upon the construction of a 
surrogate reality, isomorphic to the world. In fact, this is just 
what has happened with real and abstract situations, for the level of 
situations faces the same problem: we can provide abstract situations 
to serve as the interpretations of whole utterances, but the theory 
will not work if "situations" (the interpretations of utterances) are 
real situations -- they do not have suitable, exhibitable structure. 
In linguistics it has become standard practice to associate 
sentences with derivation trees, which display the structure of those 
sentences. Such derivation trees employ grammatical categories, 
equivalent to the intermediate or syntactic categories LRP and PrPh 
in Aliass. As for the reasons why theoretical linguists want to 
introduce non -sentential, non -terminal categories into their theory, 
suffice it to say that these categories are required for a recursive 
definition of possible (ie. grammatical) sentence structures in the 
language: with lexical insertion rules, the language (ie. the set of 
grammatical sentences) can be defined. In referential semantics, we 
have to provide a semantics for them, and that entails giving them a 
designation or reference. 
The sentence JACKIE BITEn MOLLY in Aliass is derived from the 
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following tree (where the SCats are shown in set brackets): 
S Q 
NP { a } PrPh { a } 
IT { a } LRP { a, b } NP { b } 
JACKIE RS { a, b, 1, tv } TM { 1 } IT { b 
I 
BITE n MOLLY 
The interpretation function - assigns j to JACKIE, m to MOLLY, and 
LB 
to BITE as their designations, and the designation of the whole 
sentence is the class of situations which contain the sequence 
<1, <rB,j,m >,1 >. Apart from the truth value 1, all the entities that 
are put together to construct the situation come from the basic 
expressions. The intermediate categories do not contribute anything 
to the reference of the whole sentence; they indicate the 
subsentential structure that we perceive. (The truth value enters as 
a primitive entity at the stage when BITE and n are composed -- at 
the semantic level, when 
LB 
and 1 are composed; it is not designated 
by anything.) 
The reference of the sentence has a "flat" structure, although 
the tree is hierarchical in structure. The embedding of the sequence 
<KB,j,m> within the main sequence is incidental with respect to the 
present point, for situations could be represented according to 
alternative conventions. In any case it is not designated by, nor 
does it correspond to, any syntactic constituent of the sentence. 
So, although the relation rB, the location 1, and the truth value 1 
get packed together into some abstract object to provide a reference 
for the LRP, when we have reached the sentential level, all of the 
intermediate interpretations have been unpacked to deliver the 
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references of the basic expressions: j, m, rB, 1, and 1, and the 
situation is made up of these. Unlike basic expressions, expressions 
of intermediate category do not have interpretations that are things 
in the world. In this they are like sentences, for. (abstract) 
situations are not in the world either. 
In fact Barwise and Perry never exhibit the interpretations of 
expressions of intermediate category; we never see what the 
interpretation of an LRP looks like. They avoid showing us such 
interpretations by working always at the level of meaning and by 
using settings and situations in their definition of meaning. That 
is why I had to decide on a,set theoretic entity like <l,r,_,i> above 
as the interpretation of an LRP -- for Barwise and Perry do not show 
us how they conceive of it.10 
3.1.4 A comparison of situation semantics with standard theory 
The main idea in formal semantics, in regard to the 
compositional structure of sentences, has been to see a term as 
designating an individual, and a predicate as designating either a 
function or a set -- it makes little difference which, since we can 
move back and forth between the set and its characteristic function. 
The sentence formed from a term and a monadic predicate is true just 
in case the individual designated by the term is in the set 
(equivalently, just in case the function maps that individual to 1). 
Let us call this Principle T: 
(T) If t is a term and F a monadic predicate letter, then 
the designation of t is an individual, the designation 
of F is a function from individuals to a truth value, 
and the sentence Ft is true iff the designation of F 
applied to the designation of t yields the truth value 
1. 
Now Barwise and Perry, by building all the possibilities into 
the meaning of expressions, and factoring out unwanted possibilities 
by unification, have brought their theory visibly closer to the 
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standard approach than was the original idea of situation semantics. 
To illustrate this claim in detail, I shall consider the simple, but 
representative case of a sentence Ft, consisting of a monadic 
predicate F and a term t. To enlarge the scope of this comparative 
analysis and to take account of efficiency, I shall use a 
modification of T to include contexts of utterance. Context will be 
represented by the coordinate ç: the d,c of situation semantics will 
be compressed, for the present purposes, into a single utterance 
situation or contextual coordinate that contains all the information 
in both the discourse situation d and the speaker connections (the 
original c). The modified principle is: 
(Tc) If t is a term and F a monadic predicate letter, then 
the designation of t at c is an individual, the 
designation of F at c is a function from individuals to 
a truth value, and the sentence Ft is true at ç iff the 
designation of F at c applied to the designation of t at 
c yields the truth value 1. 
Truth, it will be noted, must also be relativised to a context of 
utterance because of the efficiency in the language. 
To be precise, the definitions that follow should be considered 
relative to a language L and a model C. For simplicity I shall take 
L to consist only of individual constants and n -place predicates (for 
n = 1, 2, ...), but there is nothing in principle to prevent us from 
comparing the semantic analyses for syntactically more elaborate 
languages. Exactly what the model CILis depends on the theory in 
question. A model according to the standard theory is a pair <D,V >, 
where D is a set (the domain of individuals) and V is a function 
which assigns to each term t an individual a in D, and for each n, 
assigns to each n -place predicate F a function V(F) from n- tuples of 
individuals to truth values. A model for my formulation of situation 
semantics is just Barwise and Perry's pair <M,Mo >, as defined in 
Barwise and Perry (1983). Again for simplicity, I shall suppress 
explicit reference to the model at various points, but this should 
cause no confusion. Finally, the comparison will actually be made 
only for monadic predicates. 
The standard theory then gives us the following analysis Al. 
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The designation of t with respect to c (and 0.; henceforth this 
reference will generally be omitted), written (Et]Ic, is an individual 
(a say); the designation of F with respect to ç, I[F]lc, is a function 
f from individuals to a truth value; and the designation of the 
sentence, fFt](c, is a truth value. The sentence is true (in the 
model Ce) just in case it designates 1, ie. just in case f(a) = 1. 
We can summarise as follows: 
(A1) I[t]Ic = a 
I[F]lc = f: A -> (0, 1 } 
1[Ft]lc = f(a) = 0 or 1 
C$ (-=c Ft <_> I[F]lc(([t]Ic) = f(á) = 1 
(More strictly, we should write ([t]f for the designation of t with 
respect to c in the model (1, and so on for the others.) 
The analysis according to situation semantics gives us A2 
below. Here too, again for reasons of simplicity, I have tried to 
suppress reference to the model '1 = <M,MO >; but the clause defining 
truth makes reference to the class M0 of actual situations and thus 
requires the situation structure to be brought into the picture 
explicitly. The designations of expressions in A2 are determined by 
the meanings of those expressions, which, following situation 
semantics, attach to expressions independently of the model.11 The 
designation of a term t with respect to c is to be a set of pairs 
< cr,e >; the designation of a monadic predicate F relative to c is 
also a set of pairs < er,e >; and the designation of the whole sentence 
Ft with respect to c is a set of situations, just as in situation 
semantics.12 The sentence is true if one of these situations is 
actual: 
(A2) ([t]i = { <s,e> I ([t]I c,c7,e ) 
I[F_]Ic = { «,e> I 1[F]( ç, cr,e_ } 
I[Ft](c ={ e I (J6- ) (I[t]( ç, Cie &([F_]1 ç, dì ,e) 1 
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/ift k=c Ft <_> (]e) (e e M,D & e e KFtk) 
I take it that any changes I have made are merely changes of notation 
or other superficial changes. A2 reflects the unificatory nature of 
composition in Aliass, a feature that is absent from Al, but we shall 
now show that this is not a fundamental difference. 
The strategy for drawing out the parallels between Al and A2 
will be to define a third analysis A3, which will bear resemblances 
to both Al and A2. It is hoped in this way to bridge the apparent 
differences between them. We shall derive A3 by making small 
modifications to A2; then, when we have A3, we shall compare it with 
Al. 
In A3, we shall make (the form of) the designations of 
expressions more like the designations in Al, but shall retain the 
model theory of A2. Designations are therefore independent of the 
model. The designation of a term t relative to ç will be an 
individual a. That a term should designate an individual is not 
foreign to situation semantics, as is evident from the preceding 
discussion. The pairs «,e> inI[t]C in A2 all have the property 
that we are really after the individual as; e is arbitrary and 
superfluous. Thus, we have not changed the "real" designation of t, 
only the means of specifying it. The designation of a monadic 
predicate F relative to c in A3 is a function from situations and 
individuals to a truth value, this function from ¿ x A being fixed 
by the meaning of F. (In fact, the designation of F will map to 1 
only those pairs <e,a> such that a is F in e.) Again, this is just a 
basic reformulation of A2: there the pairs <a ,e> in 1[F]r are such 
that CT maps a to the individual which is F in e. We have preserved 
precisely the relevant information in A3: each situation e and 
setting a- such that < cr,e> is inI[F]Ic in A2 corresponds to the pair 
of that same situation and some individual which the function 1[Fjc 
(in A3) maps to 1. In fact, Plc (in A3) maps all and only those 
pairs <e,a> to 1 for which there is a pair < T,e> in [Fk (in A2) 
with á = ay. 
The designationl[Ft]1c of the sentence Ft at a context ç in A3 
is a set of situations, precisely those e such that 1[F]{c(e,([t]Ic) = 1. 
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In A3 we have a model theory very similar to the usual situation 
semantics one; Ft is true (in a model /it= <M,M0 >) if some situation 
in I[Ftk is a member of the set of actual situations M0. To 
summarise: 
(A3) ILQC = a 
I[F](C = f: ` x A -> 10,11 
([Ft]I-C = { e I ([F](c(e_d[t]Ic) = 1 } = { e I f(e,a) = 1 } 
lL=c Ft <=> (-16(e, E MO & e E I[Ft]Ic) 
I have already pointed out that A3 faithfully preserves the 
essential structure of A2 as far as the designations of the term and 
the predicate are concerned. In A3 we have eliminated the need for 
the distinguished indeterminates and the setting; we have done so by 
making explicit, for each expression, the entity we really consider 
to be the reference of that expression. Also, the truth definition 
is the same: the designations of an entire sentence at a context in 
A2 and A3 are sets of situations; the major change in transforming A2 
into A3 is the different formulation of the reference of the 
predicate. Thus, I conclude that there is no substantial difference 
between A2 and A3. 
Nor is there as much difference between Al and A3 as perhaps 
there seems to be at first. The designations of the term in both 
theories are the same -- an individual in each case. The real 
difference lies in the fact that A3 quantifies over situations, 
whereas Al does not. In fact, A3 is just Al plus abstract 
situations; if we were to remove the situations from A3, we would be 
left with Al. In such a modification of A3, we leave the semantics 
of the term alone. The new definition of the reference of the 
predicate is simply a function from individuals to a truth value -- 
exactly as in Al. And without situations, the semantics for the 
sentence would assign to Ft as reference the value of I[F](C(([t]Ic) -- 
again, exactly as in Al. The truth definition in A3 is so structured 
as to take account of the fact that sentences refer to (sets of) 
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In A3 we have a model theory very similar to the usual situation 
semantics one; Ft is true (in a model = <M,MO >) if some situation 
in I[]jc is a member of the set of actual situations M0. To 
summarise: 
(A3) ([t]c = a 
([F](c = f: t x A -> {0, 1 } 
([Ft]lc = { e I 1[F](c(e_,([t]Ic) = 1 } = { e I f(e,a) = 1 } 
IyC=c Ft <=> (-]e) (e e 
Mo 
& e e ([Ft]lc) 
I have already pointed out that A3 faithfully preserves the 
essential structure of A2 as far as the designations of the term and 
the predicate are concerned. In A3 we have eliminated the need for 
the distinguished indeterminates and the setting; we have done so by 
making explicit, for each expression, the entity we really consider 
to be the reference of that expression. Also, the truth definition 
is the same: the designations of an entire sentence at a context in 
A2 and A3 are sets of situations; the major change in transforming A2 
into A3 is the different formulation of the reference of the 
predicate. Thus, I conclude that there is no substantial difference 
between A2 and A3. 
Nor is there as much difference between Al and A3 as perhaps 
there seems to be at first. The designations of the term in both 
theories are the same -- an individual in each case. The real 
difference lies in the fact that A3 quantifies over situations, 
whereas Al does not. In fact, A3 is just Al plus abstract 
situations; if we were to remove the situations from A3, we would be 
left with Al. In such a modification of A3, we leave the semantics 
of the term alone. The new definition of the reference of the 
predicate is simply a function from individuals to a truth value -- 
exactly as in Al. And without situations, the semantics for the 
sentence would assign to Ft as reference the value of I[F](c(l[t]Ic) 
again, exactly as in Al. The truth definition in A3 is so structured 
as to take account of the fact that sentences refer to (sets of) 
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situations, but otherwise captures the same idea as that of Al, which 
is just a theory instantiating Tc. 
The model theoretic apparatus invoked by each of Al and A3 is 
significantly different: they represent the world differently, and 
this has consequences for the definition of truth. A model for Al is 
a pair <D,V> of a domain of individuals D and an interpretation 
function V which assigns to each term t in the language an individual 
and to each n -place predicate F in the language a function from n- 
tuples of individuals to truth values. According to Al the world 
contains individual objects but not properties; which qualities (or 
properties) hold of which objects can be specified only through 
language, which is what V does. A model for A3, on the other hand, 
is a pair <M,M0> of sets of factual and actual situations. Although 
these are abstract situations, they represent the world as composed 
of real situations, which consist of objects having properties and 
standing in relations to one another. In Al, therefore, it is the 
model which determines which individual a term designates and what 
the extension of a predicate is, whereas in A3 designations are fixed 
by meaning independently of the model, whose function is merely to 
define what is the case, and hence, derivatively, which sentences are 
true. To do this requires apparatus that can represent possible 
states of the world, and expressions are assigned references from 
this stock of entities. The Al theory defines which sentences are 
true and only thereby what is the case in the world. 
What this analysis shows is that the main and fundamental 
differences between situation semantics and traditional semantic 
theory exist not at the formal level (though they are superficially 
different ), but are due to the philosophical premises that underlie 
each kind of theory.13 I return to this question of the relation 
between situation semantics and traditional theories in chapter six, 
tackling it in more detail by analysing the ontology of situation 
semantics in the manner of Kaplan (1975). My aim here has been to 
show that, when any confusion occasioned by the notation as been 
removed, in its essential formal structure the basic situation 
semantics framework is not so distant from standard theories. 
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3.2 The notion of the setting 
3.2.1 Two conceptions of the setting 
Settings are bound up with the semantics of subsentential 
expressions -- that is why they are introduced into the semantics, 
and the settings associated with sentences are null. I shall discuss 
how we should conceive of the setting, some ways of representing it, 
and seek to discover the nature of settings and of their role in the 
theory. 
In their book, Barwise and Perry find it attractive to include 
settings in their representation of the notion of linguistic meaning 
and to view the linguistic meaning of an expression (1( as a relation 
d, c f [ g ]ks-, e, with the setting as one of the relata. At first it 
appears that the setting for an expression p( consists of other 
situational elements which, together with the reference or 
interpretation of pe, in that utterance, combine to produce the 
described course of events (hence the name 'setting'). If )( is a 
sentence, the setting 6 is void, but for subsentential expressions 
cs would contribute, in effect, whatever is "missing" from the 
interpretation of 8e in order for it to constitute a course of 
events. Alternatively, one may think of the setting as whatever 
needs to be added to the interpretation of oC to produce a situation. 
Of course, how much is missing (how much needs to be added) will vary 
a great deal, depending on the grammatical category of ()!. Thus, if 
A! is the tensed VP 'is biting Molly', all that is needed to 
construct a course of events from its interpretation is an 
individual, which is just what 6' provides: 
d, c ([ IS BITING MOLLY ]f ö, e 
iff 
in e: at 1= 0IS): biting, a,., Molly; yes 
where a is the individual provided by tr14 
Now this is an interesting development of the basic theory. In 
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what follows we shall be interested to arrive at some evaluation of 
exactly what settings are; in particular, we want to know whether 
they are parts of the world or theoretical constructs. The 
significance of this question has to do with how, in situation 
semantics, we see language contacting the world: only for sentences 
is meaning a relation between utterance situation (represented by the 
pair <d,c>) and the described situation e, while with other 
expressions the setting enters into meaning. An utterance of such an 
expression describes a part of the world (a situation) only with the 
help of -- only in the context of -- a setting, in effect, only when 
additional factors have been determined. In situation semantics, as 
in the standard Fregean theory, a critical importance is given to the 
sentence as the central linguistic unit for contacting extra - 
linguistic reality.15 
Although Barwise and Perry think of the meaning of an arbitrary 
expression O( generally as a relation d,c([4' ]Is,e,16 they make 
somewhat surprising decisions as to precisely what the setting is 
(and as to what it contributes towards the described situation) for 
different types of expression. When they first introduce the 
concept, it seems that the setting associated with an expression pe, 
uttered in the context of an assertive utterance u provides other 
situational elements which can be put together with the designation 
of p( to constitute a course of events: 
If we think of the utterance of an expression 0( as 
taking place in the context of an assertive utterance u, 
then u provides not just a discourse situation and 
connections, but other situational elements a- that the 
utterance of pe helps combine into the described 
situation e. In the case of a tensed VP, this setting 6- 
is just an individual, but for other types of 
expressions, the settings will be more elaborate. Thus, 
we can think of the meaning of p( as a relation 
d,ct[a(] 6,e between discourse situations, connections, a 
setting T provided by other parts of the utterance, and 
a described situation. This is the format in which we 
present our discussion of the meaning of subsentential 
expressions. (S &A, p. 128) 
On this understanding of settings, which I shall call the 'original' 
conception of a setting, from the meaning of an expression 0( as a 
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relation d,c /[]) 6",e we obtain the equation 
]Í "plus" 6 = e.17 
, 
Now this is what happens for tensed VPs, as illustrated above, and 
indeed for VPs in general: what is missing from d¡cI[ IS BITING 
MOLLY ]) to make an entire course of events is an individual, which 
is supplied by the setting. 
The semantics of terms, however, is defined so that the setting 
contributes to the described situation in the opposite way. Instead 
of ó- providing what is missing from 
d,c 
([ ]1 to constitute a course 
of events, 6- is just 
d,c 
?[ X ]) itself . The meaning of 'I' is defined 
thus: 
d,çI[ I ]táQ,e if and only if a = ad. (S&A, p. 131) 
The setting, then, can operate in either of these two ways. 
While it is true in Aliass that for all expressions, IS is an anchor 
for precisely those indeterminates in the SCat of the expression, 
this does not rationalise the diverse functions of the setting for 
different kinds of expression. It simply means that which 
indeterminates there are in an expression's SCat becomes correlated 
with the strangely diverse functions of the setting -- one could say 
that the disorder spreads. There is a slight change, too, between 
the way meaning is written down in the text and the way it is written 
down in the appendices. In the main text Barwise and Perry write 
d,c ([ I ]( á6, e and not (lc 1[ I /6,e -- probably because 6 only 
anchors a and they do not there explain exactly how â provides the 
individual. I shall call this the 'alternative' conception of a 
setting. This conception does not constrain the situation e which 
appears in the meaning of a term at all, whereas on the original 
conception of the setting, the relation d,çl[ I 16-re mutually 
constrains S and e (for given d,c) for all expressions: if we fix d 
and c, then the relation holds only for those pairs 6-,e such that 
d c ([ 
I 1 "plus" C = e or equivalently 
, 
ád "plus" s = e. 
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On the original conception, 6 is just e with a "missing ", as it 
were. 
It is the alternative conception of the setting that is chosen 
for formal development in Aliass. On this conception the basic 
structure of the operation of composing meanings, whereby the meaning 
of a compound expression is determined by combining the meanings of 
the parts, is one of unification. We can combine an NP p( and a PrPh 
ß into a sentence 0(0 (rule Si, S &A, p. 303). The meanings of the 
parts may be written as d,c ([ ae l a-1 , e 
1 
and d, c I[ ]I 6-2,e2. However, 
e1 is arbitrary and carries no information (it does not constrain 
anything), whereas 6-1 simply anchors the indeterminate a to the 
referent of 0e. Further, 62 and e2 are highly constrained: e2 is a 
situation which gets everything 0, says about the world right (but 
since (3 omits which individual is concerned, e2 is free to have any 
individual involved), and in each particular instance 6'2 must anchor 
a, the only indeterminate in SCat(j) to the individual which, in the 
corresponding e2, satisfies (1. The result of the unification is 
that all the combinations of 62,e2 for which ö2( a) 6( a) are 
factored out, leaving us with those pairs cr,e on which they agree. 
Barwise and Perry take this course for the development of their 
theory because this is the way they solve a certain problem that has 
to be faced. The problem in question is this: in situation semantics 
each basic expression has a meaning, and when used in an utterance, 
this meaning determines an interpretation for that occasion. 
Interpretations have to be put together to build up the situations 
that will constitute the interpretation of the whole sentence, and 
the problem is to put them together in the right way. We might call 
this the problem of compositionality. It is when Barwise and Perry 
face up to this problem and realise the difficulty it presents, I 
think, that they decide to pursue the alternative conception of a 
setting. Their choice as to what kind of entity settings are to be 
is dictated to some extent by their adoption of a unification 
approach with composition: this is why they need to have settings 
performing two different functions (for different kinds of 
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expressions). 
3.2.2 Developing the original conception of settings 
The following presents a development of the original conception 
of a setting. Although, compared to the one Barwise and Perry adopt, 
this theory is more suitable for representing meaning as the relation 
d,c [ pd x where x is the interpretation of aC with respect to d,c, I 
shall formulate the theory using 6 and e as they do; in this theory 
the two representations are interchangeable, so that formally it is 
immaterial which representation of meaning is chosen. For each type 
of expression, we regard the meaning of an expression ¿k as a 
relation d,c I[p( II ç, e between d, c, a setting s , and a described 
situation e, such that the interpretation of OC and the setting or 
can be put together to construct e. Given d and c, this relation 
mutually constrains o- and e. Indeed, we can regard the class of all 
pairs <a',e> such that the relation holds for cs' and e as the 
interpretation of 0(, and write: 
oc71 = {<6',e> d,c ([o( ]6,e}, d,c ([ 
We shall tentatively represent the linguistic meaning of an 
expression OC as a set of quadruples, <d,c,o- ,e >.18 
The idea behind this conception of the setting and which must 
be formalised is the idea expressed roughly above as ad "plus" c = 
e. To give a detailed formal treatment, we shall need some notation. 
Following through the idea that the setting is very like the 
described situation, only with an individual missing (in the case of 
tensed VPs), I shall first introduce a notation for writing down the 
relations between settings, individuals and situations, and 
afterwards develop the mathematical foundations. Thus, I shall write 
S'= e/á 
to signify that the setting is conceived here as the situation e 
without the individual a -- e with a missing. New entities will be 
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introduced into the semantics to represent settings, and it is over 
these entities, which might be called 'frames', 'structures', or 
indeed just 'settings', that we shall define an algebra which is to 
explicate the notion of "plus" above. We shall also write: 
a = e/6 
e = a * 6 = 6 * a. 
The ' *' denotes the algebraic operation "plus ", yet to be defined, 
which combines two or more entities or structures.19 
The representation of meaning as d, c ([ oC X 6, e in Barwise and 
Perry's theory is bound up with their choice of unification as the 
method for the composition of meanings. On their approach, the 
alternative conception, the relations 6 = e /x, etc. do not always 
hold (eg. with an NP), so they cannot move back and forth between 
writing meaning as d,c ([ X]( x and as d,ç ([ p(]( c, e, nor can they 
extract one from the other. Since it is important to know what 6 
and e are to effect the composition of the meaning of D(with that of 
another expression when calculating the meaning of the compound 
expression, they must represent the meaning of DC in the latter form 
(ie. d,c [p0( 6,e). In contrast, with the present development of the 
original conception settings, we are free to represent meaning in the 
form d,c ([ VC]( x. 
Mathematically, these new entities may be thought of as 
infinite matrices, and we would conceive of a course of events as a 
matrix also. Thus, a situation e, defined as, say: 
e:= at 11: 1.1, a, b; yes 
r2, á; no 
at 12: r3, b; yes 
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would become the matrix: 




á 0 0 0 . 
12 1 r3 b 0 0 0 . 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 
We require matrices having an infinite number of rows because there 
is no limit to the number of relations that a situation can specify 
as holding at locations.21 Note that the truth value occurs now in 
column two: this change is necessary, because otherwise its column 
would fluctuate according to the number of objects the relation 
takes. In this regard, we do not want to compose all the individuals 
together into a sequence (of variable length) taking up just one 
column -- which might at first seem like an alternative solution -- 
because that would complicate the definition of the matrix operation 
*. We need an infinite number of columns in the general case because 
otherwise an arbitrary limit would be clamped down upon the number of 
relata relations can have. However, because of the connection 
between relations and predicates in the language, if we fix the 
relation symbols available in the language, if we fix the vocabulary 
of the language, so that there is some m such that each relation 
symbol is an n -place relation symbol for some n < m, then we would 
need at most m +3 columns in these matrices. We shall employ infinite 
matrices and use zeroes as place holders filling the remainder of the 
matrix. 
I shall simplify the discussion, but without loss of 
generality, by considering an expression pe Q with just two 
constituents, p( and 
lJ 
. I shall use ' ([ p(]f ' to denote the meaning 
of D(, the class of all quadruples <d, ç, 6-, e> such that d, c 1[ dC I G-, e . 
Now, just as we shall define an operation * over settings (and more 
generally over other structures too), I propose to define an 
operation '.' over meanings, which is to signify the composition of 
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the meanings of the parts to give the meaning of the whole. Then we 
may write: 1[ !X 
O 
]1 = 1[ ck ] ([]/ (I use infix notation for the 
binary case, but in general, for n operands, we would use prefix 
notation). This operation is defined in terms of * thus: 
5(.1 . 1[(37l ={<d,c,6,e>1 ( 6)(<d,ç, 61,e> E l[a]I ) 
& (-3 62) (<d,c, arre> e i[0 ]( ) 
& e/6 = e/o-1 * e/5"2 }. 
With this conception of meaning, we can see perspicuously how the 
meanings of the parts combine to give the meaning of the whole 
expression, and also how the interpretations of the parts, 
represented as classes of pairs <6",e> (or more appropriately, as 
classes of entities e/6 ), are related to the interpretation of the 
whole. 
The reader who would like to see the rigorous definition of * 
should consult the appendix; in the remainder of this chapter I 
propose to investigate the implications of this representation of 
meaning. 
3.3 The nature of settings and abstract situations 
3.3.1 The continuity of settings with situations 
We know that a setting must be conceived of relative to part of 
an utterance (ie. an utterance of part of an indicative sentence). 
On the original conception of a setting, the setting is (or provides) 
what is required, in addition to the designation of that part of the 
sentence, to construct the interpretation of the whole. If the part 
in question is 'Jackie' and the whole utterance is an utterance of 
the sentence 'Jackie is barking', then the setting ought to 
contribute the property of barking and the location. Are we to think 
of 6' as just one thing -- some 'complex' of these two, or rather 
three, elements: a property, a location, and a truth value? Or is 6- 
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just the collection of all of these 'other situational elements', 
each considered a separate entity? In the work above, I have taken 
-. to be a specific thing with a certain complex structure, composed 
of all the other situational elements. For Barwise and Perry too, C7 
is just one thing -- an anchor, which, when given the appropriate 
indeterminates (eg. a , 1, tv), produces the situational elements 
(respectively, aa., lc, tvr) . 
Whichever representation one chooses, then, the setting welds 
these other situational elements together. The original conception 
of the setting, however, is very illuminating as to what the nature 
of this structure is. The question of what settings are is bound up 
with the question of what abstract situations are, for settings are 
essentially situations with holes, and the relation of the 
situational elements within settings is that relation which holds 
among the elements within a situation. The original conception of 
the setting makes this particularly clear, especially when the 
expression considered is a term, for then the setting has to 
contribute all the other various elements, all but an individual, to 
the situation. Our investigation into the nature of settings sheds 
light also on the nature of situations, for the close relation 
between setting and situation binds the nature of the internal 
structure of situations with the nature of the internal structure of 
sentences. 
By considering the individuals, properties and locations as 
basic and primitive, and the interpretations of sentences as abstract 
situations built out of these primitives in a set theoretic manner 
(which is what Barwise and Perry actually do formally, disregarding 
their metatheoretical comments), we have gained the power to "pull 
out" pieces from situations. A setting will be an abstract entity, 
such as I defined above in terms of a matrix or perhaps, as Barwise 
and Perry prefer to see it, an anchor. Settings are "striving to be 
situations ", they are "situations with holes ". On this approach 
situations can be regarded as settings of a special kind, ones 
without holes.22 
The resulting continuity of setting and situation is one 
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advantage of developing the original conception. The alternative 
conception suffers from the confusion that arises from having 
settings operating one way in the case of some expressions (viz. VPs) 
and in another way in the case of others (viz. NPs). Their choice as 
to what a setting should be, and how it should function, accords with 
their unification approach to composition; but it also means they 
must represent settings as anchors. In turn this raises deep 
problems about their semantics, because meaning, which is the basic 
concept of situation semantics and assumes the fundamental role in 
the theory, includes a setting among its relata, which has a 
controlling function in the composition of interpretations. The 
formal representation of meaning has turned out to be rather 
different from the original understanding of the notion deriving from 
the ecological metatheory. 
The meaning of a subsentential expression should show us how 
the expression can be used in various contexts to describe various 
situations. Consider the sentence JACKIE BITE 
n 
MOLLY of Aliass. 
Starting with the interpretation of the relation symbol BITE (a 
relation), we transform this into a matrix with a lot of holes. As 
we add to the RS respectively the TM n and the truth value 1, the 
object NP MOLLY, and finally the subject NP JACKIE, these holes get 
filled, and the matrix eventually comes to represent the situation of 
Jackie biting Molly at a suitable location. There is no asymmetry 
between the constituents here, as there is in Barwise and Perry's 
theory: their unificatory approach requires them to choose some 
constituent (the relation symbol) whose interpretation is essentially 
the situation matrix with "holes" everywhere except the place 
corresponding to that constituent. It is not clear that this is so, 
since Barwise and Perry do not show us in the book what the 
interpretations of compound subsentential expressions of Aliass look 
like, but from the definition of the meaning of a binary relation 
symbol, namely 
d,ç t[R2]i 6',e iff <r,á,ba.,tvs> e e(l6) 
where r 
2 
_ 6 (R ), the interpretation is essentially the structure <l', 
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r, a, b, tv >.23 (Cf. section 3.1.2 above.) In the theory currently 
under consideration, we can start with any constituent, transform 
from its interpretation to a matrix and add in the other 
interpretations. This point will be illustrated in detail. 
The interpretation of the NP MOLLY is first combined with the 
interpretation of the LRP BITEn to yield the interpretation of the 










0 0 . 
and the interpretation of the NP is represented as 
0 0 0 0 m 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
These are combined, by the operation * to get the matrix 
1 1 
LB 
0 m 0 . 
0 0 0 0 0 0. 
When the matrices are set out thus, they perspicuously capture our 
intuitions about how the described situation is built up. It is 
equally possible to think of the meaning of MOLLY as the relation 
d,c 1[MOLLY]' 6,e. A particular instance of <er,e> would be 6' as the 
matrix with 1, 1, LB and j in it, (the matrix thus signifying the 
structure that holds among these situational elements as they are 
welded together in the setting,) and a as the situation of j biting 
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m, represented in the same manner. 
Continuing this analysis, let us suppose that we have 
d,c 1[BITEnII , e 
1 
and d, c i[MOLLY]Ì 6-2,e2. Now 2/ Q ; more 
precisely, however, it is not m the individual, but the matrix 
containing m, written out above, that is an element of the algebra 
and thus equal to e2/62. I shall write the matrix, exhibited above, 
as '[m]'. Let the referent of the LRP be x = el/e7i. The referent 
of the PrPh is x * [m] = e/6 where e and b' are such that d,cI[BITEn 
MOLLY]I 61e. The meaning of the PrPh could also be written 
d, ç KBITEn MOLLYA x * [m] , 
illustrating that the referents of the parts are combined to produce 
the referent of the whole. What could be more natural? The 
definition of the matrix operation * underwrites this simple 
notation. 
3.3.2 The object NP problem 
A problem arises for the way Barwise and Perry use settings to 
deal with the composition of meanings, which does not seem to be the 
best way, or even a good way, of handling the problem. It 
complicates the original theory of meaning, and we wonder what 
objects like settings, as these are thought of in Aliass, have to do 
with meaning. Their theory requires the introduction of 
distinguished indeterminates a, b, 1 , and tv , whose status is 
questionable. Too many theoretical artifacts are taking the centre 
stage. Moreover, the theory does not do what is required of it: let 
us consider what we might call the 'Object NP problem', a specific 
case of the problem of compositionality.24 
Our favourite example of a sentence of Aliass, namely JACKIE 
BITEn MOLLY, consists, at one level of analysis, of a subject NP, an 
LRP, and an object NP. The SCats of these expressions are as 
follows: 
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SCat(JACKIE) = { a } 
SCat(MOLLY) = { a } 
SCat(BITEn) = { a, b 
The problem now shows up quite clearly: both JACKIE and MOLLY are NPs 
and so both have only the distinguished indeterminate a in their SCat 
(rules L2 and NP1 of Aliass), but we require the setting to map the 
indeterminate b , not a, to the referent of MOLLY. No mechanism is 
provided in Aliass as defined in Barwise and Perry (1983) to solve 
the problem. All individual terms have the set { a } as their SCat 
(lexical rule L2), and so MOLLY starts off with this SCat; there is 
no change when MOLLY is elevated to an NP. Nor is there anything in 
PrPh2, the rule which governs the composition of the LRP and the NP 
to yield the PrPh. And there could hardly be a solution at this 
point, without radically altering the way meanings and 
interpretations are composed, for if one of the constituent parts is 
d,cI[MOLLY] ¿7,e with SCat = I a }, how could we just change this a to 
b , when that would require 6-(and thus the meaning of MOLLY) to be 
changed as well. The Object NP Problem remains a problem for Barwise 
and Perry's approach. 
Compositionality and the object NP problem present difficulties 
on the approach that employs the original conception of a setting. 
With this approach the problem appears when we try to transform from 
the individual m to the matrix [m]: we could have m occur in the 
fourth column of the first row, with zeroes elsewhere, or in the 
fifth column of the first row with zeroes elsewhere, or indeed in the 
sixth, seventh, eighth, etc. column of the first row, if we have 
relations that take a sufficient number of relata. Once we have [m], 
there is no problem in combining this matrix with the others. 
Essentially the problem concerns how the location of Molly in 
the situation being constructed is determined. The name 'Molly' can 
occur in either subject or object position within sentences,Z5 and 
which position it occupies determines the location Molly ought to 
take within the situation. However, it is no part of the meaning of 
'Molly' that the name occurs in subject position (or object 
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position), so meaning is not sufficient to determine interpretation. 
The solution to the problem requires allowing access to syntactic 
information about the sentence uttered, which is contained in the 
discourse situation d, one of the relata of meaning. Barwise and 
Perry, too, would have to allow this to solve the problem within the 
Aliass version of the semantics.26 
This point raises the question of whether entities like 
meaning, with which the semantics is concerned, are actually in the 
world as they are claimed to be. To solve the Object NP Problem 
requires the semantics to have access to the syntactic structure of 
the sentence uttered -- the interpretations of the subsentential 
expressions do not contain enough information on their own as to how 
the interpretations of the parts should be put together to produce 
the interpretation of the entire utterance. That is, the pieces of 
the world such as Jackie and the relation of biting that are 
interpretations of subsentential expressions do not combine by 
themselves to constitute compound interpretations. Situation 
semantics fails the principle of strong compositionality. So where 
does the extra information come from? If the problem can only be 
solved by allowing semantics access to syntax, have we not thereby 
introduced a syntactic or linguistic element into the semantics? 
3.3.3 Settings and situation types 
It is interesting to see if our representation of both settings 
and situations as matrices, which has proved very useful, can be 
extended: how do situation types (event types) fit into this picture? 
The difficulty with representing situation types as matrices is that 
in addition to the constituents of situations they contain 
indeterminates. The straightforward identification of event types as 
matrices, with holes replacing indeterminates, is not possible. 
There is a significant difference between a situation of type El and 
one of type E2, where these types are defined as: 
E1:= at l: loves, a, b; yes 
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E = at 1: loves, a, a; yes 
2' 
A situation is of type El just in case in it someone loves someone at 
the location 1; in general the two individuals will be distinct, 
though they need not be. In a situation of type E2, they must be 
identical. We cannot represent this difference if we simply replace 
indeterminates by holes. 
However, our basic intuition of certain parallels between 
situation types and settings as conceived here remains. In 
accommodating situation types to their theory, Barwise and Perry 
expanded the classes of primitives to include basic indeterminates; 
we could let matrices contain basic indeterminates too, and thus 
capture the above distinction, but is this the sensible course? 
To do this would mean that situation types would be effectively 
settings with no holes, like situations, which is contrary to our 
intuition -- situation types are more like settings than situations. 
Indeterminates are a technical method of correlating holes in certain 
cases, and we should therefore treat them as such. We may want to 
introduce indeterminates into the matrix representation, or we may 
choose some alternative method of correlating holes. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter divides into three sections. In the first I asked 
what kinds of things the - interpretations of basic and compound 
expressions in Determiner -free Alias were; it was found that only the 
interpretations of basic expressions are things in the world: the 
interpretations of all other categories must be abstract theoretical 
entities. I also argued that it is possible to reinterpret situation 
semantics such that even the interpretations of basic expressions are 
abstract entities -- classes of pairs <s ,e>. Moreover, I compared 
situation semantics with the traditional model theoretic semantics, 
which assigns individuals to terms and extensions to predicates, and 
showed that formally situation semantics is just the traditional 
theory plus quantification over situations. 
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In the second section I argued that the conception of the 
setting as originally presented can be developed as a rival to 
Barwise and Perry's formalisation of the setting in Aliass as an 
anchor for distinguished indeterminates, and that this original 
conception is formally equivalent to Barwise and Perry's 
formalisation. 
In the third and final section, I investigated the nature of 
settings and argued that the continuity between settings and 
situations, which is especially clear on the original conception of 
the setting, discloses the nature of abstract situations. The 
picture that emerges from a study of the problem of compositionality 
and the object NP problem is that this common nature is essentially 
linguistic. 
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Chapter Four: Russell, Richards, and Situation Semantics 
4.0 Introduction 
Frege and Russell represent the two great traditions in the 
philosophy of language over the last century. They divide crucially 
on the issue of semantic innocence: Frege distinguishing between 
sense and reference, Russell declining to follow this and instead 
urging his theory of denotation. In this chapter I want to compare 
situation semantics with' Russellian theory. In addition to 
considering Russell's own views, we shall compare the theory with the 
semantics developed by Barry Richards, which follows Russell closely. 
In Richards' system we have a full formal semantics for a range of 
grammatical constructions, and we can therefore compare it with 
situation semantics in detail. 
4.1 Russell's views on language and the world 
Russell's views of interest to us, on the relation of language 
to the world and the nature of propositions, are presented in The 
Principles of Mathematics (1903); in 'On Denoting' (1905); in his 
lectures 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' (1918); and in 'On 
Propositions' (1919), which, although following closely upon the 
lectures, presents different ideas from them. Russell called his 
view at this time the Philosophy of Logical Atomism; logical atomism 
construes the world as constituted out of many separate things: by a 
process of analysis we would eventually arrive at logical atoms, some 
of which are particulars and some of which are predicates or 
relations. These atoms are constituents of the world; the world also 
contains facts, which are the things in the world that make 
propositions either true or false. Facts are part of the real and 
objective world, they are as real as particulars; to describe the 
world we need to mention which facts it contains as well as which 
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particulars there are in it. (Russell, 1956, p. 183) 
Facts fall into two classes, particular facts and general 
facts. An example of a particular fact is that of Socrates being 
mortal;1 an example of a general fact is that of all men being 
mortal. Russell argues that a complete description of the world 
requires recourse to at least one general fact in addition to all 
particular facts -- namely, that these are all the facts there are. 
More specifically, general facts such as all men's being mortal 
cannot be derived from particular facts alone, such as as being 
mortal, b's being mortal, etc. One needs in addition the general 
fact that all men are among those here enumerated. (Russell, 1956, p. 
235) 
The simplest kinds of facts are those consisting of something 
being predicated of a single particular. Atomic facts consist of one 
or more particulars satisfying a predicate. Russell did not think 
that there were disjunctive facts that would make the proposition p 
or q true, but he did envisage negative facts.2 As well as atomic 
facts, there are facts, such as Othello's believing Desdemona loves 
Cassio, involving an attitude, which do not consist of a single 
predicate and a suitable number of particulars. I shall say more 
about these kinds of facts in conjunction with the propositions that 
correspond to them, to which subject we now turn. 
It is well known by those familiar with Russell's work that he 
changed his opinions frequently. I intend to review his thoughts 
about propositions briefly, and then to condense out a fixed 
position, which will be a useful reference point for the sequel. 
In The Principles of Mathematics Russell distinguishes some 
constituents of propositions, but believes that the proposition is 
more than the totality of these constituents. The proposition 'A 
differs from B' has as constituents: A, difference, B. 'Yet these 
constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the 
proposition.' (p. 49) The "extra" is some 'ultimate notion of 
assertion' which is lost when we break the proposition up into its 
parts. Russell here differs from Moore, who located propositions in 
the world, and identified true proposition and reality: 'The truth 
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that "I exist" differs in no respect from the corresponding reality 
"my existence ".' (Passmore, 1966, p. 203; see also Moore, 1899, 1903) 
While Russell would almost agree, he finds some 'ultimate notion of 
assertion' in the proposition 'Caesar died' which is absent from the 
corresponding part of reality, the event of Caesar's death. 
A proposition ... is essentially a unity, and when 
analysis has destroyed the unity, no enumeration of 
constituents will restore the proposition. The verb, 
when used as a verb, embodies the unity of the 
proposition, and is thus distinguishable from the verb 
considered as a term, though I do not know how to give a 
clear account of the precise nature of the distinction. 
(Russell, 1903, p. 50) 
We consider the verb as a term when we think of it as a thing, or 
when we focus our thoughts on the verb itself, which necessitates our 
removing it from its place in the proposition. At this stage, 
therefore, there was for Russell something puzzling about the nature 
of propositions, which concerned the way the constituents were held 
together within the proposition. This is quite an important idea, 
and one we shall return to. 
When he came to write 'On Denoting', Russell thought of 
propositions as entities which could have individuals as constituent 
parts; we are not told in that article what the other parts of 
propositions are conceived to be, or how all the parts are related. 
Propositions are, of course, spoken about and referred to by 
expressions in natural language or logical notation: Russell uses 
'C(á)', where a is a constant, to mean a proposition, and 'C(x)', x a 
variable, to designate a propositional function. This view of the 
nature of propositions -- as complex entities composed out of 
individuals contributed by singular terms and other constituents 
(attributes) contributed by verbs -- is what we shall take as 
representative of Russell's thought. For Russell, the propositional 
function is intensional: two propositional functions C(x) and C'(x) 
may be logically equivalent, yet the proposition C(a) is not the same 
proposition as C'(a). 
In the 1918 lectures, propositions are what are made true or 
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false by facts, but they are no longer themselves parts of the 
objective world. Nor are propositions names for facts, as is easily 
demonstrated from the observation that there are always two 
propositions corresponding to any one fact; one of the propositions 
is made true and the other is made false by the fact. Russell at 
this stage conceived of propositions as linguistic entities: 
A proposition, one may say, is a sentence in the 
indicative, a sentence asserting something, not 
questioning or commanding or wishing. [...] A 
proposition is just a symbol. It is a complex symbol in 
the sense that it has parts which are also symbols. 
(Russell, 1956, p. 185) 
Symbols for Russell were things that "mean" something else. His 
provisional definition of propositions and facts is: 
That the components of a proposition are the symbols we must 
understand in order to understand the proposition; 
That the components of the fact which makes a proposition 
true or false, as the case may be, are the meanings of 
the symbols which we must understand in order to 
understand the proposition. (Russell, 1956, p. 196) 
(Part of the reasoning for regarding this as a provisional definition 
is that certain components of molecular propositions: 'or', 'not', 
etc., do not correspond to anything in the facts corresponding to 
these propositions as wholes.) 
The section in the lectures on beliefs emphasises the view of 
propositions as those things which we believe. Nonetheless, the fact 
that corresponds to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
(1) Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio. 
does not have the form of a relation (believing) between a particular 
(Othello) and a proposition (expressed by 'Desdemona loves Cassio'). 
For Russell, 'It is just one fact that you have a belief' (Russell, 
1956, p. 218). Behind this view lies the problem of false belief: 
the problem, if true belief were a fact that consisted of a relation 
between the agent and something else, of saying what that something 
else is. The case of false belief prohibits our regarding belief as 
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a relation to facts, but can one regard belief as a relation even to 
propositions? Russell continues: 
You cannot say that you believe facts, because your 
beliefs are sometimes wrong. [...] You have to say that 
you believe propositions. The awkwardness of that is 
that obviously propositions are nothing. Therefore that 
cannot be the true account of the matter. [...] It does 
not seem to me very plausible to say that in addition to 
facts there are also these curious shadowy things going 
about such as That to -day is Wednesday' when in fact it 
is Tuesday. I cannot believe they go about the real 
world. It is more than one can manage to believe, and I 
do think no person with a vivid sense of reality can 
imagine it. (Russell, 1956, pp. 222,223) 
It is difficult to think of false propositions as part of the world, 
part of the furniture of the world, and as entities that enter into 
facts as constituents. Therefore Russell refused to believe that the 
belief contains the proposition; rather, he believed that the belief 
contains the only the constituents of the proposition as 
constituents.3 
Finally, in 'On Propositions' (1919), Russell asks 'Can the 
word "proposition" stand for anything except a form of words ?' In 
that paper he had come to a view of propositions as constituted out 
of words; but his interest in psychology resulted in an attempt to go 
further, and so he writes not only of word -propositions, but also of 
image -propositions, the latter being regarded as primary. 
From this brief summary we get a picture of the evolution in 
Russell's ideas on the nature of propositions. In his earliest 
stage, he regarded them as structures, parts of which (expressed by 
terms) are actual individuals, other parts of which are predicates, 
or verbs and thus linguistic, and the whole being put together in 
some way, which was not entirely clear but appeared to have to do 
with the proposition being asserted. The later Russell took the view 
that propositions were linguistic, and finally expressions were 
replaced by images. Of relevance to us in the present work is the 
view of his early period, when propositions can have individuals as 
their constituents. 
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4.2 Situation semantics and the ideas of Russell 
Barwise and Perry tell us that they regard situations as the 
basic constituents of the world, even to the extent of making 
individuals, relations and locations subordinate. They want to 
account for individuals, etc. as "uniformities" across situations.4 
The main issue underlying chapter three was how (abstract) situations 
and their components are related; what is the nature of abstract 
situations and their constituents, and how are these constituents 
held together within real situations? This issue reappeared in the 
discussion of Russell's ideas above (section 4.1) -- in his 
terminology, the issue is how propositions and their constituents, 
and facts and their constituents, are related. Russell saw the atoms 
of logical analysis -- particulars, predicates and relations -- and 
facts as the constituents of the world: the atoms and the facts are 
equally basic, for although facts can be analysed so that we discern 
the atoms that constitute their parts, facts are more than the 
collection of their parts. 
Just as for Russell, with logical atomism, facts were the 
starting point as the constituent parts of the objective world, so 
real situations have been the starting point for Barwise and Perry, 
working from ecological realism. Although there are differences, it 
is fair to regard real situations in situation semantics as 
corresponding to facts in Russell's work. (I want to emphasise the 
similarities between their views as well as point out the 
differences.) Consider the similarity between the following two 
passages, the first from Russell, the second from Barwise and Perry: 
The things in the world have various properties, and 
stand in various relations to each other. That they have 
these properties and relations are facts, and the things 
and their qualities or relations are quite clearly in 
some sense or other components of the facts that have 
those qualities or relations. (Russell, 1956, p. 192) 
Reality consists of situations -- individuals having 
properties and standing in relations at various spatio- 
temporal locations. We are always in situations; we see 
them, cause them to come about, and have attitudes toward 
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them. The Theory of Situations is an abstract theory for 
talking about situations. We begin by pulling out of 
real situations the basic building blocks of the theory; 
individuals, properties. and relations, and locations. 
These are conceived of as invariants or, as we shall call 
them, uniformities across real situations; the same 
individuals and properties appear again and again in 
different locations. (S &A, pp. 7,8) 
The basic entity in each theory, whether fact or situation, is viewed 
as part of the world. 
The first major difference between situation semantics and 
Russell's theory is that (abstract) situations can, and often do, 
contain more than one constituent sequence, and are thereby able to 
specify more about the world than facts. Not only do we have 
situations such as el and e2, but also situations like e3: 
e1:= at li: barking, Jackie; yes 
e2:= at 12: biting, Jackie, Molly; no 
e3:= at 13: eating, Jackie; yes 
eating, Molly; no 
at 1 reading, Jon; yes 
4' 
In this way situations can describe more of the world than facts. As 
in Russell's theory, there are negative facts in situation semantics 
(cf. e2), but unlike Russell, for whom there were no disjunctive or 
conjunctive facts, Barwise and Perry allow situations which support 
the truth of sentences that are conjunctions of subsentences, such as 
(2) Jackie is barking and Molly is eating. 
A consequence of situations having such structure is that in 
situation semantics we can give the truth definition for an utterance 
of (2) either directly, as if it were an atomic sentence, or 
indirectly, treating the conjunction in the normal manner in truth 
conditional semantics. For an arbitrary conjunctive sentence p & q 
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The comparison with the connective v is instructive. We can give the 
truth conditions for an utterance of a sentence p v g in either form, 
since we know how to find the interpretation of the entire utterance, 
given the interpretations of the subsentences p and q.5 However, 
there are no "disjunctive situations ", abstract situations which 
specify that either p or else q. All the situations which support 
the truth of an utterance of p v g do so in virtue of supporting the 
truth of one of the disjuncts.6 
Consider also the connective ->: " p -> q can be defined 
as one would expect. If we read -> as material implication, then p 
-> q is true at <d,c> in hl iff: 
d,c p 
materially implies g 
If we read -> as Barwise and Perry's strong consequence, then 
d, c p -> g iff d,c t[p](Ç d,c ([q]( Could the meaning of p -> q be 
defined directly, as with the connectives & and v? Because of its 
connection with deduction, -> tends to cause us to shift our thought 





([q]( , rather than to define ([p -> q] 
directly. What would it for a situation e to be such that 
d,cl[p -> q]( e? Thus, no one believes there are "implicational 
facts" in the world; in situation semantics we have instead 
structural constraints between situations. 
In the more recent development of situation semantics, Barwise 
has interestingly adopted the word 'fact' into the vocabulary of 
situation semantics and uses it to mean an atomic fact in the 
Russellian sense (Barwise, 1984, lecture 1). It is important to 
realise that facts for Barwise are not set theoretic entities like 
abstract situations, but are parts of the world, just as Russell 
conceived of them. 
A located fact f consists of a sequence x1,...,xn (n > 0) 
of objects standing, or not standing, in a spatio- 
temporal relation r at a space -time location 1. An 
unlocated fact f consists of a sequence x1,...,xn (n > 1) 
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of objects standing, or not standing, in a certain non - 
spatio- temporal relation r. (Barwise, 1984, lecture 1, p. 
2) 
Barwise then goes on to say how he intends to classify facts and real 
situations with set theoretic objects. The set theoretic object that 
corresponds to a fact is called a 'circumstance'.7 
In situation semantics sentences designate situations, or more 
precisely, utterances designate classes of abstract situations. The 
rejection of Frege's choice of a truth value as the designation for 
sentences (utterances) has resulted in a major structural change to 
the semantics, with sentential references becoming more sensitive to 
the subject matter of the sentence. This feature enables an innocent 
semantics to get off the ground and the reference of an utterance, 
its interpretation, to perform some of the roles given to Fregean 
senses. In particular we are interested in whether the 
interpretations of utterances can be regarded as propositions. In an 
earlier version of the theory, a realistic proposition was a class of 
abstract situations which satisfied the monotonicity constraint, and 
thus something that could be designated by an utterance of a sentence 
(Barwise and Perry, 1981b, p. 699). Propositions, in the sense in 
which they occur in that paper, have no role in the 1983 theory, 
because they are proper classes and hence they do not correspond to 
anything that could be part of the causal order.8 
There is an interesting remark on the use of 'realistic' in the 
term 'realistic proposition': 
The adjective 'realistic' is here used to emphasize that 
these are constructs of real objects, properties, and 
locations, not things in someone's head. (Barwise and 
Perry, 1981b, p. 669) 
But the point is that they are still constructs; realistic 
propositions in this sense are not to be found in the world. 
There is a difference in the way that the theories of Russell 
and Barwise and Perry deal with the semantics of the attitudes. For 
Russell, the fact corresponding to a belief sentence consists simply 
of the agent having the belief he does: belief is not a relation to a 
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proposition. Belief certainly is not a relation that the agent has 
to a fact, since people can believe falsely. Construing belief as a 
relation that the agent has to a proposition can only be a facon de 
parler, for propositions are not really anything (see the quotation 
above). Rather, there is one large fact that the agent has the 
belief he does; the constituents of this fact are the agent, the 
predicate of believing, and the particulars and predicate of the 
embedded sentence: 
It is not accurate to say 'I believe the proposition 2' 
and regard the occurrence as a twofold relation between 
me and p. [...] Therefore the belief does not really 
contain a propositionas a constituent but only contains 
the constituents of the proposition as constituents. 
(Russell, 1956, p. 224) 
Russell had in a way already abandoned the principle of 
compositionality at the level of reference when he regarded a 
proposition as more than the sum of its parts. Once we had analysed 
it into its constituents, he thought, -- individuals and a verb or 
predicate -- we had lost something: it was no longer the proposition, 
but just the collection of the constituents. Here, too, in the 
semantics of the attitudes, he relinquishes the principle of 
compositionality. When the embedded sentence, which on its own 
expresses a proposition and designates a truth value, occurs in a 
belief sentence as here, it does not express a proposition and does 
not designate anything. Indeed, semantically the embedded sentence 
is not a constituent of the whole utterance. 
In situation semantics an effort is made to preserve the 
principle of compositionality. The embedded sentence 'Desdemona 
loves Cassio' in (1) designates (with respect to a discourse 
situation and speaker connections) a class of abstract situations 
just as usual, and believing is understood intuitively to be a 
relation between the agent and these situations. However, working 
out the details of this idea has proved problematic for the approach, 
and much of Situations and Attitudes is devoted to discussing the 
problems and trying to resolve them. Consideration of all these 
issues is postponed until later chapters, when we shall have 
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completed the basic analysis of situation semantics, and can treat 
them more profoundly. 
4.3 Richards' theory 
Of great importance to our analysis is the formal theory that 
Barry Richards has proposed. In this section I shall explain that 
theory, making comparisons with Russell's ideas; in the next section 
the theory will be compared to situation semantics, which promises to 
be a fruitful exercise. The semantics is laid out mainly in Richards 
(1974), and an extension for adverbs is given in Richards (1976). 
On Richards' proposal there is, in addition to the object 
language, a family of languages L(y'd, g,,g), indexed by the sets 
and _6. An utterance of a sentence of the object language 
expresses a certain proposition. Much of Richards (1974) is 
concerned with theories of definite descriptions and names, which are 
regarded as pragmatically ambiguous, so that the extraction of a 
particular proposition as the one expressed in an utterance of an 
object language sentence is seen as part of pragmatics. Consider the 
following passage, quoted in chapter two and repeated here: 
The pragmatic features of a sentence are those whose 
semantic import is determined only relative to an 
utterance or context of use. Indexi.cals, such as that 
and here, are among the familiar examples. Unless 
relativized to an utterance, a sentence containing an 
indexical is neither true nor false, for the indexical by 
itself has no definite referent and thus the sentence 
expresses no determinate proposition. (Richards, 1976, p. 
355) 
Today, pragmatic features of natural language such as indexicality 
have been subjected to considerable study, whereas in Russell's day 
attention focused on the "narrow semantic" properties of languages, 
mainly because these were the issues that arose in the study of 
formal languages and were regarded as the main semantic issues at the 
time. Richards recognises that something has to be said about this 
question, and so devotes a lot of space to it; but he sees it as part 
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of the pragmatic component of his theory. 
Semantics comes into play only after the pragmatic component 
has done its work and delivered up the proposition expressed. This 
is the essential structure of Richards' theory: the input to 
pragmatics is an utterance, which is represented by the sentence and 
'a point of reference' -- in general, such information about the 
context of utterance as is required to determine the proposition. 
The task of pragmatics is to determine the proposition expressed, 
which then becomes the input to the semantic component. Semantics is 
concerned with specifying truth conditions and detailing inferences. 
Significantly, this view of the relation between pragmatics and 
semantics locates many of the questions about reference within 
pragmatics. (Compare this view with that of Stalnaker, 1972, 
discussed in chapter two.) 
In this theory, propositions are conceived very much in the 
manner of Russell. The proposition expressed by an utterance of an 
object language sentence is specified in terms of individuals and 
predicates, for example, as 'u loves v'. Here the 'u' and 'v' stand 
for the actual individuals involved; much care is needed to 
understand exactly what is involved here. Richards says: 
The parameters are not names of these objects, nor are 
they used to refer to them; rather they stand in their 
stead. [...] It will be appreciated, therefore, that we 
are actually thinking of propositions somewhat as Russell 
once conceived of them, ie. as determined in part by the 
objects referred to rather than the singular terms used 
to refer to them. (Richards, 1976, p. 360) 
When we speak of the proposition 'u loves v', then, we are using the 
symbols 'u' and 'v' in place of the individual objects concerned, and 
the proposition is the admittedly rather strange, quasi -linguistic 
entity that consists of these two objects and the predicate 'loves'. 
The proposition is not just the collection of these three entities: 
they are put together by the linguistic operation of concatenation 
(this aspect to Richards' theory receives attention shortly). Hence 
the proposition is this quasi- linguistic entity 'u loves v_': that is, 
we are here exhibiting the proposition itself, rather than naming it 
- 100- 
metalinguistically. 
Because of the pragmatic ambiguity inherent in the object 
language and the view that dealing with it is part of pragmatics, not 
semantics, Richards introduces the level of the logical languages 
L( 12 , 4-, .B) over which to define the semantic component of his 
theory. A language L is determined by its set of predicate 
letters, its set J-- of function letters, and its set ,(7 of individual 
constants. An utterance of a sentence A of the object language is 
connected to a formula (P in a language L( , , C) through the 
proposition expressed: the formula y is chosen precisely because, 
under an interpretation, as a sentence of L it expresses the same 
proposition as the utterance of A. The semantic component of 
Richards' theory is a model theoretic semantics for the family of 
languages L( P,` ,.ß ) . 
Now comes a shift in the way we think of the theory. Rather 
than regarding the sentences of L as expressing propositions, we can 
regard them as representing propositions. On this view sentences of 
a language L under an interpretation are a theoretical explication of 
(Russellian) propositions. Consider a sentence P(t1,t2) of L where P 
E 
0" and t1 and t2 E ,,g. We may think of P(t1,t2) as representing, 
say, the proposition that Jackie is biting Molly under the chosen 
model '1 . Like Richards (1974), I am here using metalanguage names, 
not exhibiting expressions of L(óß, li-, $ ). Thus t1 and t2 are names 
in the metalanguage for Jackie and Molly respectively, P is a name in 
the metalanguage for the suitably chosen predicate in , and 
P(t1,t2) is a complex name in the metalanguage for the appropriate 
formula of L. Because the set of individual constants can be 
anything,9 we can choose L so that .ß includes Jackie and Molly, and 
so that the formula P(t1,t2) is a quasi- linguistic entity with 
components Jackie, Molly, and the predicate P C , which is 
interpreted in y4c as biting. The sentence P(t1,t2) is proposed as a 
suitable candidate for (a representation of) the Russellian 
proposition expressed by the original utterance. 
This shift in our understanding of the theory highlights the 
strange status of the language L. Expressions of L are sometimes the 
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usual kinds of linguistic object, as with the predicates; but at 
other times our intuitions are strained, for we are asked to think of 
any kind of object, including in particular physical objects such as 
Jackie and Ortcutt, as expressions of these languages. There is a 
tension here between Jackie, say, as physical object and as 
expression in a language L(9, --, e) where 4 contains Jackie (ie. 
the physical object). By placing an object in the set .6, that same 
ob-iect becomes an expression in various languages L. The situation 
is further complicated by the fact that, to return to the example, 
Jackie as expression is assigned as reference Jackie, the physical 
object, by the interpretation function. I have explained the syntax 
of the languages L and indicáted that we are intended to think of the 
closed formulae of these languages as propositions; I turn now to say 
something about semantics. 
A model for L(6 , 4 (3) is an ordered pair ' _ <X,V >, where 
the domain X is the union of the sets of individual constants and 
Y of all sentences of L; and V is a function which assigns extensions 
to each predicate letter P E 0 and function letter F E . More 
precisely, for each k -place predicate letter P e , V(P) is a k- 
place relation on X; and for each k -place function letter F 
V(F) is a k -place operation on X. The reader will notice that V has 
not been defined on ; partly we want each ç e .1 to be assigned 
itself, and partly Richards deals with the model theoretic meaning of 
individual constants by defining another function S on the set of 
closed terms. A term of a language L (Q 4, t) is closed iff it is 
either: 
(1) an individual constant, 
(2) a sentence of L( , -, ), or 
(3) an expression of the form F(t1,...,tn), where F is an 
n -ary function letter and each ti (i = 1,...,n) is a 
closed term. (Richards, 1974, p. 434) 
* 
The function S is defined by: 
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(1) If t is an individual constant or a sentence of 
L(6), W -,-2D), then S (t) is t; and 
(2) If t is a closed term of the form F(t1,...,tn), then 
S *(t) is the value of V(F) at <t1,...tn >. (p. 435)10 
* 
Richards has split the interpretation function into two, V and S ; 
the net result, however, is that individual constants are assigned 
themselves, as members of the domain, as references. To illustrate, 
and perhaps make the point more clearly, Jackie, qua expression of a 
language L, is assigned Jackie, qua physical object, as reference. 
Yet it is Jackie we are thinking of in both cases. 
The goal of Richards' theory is to provide an analysis and 
explication of Russellian propositions -- propositions which have 
"bare" individuals as constituents, as opposed to having either 
designating expressions, concepts, or Fregean senses as constituents. 
In identifying the formulae of a language L with Russellian 
propositions, Richards is claiming that the proposition is 
essentially a linguistic entity; its parts are individuals and 
predicates, but the way they are put together -- the thing that 
puzzled Russell -- is an operation which at bottom is the 
concatenation of linguistic expressions. In the next chapter we 
shall consider the abstract situations of Barwise and Perry's theory, 
where, if we consider abstract situations as analogous to 
propositions, the relation of the parts within the whole is affirmed 
to be non -linguistic and is represented by a set theoretic operation, 
set membership. 
Notice that we can express within Richards' semantics a 
distinction between determinate and non -determinate propositions, 
which reflects Russell's distinction between particular and general 
propositions. We can make this distinction because a single sentence 
can be used to express either of these kinds of proposition on 
different occasions. It will be no surprise that these sentences 
contain definite descriptions. 
Following Richards (1976), suppose Harry utters (3) and that 
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some individual w is such that both Harry intends to refer to w and 
Harry believes that w is the senior caretaker. 
(3) The senior caretaker writes guide books. 
Then this example satisfies Richards' conditions for Harry to refer 
definitely to w, and to determine a particular proposition, namely, 
that w writes guide books. Again, suppose John utters (3) and that 
John believes that exactly one person is the senior caretaker and 
intends to refer to whoever is the unique senior caretaker, but for 
all x, it is not the case that x is such that John intends to refer 
to x. Then, assuming w is the (unique) senior caretaker, John refers 
attributively to w. The proposition that John expresses in uttering 
(3) is, however, not that w writes guide books, but that whoever is 
the unique senior caretaker writes guide books, ie. 
(gx)(x is a senior caretaker & (Vy)(y is a senior caretaker 
y = x) & x writes guide books). 
This distinction is precisely Russell's distinction between 
particular and general propositions. The determinate or particular 
proposition involves an individual,11 and the non -determinate or 
general proposition has a quantifier binding a variable (remember 
Russell's examples of general propositions: that all men are mortal, 
that all men are amongst those here enumerated). 
The problems with propositional attitude contexts are pragmatic 
problems of reference for Richards; a sentence aZCp(t) with a 
singular term t inside a modal operator Z does not always allow 
either exportation of the term or existential generalisation. The 
context can be either transparent or opaque; traditionally the 
sentence has been regarded as having two readings, a de re reading 
and a de dicto reading. The opaque or de dicto reading does not 
generally permit exportation. In Richards' theory the modal cases 
are treated analogously to the nonmodal cases; the theory is 
therefore fundamentally innocent. As in the nonmodal cases, the 
pragmatic part of the theory determines which proposition a speaker u 
expresses in uttering a sentence aZ p(t) on an occasion, and only 
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then does the semantics take over, operating on this proposition in 
the usual manner. 
The details are as follows. A speaker who utters (4) below on 
an occasion might express one of four kinds of proposition: he might 
have Scott in mind and intend to refer to him (two propositions), or 
he might not (another two propositions). 
(4) George IV believed that the author of Waverley also wrote 
travel guides. 
If the speaker has Scott in mind and intends to refer to him (if the 
speaker refers definitely to Scott), then he might express the 
proposition that Scott is such that George IV believed he wrote 
travel guides, that is, he expresses the proposition that Scott has 
the property of being believed by George IV to write travel guides. 
The other proposition which he might express by uttering (4) with 
definite reference is that Scott is such that George IV believed he 
was the author of Waverley and he wrote travel guides. Formulated 
differently, Scott has the property of being believed by George IV to 
be the author of Waverley and to write travel guides. 
If no one is such that the speaker intends to refer to them in 
uttering the definite description in (4), but the speaker nonetheless 
refers to Scott, in virtue of the fact that Scott is the unique 
author of Waverley and that the speaker believes that exactly one 
person is the author of Waverley and intends to refer to him, in this 
attributive case the proposition expressed is that there is exactly 
one author of Waverley and George IV believed that he also wrote 
travel guides. The other proposition in the present case of 
attributive reference is that there is exactly one author of Waverley 
and George IV believed that he was the author of Waverley and also 
wrote travel guides. We can represent these four propositions as 
follows: 
(5) a. s has the property Au Bel(g.,W(u,t)) 
b. s has the property Au Bel(g.,A(u,w) & W(u,t)) 
(6) a. ( .]x) (A(x,w) & (Vy.) (A(y.,w) = Y = x) & x has the 
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property Au Bel(g,W(u,t))) 
b. (}x)(A(x,w) & (VY)(A(y,w) = Y = x) & x has the 
property Àu Bel(g,A(u,w) & W(u,t))) 
The notational conventions I have adopted here are intuitive: 's' 
stands for Scott, 'g' for George IV, 't' for travel guides, 'w' for 
Waverley, 'W' for 'writes', and 'A' for 'author of'. 
Like Russell's account, this theory is innocent: no intensional 
entities are invoked, and the semantics is the same in this respect 
in the modal and nonmodal cases. When the description is used 
referentially, the proposition expressed is not simply one of the 
form George IV believed that p, for some proposition 2, an analysis 
that Russell also rejects when the proposition is understood as 
having the structure that 'believes' related George IV and p. Rather 
the form is that the individual s has a certain property, 
AuBel(g,W(u,t)). While Russell clearly tells us what form the 
proposition expressed does not have -- namely, that George IV 
believed that p -- he does not say what form it does have. All we 
know is that the proposition has as constituents: George IV, 
believing, Scott, and (the property of) writing travel guides. In 
his analysis, Richards goes beyond Russell: he takes some of these 
constituents and constructs the property of being believed by George 
IV to write travel guides; then the proposition expressed by the 
utterance of the whole sentence is just that Scott has this property. 
On the other hand, when the description is used attributively, 
the proposition expressed is that there is a unique author of 
Waverley and he is believed by George IV to write travel guides. In 
this case, the same complex property, AuBel(g,W(u,t)), is satisfied 
by an individual, though the individual in question is whoever makes 
true the proposition represented above (6a) with an existential 
quantifier. 
The structure of Richards' theory (pragmatics and semantics) 
can now be seen. An utterance determines a proposition, and I have 
looked at the four kinds of proposition that can be expressed, the 
differences resulting from a pragmatic ambiguity in definite 
descriptions. Thus the task of the pragmatic part of the theory is 
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to determine the proposition expressed when a sentence is uttered on 
an occasion. There are determinate or particular propositions, in 
which a particular individual has a specified property; and there are 
general propositions, where there is a unique something or other, and 
it has a specified property. The specified property in each case is 
generated from the other elements of the sentence, and the procedure 
is really no different, whether the sentence contains a modal 
operator or not. In all of this, Richards' approach is fundamentally 
Russellian and innocent. Most important of all for us is the fact 
that Richards uses linguistic concatenation of expressions to 
represent the relation that holds among the constituents of a 
proposition. 
4_4 Situation semantics and Richards' theory 
The issues to be borne in mind as we compare situation 
semantics and Richards' theory are the following. First there is the 
question of where the boundary between semantics and pragmatics is 
drawn by each theory, and what is dealt with at the different levels 
or components. I shall be concerned with the basic structure of the 
semantics in each case, concentrating on the mathematical structure 
and excluding philosophical or meta -theoretical commentary (there is 
little by Richards in any case, but the exposition of situation 
semantics is full of it). Further, we shall seek to determine which 
entity in situation semantics can appropriately be regarded as the 
proposition. Finally, I shall consider, briefly here but in detail 
in the next chapter, both the relation between the abstract entities 
of the semantics and the real world, an enterprise on which Barwise 
has been especially concerned to focus attention, and the nature of 
the relations that hold among the abstract entities. 
Both the theories acknowledge the need for the study of 
language to be concerned with the situations in which language is 
uttered. Richards says, at the beginning of his (1974): 'Following a 
recent trend, we accept that any adequate theory of reference must be 
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pragmatically based.' (p. 361) As a consequence, sentences only 
express propositions when uttered at a point of reference, as 
Richards says, consisting of an ordered pair <u,t>, where u is the 
speaker and t is the time of utterance. This matter is at the heart 
of situation semantics; the authors Barwise and Perry go to 
considerable pains to emphasise their conviction that the formal 
semantics of natural language has been too much influenced by the 
model theoretic semantics of mathematical and formal languages, 
resulting in the neglect of such properties as efficiency, 
exemplified by the phenomenon of indexicality. The two theories are 
based upon different positions regarding the issue of wide or narrow 
semantics, as I called it in chapter two. Whereas for Richards 
semantics is about giving a theory of reference, for Barwise and 
Perry it is about a theory of linguistic meaning, of those factors 
that govern how an expression, used on an arbitrary occasion, has the 
interpretation it does with respect to that occasion. 
Richards conceives of propositions as linguistic entities. As 
I have shown, the proposition expressed is not so much expressed by, 
but represented by and regarded as a closed formula cps e L. This 
formula is also, from another point of view, a compound, quasi - 
linguistic entity composed out of real world individuals and 
predicate letters (and function letters!) of L. It is at once 
linguistic in being a formula of a language, and yet non -linguistic 
in having among its constituents parts of the world; therefore are 
there these two perspectives towards it. The operation of 
concatenation in L has taken on the burden of representing the 
relation, whatever it is, that holds between the constituents in a 
Russellian proposition. 
In situation semantics the proposition expressed on an occasion 
is the interpretation of the sentence uttered with respect to the 
discourse situation and speaker connections. Interpretations are 
classes of situations, and situations are set theoretic constructs of 
individuals, properties and relations, and locations. If we attempt 
to draw the parallels with Richards' theory, we find that the 
primitives -- our basic constituents -- consist of more real world 
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entities in situation semantics. In both cases these constituents 
are composed into propositions (regarding abstract situations as 
propositions for the moment), but whereas for Richards this operation 
is openly recognised as linguistic, with Barwise and Perry it is said 
to be set theoretic. 
The basic parallel raises the question of whether the set 
theory in situation semantics does not play a fundamentally 
linguistic role in replacing the explicitly linguistic structures of 
Richards' theory (and Fregean theories). Although the only explicit 
language is the object language, situations are theoretical and 
abstract entities that are composed out of things in the world put 
together in certain ways. The parts are held together in the world, 
although the way in which this is so puzzled Russell. Barwise and 
Perry do not have much to say about it in an illuminating way either 
(we are told that real situations are prior and that the parts are 
isolated as "uniformities" across real situations). In situation 
semantics the parts are put together set -theoretically, but the 
question arises as to what kind of structure the set theory embeds or 
encodes. This question is the topic for the next chapter, though it 
has been prowling around in the background since chapter three. 
There is a matter that needs to be clarified: should we regard 
the proposition in situation semantics as an abstract situation or as 
a class of abstract situations (the interpretation of some 
utterance)? In many cases there will be one situation in the 
interpretation 
d,c 
([ <n](that is contained in all the other situations 
in 'e ](. Where this situation exists, call it the minimum 
situation. Since all the information in the interpretation can be 
extracted from the minimum situation (in a given model), the 
semantics could theoretically be redefined with respect to it, were 
it not for the problem that not every utterance has an interpretation 
that contains a minimum situation. For example, the interpretation 
of an utterance of a sentence containing a definite description has 
no minimum situation when the description is used attributively. 
An example will make this point clear. The interpretation of 
an utterance of 
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(7) The bravest warrior among the Achaeans has won the best 
prize of the games. 
will contain more than one situation which is minimal. A situation 
in which Ajax is the bravest warrior among the Achaeans and where 
Ajax has won the best prize is in the interpretation; so is a 
situation where Achilles fulfils these conditions. More precisely, 
both e and e2 are in the interpretation: 
e1:= at 1: bravest -warrior -among- the -Achaeans, Ajax; yes 
at l': winning, p, Ajax; yes 
e 
2' 
.= at 1: bravest -warrior- among- the -Achaeans, Achilles; yes 
at l': winning, p, Achilles; yes 
where 1 o ld, l' < ld, and p is the best prize of the games (a 
referential use of the definite description, we may assume). Yet 
neither e1 Ç e2 nor e2 Ç e1, so the interpretation does not contain a 
minimum situation. 
This feature -- that many interpretations do not have a minimum 
situation -- is deeply rooted in the semantics, in the way situations 
are defined. More specifically, it is rooted in the decision that 
situations should be abstract entities constructed out of actual 
individuals, relations and locations. To get at the proposition 
expressed or the statement made when a definite description is used 
attributively by saying that there is a unique something or other 
that is such and such (which is the conception of the proposition 
expressed when there is attributive reference in Richards' theory) is 
prohibited in situation semantics. Barwise and Perry never speak of 
a proposition of the form 'there is an x such that F(x)' -- perhaps 
this is a consequence of their revolt against the undue influence of 
formal logic on natural language semantics. 
Essentially, Barwise and Perry are denying that the logical 
structure of an utterance of 'The D is F', where D is a definite 
description used attributively, is (- !x)(D(x) & F(x)).12 That is, 
they reject Russell's analysis of definite descriptions; they reject 
the idea that general propositions have a special form. Instead, 
- 110 - 
situation semantics specifies the proposition by requiring the class 
to contain the situations a is such and such, b is such and such, 
etc., where á, b, ... are all the individuals that satisfy the 
description. If this is correct and it is not the case that they 
have simply not yet dealt with general propositions in detail, 
Barwise and Perry intend Russell's general propositions to be 
represented in situation semantics by classes of abstract situations 
(classes of particular propositions).13 
The state of the semantics -- any special form for general 
propositions being relinquished -- creates difficulties for thinking 
of propositions as single abstract situations. Without a special 
form for general propositions, we can only represent them through 
classes of abstract situations. Yet there is merit in the idea of an 
abstract situation corresponding to a proposition: if we were to add 
to the representational power of situation semantics, so that we 
could construct an abstract situation that would of itself specify 
that p, for p a general proposition, then the idea would be 
vindicated.14 
To summarise this section on the relation between Richards' 
theory and situation semantics, we have found that Richards believes 
semantics should be narrow semantics and concern itself with 
reference, whereas Barwise and Perry believe that we should do wide 
semantics and give prominence to linguistic meaning. The notion of 
the proposition is central to Richards' semantics; in contrast, it is 
not clear that there are propositions in the 1983 version of 
situation semantics, or what they might be, but it seems that in 
certain circumstances abstract situations can be regarded as 
propositions. Finally, Barwise and Perry are going beyond Russell 
and Richards in employing not predicates, but rather real world 
properties and relations, in their semantics. Counting also the 
addition of locations, regarded as parts of the world, to situation 
semantics, Barwise and Perry have gone the entire way to constructing 
propositions out of pieces of the world. 
Chapter Five: The. Quasi - Linguistic Status of the Semantics 
5.0 Introduction 
Probably the most radical departure from tradition to be found 
in situation semantics is the claim that meaning is located in the 
world, independent of language. The aim of this chapter is to 
examine and evaluate this claim about situation semantics to discover 
whether the semantics as actually given vindicates the rhetoric, and, 
more generally, to ask in the process whether such a theory is 
possible at all. To anticipate results, our concern is to establish 
that Barwise and Perry have not achieved what they claim; that there 
is an irreducible linguistic or quasi -linguistic residue inherent in 
situation semantics. 
We shall concentrate initially on abstract situations, the 
relation of their constituents, and on the role of the set theory 
that is employed to construct abstract situations. Then we shall 
consider the formal apparatus of abstract situations as a formal 
language which requires to be interpreted via model theory, thus 
treating it explicitly as a language, and investigating the 
consequences. Finally we shall apply the argument that motivated a 
recent extension of the theory by Robin Cooper to show that the 
theory must be extended further; the result of these extensions is to 
turn the level of abstract situations into a syntactic system. 
5.1 The quasi- linguistic status of the semantics 
5.1.1 Abstract situations displace real situations1 
Barwise's paper 'Scenes and Other Situations' is concerned with 
a certain kind of report -- what are called naked infinitive (NI) 
perceptual reports, after the form of the verb in the embedded 
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clause. To illustrate the kinds of report involved, (1) is a NI 
perceptual report, whereas (2) is not. 
(1) Odysseus saw the Cyclops milk the ewes and goats. 
(2) Odysseus saw that the Cyclops was milking the ewes and 
goats. 
Barwise's analysis of (1) in his paper falls into two parts: firstly, 
he says there is a scene s (a visually perceived situation) which 
Odysseus saw, and secondly, this scene supports the truth of 'The 
Cyclops milk the ewes and goats'. 
(3) 4s(Odysseus sees s & s E ([the Cyclops milk the ewes and 
goats]( ) 
This analysis reflects both the fact that Odysseus is causally 
affected by something in the world, the scene which he sees, and the 
fact that the scene, as part of the world, is important for 
determining the truth or falsity of the perceptual report. This 
conception of a scene supporting the truth of a sentence Ç is 'the 
central notion in the theory'. (Barwise, 1981, p. 390) 
At the time the early papers on situation semantics were 
written (Barwise, 1981; Barwise and Perry, 1981a, 1981b), Barwise and 
Perry thought there was a world, ie. a largest or total situation. 
(Later they change their mind about this: in Barwise and Perry (1983) 
the model theory leaves the existence of a world undecided and 
Barwise and Perry do not commit themselves one way or the other; in 
Barwise's more recent work (Barwise, 1984), the possibility of a 
world is explicitly excluded.) Situations were parts of this 
reality. At this stage in the development of the theory, therefore, 
situations are real situations, parts of the real world.2 Barwise 
writes: 
Any part of the way the world M happens to be I call a 
situation in M. Scenes are visually perceived 
situations. The central notion in the theory is that of 
a scene or other situation supporting the truth of a 
sentence cip in M. ( Barwise, 1981, p. 390) 
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The interpretation WIM of a sentence CQ is a collection of real 
situations; when Barwise gives examples of some scenes, they are 
parts of the world: for example, the scene in Barwise's office seen 
from under his desk. 
Why is it that those situations which have the central role in 
the theory at this stage are real situations, but that later the 
central position is taken over by abstract situations? The crucial 
point is that in Barwise (1981), there is no analysis of the internal 
structure of situations; in fact Barwise explicitly acknowledges that 
one of the things that must be done to make his proposed semantic 
theory precise is to 'explain exactly how we represent situations' 
(Barwise, 1981, p. 391). Notice particularly the way scenes and 
situations are specified: thus, 'the scene seen from under the desk'. 
Already, however, situations are understood in terms of what 
constitutes them: objects having properties and bearing relations to 
one another. Once the attempt is made to articulate the structure of 
situations -- by discerning their parts: individuals, relations and 
locations, -- the question of how these parts are related raises its 
head. Barwise and Perry use set theory to put the pieces of 
situations together, but what they produce by this procedure are of 
course abstract situations, not the things in the world they started 
out with. The switch to abstract situations is necessitated, 
significantly and interestingly, by the need to make accessible the 
internal structure of situations. 
We have established that abstract situations have taken over 
the central role from real situations;3 but the question of the real 
nature of the structure possessed by these set theoretic entities 
remains in large part to be answered. On the surface it is a set 
theoretic structure; but the question we are urging is whether this 
set theoretical structure hides a fundamentally linguistic or 
language- dependent structure. In our evaluation of the truth of 
Barwise and Perry's claim to do semantics in terms of meanings and 
structures in the world, independent of language, we are interested 
in the possibility that some of the semantic entities to which they 
help themselves are perhaps after all linguistic, with the 
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consequence that their claim would be invalidated. 
5.1.2 The setting and distinguished indeterminates 
As basic indeterminates, the distinguished indeterminates a, b, 
1 and tv of Aliass are all urelements of the set theory, and can 
therefore be any objects at all, except sets (either generated from 
other urelements or the empty set). What is meant by distinguished 
indeterminates? What sort of role do these indeterminates have in 
the semantics? According to the philosophical backdrop to situation 
semantics, meaning -- both linguistic and non - linguistic -- is 
claimed to exist in the world prior to language; but an examination 
of the role of these entities suggests the contrary view. So are 
they a means of covertly maintaining required linguistic structure in 
the semantics? We focus in this chapter on the question of whether 
the semantic entities in situation semantics have retained a quasi - 
linguistic character. 
Ignoring the tense marker and polarity for simplicity, the 
sentences of Aliass have a certain grammatical structure, which 
consists of a relation symbol, a subject, and an optional object. 
The role of the indeterminates a and b is to act as place holders in 
the situation being constructed, until the semantic values of 
(respectively) the subject and, if present, the object can be 
entered. The function of these indeterminates can be seen more 
clearly if we think of the situation as being constructed from the 
components <r, a, b >, á, and b. I am here using a dynamic language 
and speak of the situation designated by an utterance as being 
constructed out of pieces contributed by the constituent expressions 
of the sentence; in effect, the utterance simply designates the 
situation <r, a, b >. Nonetheless, the dynamic view is supported by 
the idea behind the principle of compositionality, namely, to relate 
the interpretation of the whole to the interpretations of the parts. 
The role of a and b, and indeed of the other distinguished 
indeterminates, is not to determine what any of the constituent 
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expressions designate, nor, ultimately, what the whole sentence 
designates. Rather, expressed dynamically, their function is a 
compositional one, to operate in the process of constructing the 
interpretation of the whole from the interpretation of the parts. 
The setting has a similar function; in fact, the roles of these two 
kinds of entity -- setting and distinguished indeterminate -- are not 
only linked, but are essentially one. Neither has a semantic role: 
they have the function of operating together to ensure that the 
interpretations of expressions are put together in the right way in 
constructing the described situation. 'In the right way' means, of 
course, that, respectively, the structure of the described situation 
and the particular way that that structure is instantiated, are 
parallel to and matched by the logical structure of the sentence 
uttered and the particular expressions that have those grammatical 
roles. 
Distinguished indeterminates are potential members of the SCats 
of expressions; they function by being incorporated into the 
interpretations of relation symbols (eg. a in <r, a , b >) and by 
being mapped to parts of the world (or a truth value) by the setting, 
so that as place holders they "pull" that part of the world into a 
specific location in the structure being built (thus, if as = j, b. = 
m, the situation <r, j, m> gets built, and not <r, m, j> or <j, m, 
r >). The setting, in mapping the indeterminates to parts of the 
world, is able to coordinate the interpretations of the parts and 
ensure that the interpretation of the whole is correctly constructed, 
but only because each indeterminate has a special function, which it 
derives solely from the compositional rules; namely, a is associated 
with the subject, b with the object, etc. The function of the two 
kinds of entities are linked; setting and distinguished indeterminate 
perform their task together. 
Having seen that the setting and distinguished indeterminates 
have no referential role, but rather control the way things are put 
together through their mutual action, the question we need to ask is: 
What is the nature of the structure that the setting and the 
distinguished indeterminates together specify? In other words, we 
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are asking about the nature and status of abstract situations in the 
theory. 
We shall begin with this question by considering one aspect of 
abstract situations. It is important that the building blocks, ie. 
the interpretations of the parts of an utterance, are combined 
appropriately, but why does this matter? Consider an utterance of 
the sentence 'Jackie is biting Molly', which designates the abstract 
situation <l, <rB, j, m >, 1 >. The five elements we obtain, four 
pieces of the world and the truth value according to situation 
semantics, could have been combined set theoretically in other ways. 
Most of these would simply not be situations, but there is one that 
is: <1, <rB, m, j >, 1 >. Abstract situations are set theoretic 
entities, and these two sets are distinct, therefore these two 
abstract situations are distinct. The role of the setting and the 
distinguished indeterminates is to ensure that the first abstract 
situation is assigned to the utterance of the sentence, and not the 
second. 
The setting and the distinguished indeterminates have the role 
of constraining a set theoretic structure, for the formal structure 
of abstract situations is set theoretic. Abstract situations were 
introduced, we were told, to classify real situations. Intended as 
tools with which the theorist can model the world, their structure, 
while formal, is intended to capture the structure of real 
situations that is important to language using organisms, namely 
ourselves. Although some would say that it is specifically our 
cognitive abilities that enable us to divide the world into objects 
having properties and standing in relations to one another, Barwise 
and Perry take the ecological view, that the organism perceives such 
and such structure in the world only because it is there in the first 
place to be perceived. They speak of the 'duality' between the 
cognitive states of the organism and the environmental structure 
external to the organism. This structure, which is out there in the 
real world (on the ecological and situation semantics views), and 
which is apprehended by organisms, is basic or fundamental for 
Barwise and Perry; it is what they want to model with the set 
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theoretic structures of their semantics (abstract situations). 
The utterance conveyed information about Jackie, the same 
information that was conveyed to the vet by the X -ray, 
that her leg was broken. Information can be carried by 
language but information is not language; in fact, 
information is prior to language. [...] If our theory 
of language is going to capture this ability of 
utterances to convey a piece of information we must have 
the information there to be conveyed. (S &A, p. 29) 
The set theoretic nature of abstract situations is incidental -- it 
just happens that set theory has been used extensively as the basic 
means of expressing or formulating mathematics (although it seems 
that this foundational role is now beginning to be taken over by 
category theory4). 
Barwise and Perry want us to view the set theoretic structures 
of the semantics merely as convenient tools that are used to model 
and classify the structure (information) that is already there in the 
world. While it is true that abstract situations are introduced 
amidst a lot of talk that they will be used to "classify" real 
situations, hardly have they been introduced than they usurp the 
central role of the theory, and real situations are relegated into 
obscurity. The classificatory, modelling and representational aspect 
of abstract situations is soon overshadowed, and we focus on abstract 
situations as entities in themselves. They have ceased to represent 
anything, certainly not real situations, and they, not real 
situations, have a semantic role. Being forced, therefore, to attend 
to abstract situations as objects in their own right, we find our 
attention thrust back upon that same formal, set theoretic structure. 
We can no longer regard it merely as a tool for modelling or 
classifying structure that is out there in the world, for it has 
itself become the object of our attention. 
What has happened is just the same story as happened with Moore 
and Russell. Initially, the idea is to locate propositions, or 
meaning, or semantic structure in the world, independent of language, 
later one is forced to retreat from this position. We have already 
indicated how this took place with Moore and Russell: essentially it 
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was the problem of false propositions and false belief. With Barwise 
and Perry, the initial emphasis on real situations, as for example in 
Barwise (1981), gives way to abstract situations, abstract entities 
not in the world. 
It is important to realise that we are not being forced to take 
up a position on whether fundamental mathematical concepts, whether 
those of set theory or category theory, and more particularly, 
Barwise and Perry's set theory, are essentially linguistic in origin 
or whether they represent a non -linguistic faculty of the human 
cognitive apparatus. That interesting question is irrelevant to our 
present interests. We are not asking about the nature of the 
mathematics, but about the use to which it is put in the semantic 
theory. 
We must be clear also on the question of where the structure we 
are talking of is actually located. On the ecological view, the same 
structure both exists in the world and is present in the organism's 
cognitive activity (an idea expressed by the notion of the organism - 
environment duality). Barwise and Perry claim that linguistic 
structure, which they model by means of abstract situations, is the 
structure in the world. Unlike the real situation, however, where 
the constituent pieces fit together quite naturally and of 
themselves, the way in which the pieces are combined when the 
abstract situation is built up -- by means of the set theory -- must 
be subject to constraints to ensure that the right result is 
obtained. The source of these constraints is the syntax of the 
object language. The structure represented by the theoretical 
entities -- abstract situations and their constituents, considered as 
elements of abstract situations, -- therefore "inherits" a syntax 
from the object language. 
Our aim has been, firstly, to point out that abstract 
situations have a syntax, and secondly, to show that the structure 
represented by abstract situations is also syntactic. Since the 
world is not syntactical, we must then conclude that there is a gap 
between abstract situations and the world, one which discredits 
Barwise and Perry's claim about the status of meaning and 
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information. 
An illustration from physics at this point should clarify the 
matter. The relation between abstract situations and real situations 
may be compared to that between our theory of planetary revolutions 
and the situation of Jupiter orbiting the sun. In each discipline, 
semantics and physics, one member of the pair is part of the world 
(real situations and the situation of Jupiter's orbit, respectively); 
and the other member (abstract situations and our theory of planetary 
revolution) is part of our theorising about the respective piece of 
the world. This is what Barwise and Perry expect us to think of the 
relation between abstract situations and real situations. The 
problem for them and their claim that meaning is in the world, 
however, is that this is not the situation with the theory as 
actually developed and practised. 
In the physical case we are dealing with both laws formulated 
in the theory and the corresponding features of the real world -- 
that matter, or the world in general, behaves in such and such a way. 
The latter is just the fact of the world's being the way it is; the 
former is our expression of this property of the world within a 
theory, and that expression requires language -- but this does not 
make the world linguistic, of course. Similarly, real situations 
have a certain structure (that Jackie is biting Molly, for example), 
and abstract situations represent this structure by having a 
syntactic structure of their own. The difference between the two 
cases lies in the fact that the object of the theory in situation 
semantics is, as we have shown, not the level of real situations, but 
that of abstract situations. Meaning and interpretation in Barwise 
and Perry's formal theory, instead of being in the world, are just 
formal structures, requiring syntactic constraints on their 
combination. These constraints originate with the syntax of the 
object language. Because the level of abstract situations requires 
such constraints, derivative on linguistic structure, situation 
semantics fails to satisfy the conditions for strong compositionality 
and is only weakly compositional. 
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5.1.3 The language- dependent nature of Fregean semantics 
For purposes of comparison in our exploration in this central 
and crucial question, let us consider Fregean theory and the way in 
which it integrates language into its view of meaning; we can then 
reconsider the role of the set theory in situation semantics. We 
shall consider a sentence Ft, consisting of a monadic predicate F and 
a singular term t. 
Frege's philosophy of language begins with the choice of the 
sentence as the unit of analysis and of truth as the fundamental 
property of sentences, in terms of which the semantics is worked out. 
For Frege the reference of a term is an individual, and the reference 
of a predicate is its extension, the collection of all individuals 
that have the property. Each of these expressions also has as sense. 
The sense of a term is a common or public way of thinking of the 
individual associated with the term, a mode of presentation of the 
individual. The sense of a predicate is more difficult to specify, 
but is that which determines its extension -- which we may think of 
as the concept of its extension. 
Fregean semantics was developed by Carnap and Church with the 
tools of intensional logic to represent the senses and references of 
expressions. This theory assigns an individual concept to a term as 
its sense -- a function which when evaluated at a possible world will 
determine the reference, which is an individual in the domain of 
interpretation of the model. A predicate is assigned as its sense a 
function which, given a world, determines the extension of the 
predicate at that world, the extension usually being represented as a 
set of individuals (or the characteristic function of this set). 
But which set? Well, precisely the set of individuals which 
satisfy the predicate. The references of predicates in the Fregean 
theory are not things in the world, independent of language: we 
cannot define the set that is assigned as the reference of the 
predicate F independently of the predicate itself; we have to say 
that 1[F]J = lá 1 a satisfies Fx }. This is not a circular definition: 
we are defining the reference of F, not in terms of itself (namely 
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KF]t ), but in terms of the predicate F, thereby displaying the 
language -dependence of the Fregean concept of meaning. The 
interpretation function assigns to F a set, which is by definition 
the set of all objects that satisfy the open formula Fx. What we 
should notice is that we cannot separate the reference of F -- 
something we might like to think of as part of the world, if our 
philosophical view were so inclined -- from the predicate itself: 
definition or specification of the reference is irreducibly 
language- dependent. The Fregean approach, then, differs from 
situation semantics in respect of what it takes as being in the 
world; it regards individuals as in the world, but stops short at 
properties. 
Let us try to grasp more firmly the sense and reference of the 
predicate F by considering its contribution to the proposition 
expressed by the sentence Ft. The sentence consists only of two 
basic expressions, F and t, the term contributes to the proposition 
the concept determining the individual object; hence the predicate 
must contribute everything else. Michael Dummett expresses this: 
The sense of an expression has been explained as that 
ingredient of its meaning which is relevant to the 
determination as true or false of a sentence in which it 
occurs: we can now say that it is that ingredient of its 
meaning which determines the semantic value of the 
expression. (Dummett, 1978, p. 121) 
The sense of the predicate is basically the proposition expressed by 
Ft minus the individual concept, for when we add the individual 
concept, contributed by t, to the sense of F, we get the proposition 
expressed by Ft. Whatever this strange entity is -- a proposition 
with a piece missing, with a hole, -- it cannot be something that 
exists in the world independently of language. 
With the Fregean theory we have to work at the level of sense, 
identifying propositions with senses of sentences, since the 
reference of a sentence is a truth value, not a proposition. Frege 
regarded the sense of a sentence as the thought expressed (Frege, 
1956, p. 292), and this means nothing other than the proposition 
expressed. The sense of the predicate is a proposition with a hole. 
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What about the term? For the pure Fregean theorist, there are no 
singular propositions; the sense of a singular term is an individual 
concept which may be thought of as something that picks out an 
individual. Although the individual concerned may be picked out bya. 
description, for example, the individual, as a member of the domain 
of interpretation, is taken to be an already existing object, a part 
of the world. In possible world formulations the individual concept 
is represented by an intension, a function which for each possible 
world w provides us with an individual áw from among the individuals 
that exist in w (if a suitable individual exists). 
In Russellian semantics, which allows singular propositions, we 
can "pull out" all individuals that are constituents of a singular 
proposition. Propositions have some structure -- the proposition 
expressed by 'Jackie is biting Molly' on an occasion is not the same 
as that expressed by the sentence 'Molly is biting Jackie' (on the 
same occasion): this is the structure that Barwise and Perry capture 
in the set theoretic notion of a sequence. This parallelism in 
structure between propositions and sentences suggests that 
propositions are very like linguistic entities -- though rather 
strange ones, since their constituents include real world 
individuals. I should say in passing that Richards' work is a 
formulation of this very picture. 
The introduction of singular terms and singular propositions by 
adding these Russellian notions into the basic Fregean framework is 
Kaplan's development. In his theory a singular term t determines the 
relevant individual at the context of utterance. A sentence only 
expresses a proposition when taken relative to a context, and a 
singular proposition is composed out of the individual and the sense 
of the predicate, which is a function from possible worlds to 
extensions. 
In the Fregean theories individuals, but not properties, are 
given independently of language. Moreover, there is no semantic 
mechanism for specifying situations ie. parts of the world. Richards 
has predicates, not properties, in his theory with which he 
constructs propositions, but these entities are not in the world. 
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That we get a hold on the senses and references of predicates and 
sentences by means of language is what is rejected in situation 
semantics by the claim that all of meaning is in the world and the 
consequent attempt to do semantics with properties as primitives. We 
have seen some of the problems Barwise and Perry face in attempting 
to locate meaning in the world, and have seen, too, that the set 
theoretic apparatus employed in situation semantics still requires a 
necessary role for linguistic or syntactic structure in the theory of 
meaning. We shall now attend more carefully to the question of 
whether there is anything to Barwise and Perry's claim to be using 
the set theory in a classificatory role in their semantics, or 
whether in the definition and specification of interpretations it 
really does take over the function performed by language in standard 
theories. 
5.1.4 On the alleged classificatory nature of abstract situations 
The primitives of situation semantics are individuals, 
properties, locations and indeterminates; abstract situations and 
situation types are constructed from these. Lest we think, however, 
that Barwise and Perry see their primitives as corresponding to the 
basic constituents of the world, we are told that the world consists 
of (real) situations -- that such situations are metaphysically and 
epistemologically basic, and that the primitives arise as 
"uniformities" across real situations. These primitives are the 
urelements of a constructive set theory (Kripke -Platek admissible set 
theory with urelements, or KPU), abstract situations being identified 
with certain sets thus generated. Some abstract situations are 
intended to be seen intuitively as 'counterparts' of real situations, 
and the entire apparatus of abstract situations is intended as a 
means of classifying real situations. But what exactly does 
classification mean in this context? 
At one point we are told that there is a relation classifies 
that holds between abstract and real situations; this requires us to 
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see Barwise and Perry's semantics -- the classificatory apparatus of 
abstract situations, event types, etc. -- as a part of the world and 
pieces of it as bearing the relation classifies to other parts of the 
world; at least this is so if we view classifies as a relation in the 
world, which it seems to be. 
[...] we suppose that there is a nonempty collection E0 
of real situations and a relation classifies that holds 
between abstract courses of events, on the one hand, and 
real situations, on the other. Objects, relations, and 
locations provide the connection between real situations 
and abstract situations. They are uniformities across 
the former and constituents of the latter. Intuitively, 
e classifies e if and only if 
if, in e, at 1, r, a11...,an; yes, 
then, in e, at 1, a1,...,ar1 stand in the relation r; 
and 
if, in e, at 1, r, a1,...,an; no, 
then, in e, at 1, a1,...,an do not stand in the relation 
r. 
And we say that e is factual if it classifies some real 
situation e. (S &A, p. 61) 
There is a sense in which abstract situations are parts of the world, 
similar to the sense in which numbers and, more generally, abstract 
mathematical objects are. More precisely, abstract situations are in 
the world because they are part of our world: our theorising is as 
real as our literature and music. But this idea of being in the 
world is confusing, for we meant more than this by our question about 
the status of Barwise and Perry's semantic entities. We are not 
presently engaged in philosophy of mathematics, we are not asking 
which mathematical objects exist, and in which sense. 
Abstract situations are neither names nor labels for real 
situations; many abstract situations do not correspond to any real 
situation, so there is nothing for them to name. They seem rather to 
constitute a duplicate or surrogate world, but, significantly, a more 
flexible one. Objects, relations and locations are constituents of 
abstract situations, and can be put together in specific ways that 
are non -factual, ways in which they are not related in real 
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situations. Even if we have correctly identified parts of real 
situations, we do not know how they are put together in those 
situations; in contrast we know exactly what the relation between an 
abstract situation and one of its constituents is: it is a set 
theoretic relation. The relation between an abstract situation and a 
part of it is not "in the world" in the sense that is relevant to our 
inquiry; it is a completely different composition of parts from that 
which holds in reality. 
An abstract situation has parts of the world as its 
constituents,5 these parts being held together in some structured 
way, which is in fact accomplished by means of the set theory. The 
apparatus of abstract situations is part of a theory -- a semantic 
theory -- and as such accepts a representational or modelling status. 
Given this representational status of situation semantics as a 
theory, it is natural to consider whether the set theoretic nature of 
the operation of holding constituents together within abstract 
situations stands for itself, or represents something else.6 
In this chapter, and to some extent in chapter three, we have 
been trying to show that the level of abstract situations in 
situation semantics has a quasi -linguistic status. The property of 
language that interests us is that it is symbolic; expressions 
represent something, have meaning -- they refer to something beyond 
themselves. Comparing situation semantics with physics, Newton's 
third law of motion, to take that example, is formulated as 
F = ma 
and this equation has a meaning (Bedeutung), since the equation is a 
linguistic expression. The meaning, however, is something in the 
world, a feature of the way the world behaves. An expression from a 
paper on situation semantics is similarly linguistic and also has a 
meaning: thus 
e:= at 1: biting, Jackie, Molly; yes. 
The meaning (Bedeutung) in this case is a specification of the 
abstract situation e, a set theoretic entity, which is part of the 
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world in the sense that abstract objects exist as part of the 
furniture of the world (which we are allowing). But the abstract 
situation e has another role as a theoretical object: it is part of 
the apparatus of abstract situations which as a totality represents 
the states of the world -- the real situations. The level of 
abstract situations is not a part of the world gua something with a 
theoretical and symbolic role: there is a difference between the 
physical and situation semantics cases. 
Barwise and Perry talk of abstract situations 'classifying' 
real situations; it is true that we cannot regard every individual 
abstract situation as representing some real situation, since there 
are many more abstract situations than real situations, and this 
state of affairs disguises the representational status of abstract 
situations. Nonetheless, as we saw in section (5.1.1), the level of 
abstract situations displaces the real world and, as a whole, 
functions as a surrogate level representing real situations. 
We conclude, therefore, that the relation between the level of 
abstract situations and the world is identical to that between a 
language and the world: it is one of representation rather than 
"classification ". The set theoretic "glue" is essentially a 
linguistic holding- together of the constituents of abstract 
situations. To carry forward this idea I shall consider treating the 
apparatus of situation semantics as a formal language with an 
interpretation. 
5.2 Situation semantics as an interpreted language 
In his (1974) Barry Richards defined a family of languages 
where the terms (more exactly, the individual constants) can be any 
kind of object in the world. In Richards (1976), where there is a 
similar semantics, this device, the technique of Henkin -style 
completeness proofs of letting the domain of interpretation be the 
set of constants of the language, is adopted in providing a formal 
semantics for adverbs. These cases of identifying objects in the 
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world and expressions of a language (although a certain restricted 
class of expressions) are suggestive in the present context of 
whether there is a quasi- linguistic element to the structure of 
abstract situations. Could we similarly define a family of languages 
where not only individual constants but other expressions as well are 
at the same time entities in the world? 
I shall now construct a family of languages with a semantics on 
similar lines. The languages are to be defined in such a way that 
sentences of the languages correspond to abstract situations. Thus 
we shall have properties and locations as actual basic expressions of 
the languages, in addition to individuals (Richards' strategy), since 
these real world entities are the primitives which situation 
semantics adds to standard model theory. The atomic predicates of 
the languages will therefore actually be the properties of situation 
semantics, the things that are part of the world; and the location 
markers of the languages (instances of the grammatical category Loc) 
will be the space -time locations of situation semantics. And, of 
course, the individual constants will be the individuals from 
situation semantics. Closed well - formed formulae of the formal 
languages which I shall define are intended to be regarded as 
corresponding to the abstract situations of situation semantics, in 
virtue of the identity of the constituents of each. 
The aim of this exercise is to help uncover the real status or 
nature of abstract situations. Barwise and Perry have claimed that 
they are abstract, mathematical entities that are used to classify 
real situations. Fundamental to their semantics is the idea that 
meaning is in the world: that although meaning is connected with 
linguistic expressions (both expressions and mental states have 
meanings, but are not themselves meanings -- Barwise and Perry, 1983, 
p. 7), yet meaning itself is essentially non -linguistic in nature. 
If this claim about linguistic meaning were true, it would be 
possible to study meaning using abstract situations, but without 
reference to language, except in so far as to keep in mind that 
linguistic expressions have these individual meanings and have also 
particular designations on occasions. That is, the realm of meaning 
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should be capable of being treated autonomously, even though 
particular meanings are related to expressions of the language. The 
study of meaning would be identical in this respect to physics or 
chemistry; theorising would be carried out in language (of course), 
but there would be nothing linguistic about the objects of study. 
Importantly, if meaning is in the world, composition of meanings 
should be definable wholly within the realm of meaning and without 
reference to language. On this picture there is an isomorphism 
between the realm of language and the realm of meaning -- but this is 
possible only because meaning is autonomous. 
In this chapter we are seeking to discover whether, in the 
semantics as given, abstract situations and relations between 
abstract situations (meanings) are, or even could be, defined 
independently of language; we propose to carry this investigation 
forward by considering the points that arise when we explicitly treat 
the tools of situation semantics as expressions of a formal language. 
With this strategy we shall pursue the idea that abstract situations 
cannot be regarded as mathematical entities classifying real 
situations and thus operating with parts of the world and meaning in 
the world, but should be conceived as sentences expressing 
propositions, or as pictures or representations of real situations, 
thereby betraying their fundamentally symbolic status. 
5.2.1 Syntax 
The family of languages L(1, , )e ) will be defined in such a 
way that the structure of sentences of individual languages parallels 
the structure of abstract situations. An atomic sentence will 
correspond to a situation that has only one thing happening at one 
location -- only one relation is specified to hold of the appropriate 
number of objects; "larger" situations, those that specify two or 
more relations as holding, will correspond to molecular sentences. 
The languages each have the following grammatical categories: S 
(sentence), Term, for each natural number n, RSn (n -place relation 
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symbol), Seq (constituent sequence), Loc (location marker), and Pol 
(polarity or truth value). All atomic sentences are generated by the 
phrase structure grammar: 
S -> Loc Seq Pol 
Seq --> RSn Term ... Term (n = 0, 1, 2, ...) 
n instances 
The terminal categories are: Loc, RSn (n = 0, 1, 2, ...), Term and 
Pol; S and Seq are grammatical categories. An atomic sentence will 
therefore have the structure: 
S 
Loc Seq ol 
A \ 
RS Term ... Term 
A sentence 1 r a1 ... át,ß 1, to take an example, will 
accordingly express the proposition that the relation r holds among 
the individuals á1, ..., a_l (in that order) at the location 1. We 
shall think of this sentence as expressing the proposition (in the 
situation semantics sense, ie. a. class of abstract situations) of 
which <1, <r,á...,aa >,1> is the minimum situation, that is, the 
proposition { e J <1, <r,a.,...,án >,1> E e }. If Si and S2 are 
sentences, we can form another sentence, written Si & S2, which 
corresponds to the situation e = e1 U e2, where Sj corresponds to the 
situation ej (j = 1,2).7 
A rigorous definition of these languages and their semantics 
now follows. Formally, a language is determined by disjoint sets ,8, 
Q and óg, where, from the point of view of the language, A is the 
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set of individual constants, (R is the set of relation symbols, and 
oe is the set of location markers.8 As pointed out above, these sets 
will be chosen, in the specific case, so that the set ../ of 
individual constants is a subset of the class of individuals from 
situation semantics; the set 14 of relation symbols is a subset of 
the class of relations from situation semantics; and the set / of 
location markers is a subset of the class of space -time locations 
from situation semantics. We also employ the truth values 
(polarities) 0 and 1, and have available an infinite number of 
variables of each atomic kind.9 
The formation rules for a language L(..6, K, /) are as follows: 
Term: Every individual constant c e is a term; 
Every individual variable x is a term; 
Nothing else is a term. 
Sequence: If r is an n -ary relation symbol or n -ary relation 
variable and c ..., 
-n 
c are n terms, then r c ... cn 
is a sequence. 
Nothing else is a sequence. 
Atomic formula: If 1 is a location marker or a location 
variable, s a sequence, and i s polarity or a polarity 
variable, then 1 s i is an atomic formula. 
Nothing else is an atomic formula. 
We define the (molecular) formulae of a language L(..O, P.,pe ) as 
follows: 
(Molecular) formula: Every atomic formula is a formula. 
If S and S' are formulae, then (S & S') and (S v S') are 
formulae. 
Nothing else is a formula. 
We shall use punctuation, '(' and ')', on an informal basis when it 
helps to clarify the syntax. 
We do not have quantification of any kind in these languages: 
the 1983 theory allows us to state only particular or definite 
propositions (statements), not general propositions, without invoking 
classes of situations. The 1984 theory, which employs situation 
types as the central notion, involves implicit quantification; we 
could make this explicit, adding existential and universal 
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quantifiers to the languages L (9 , IR, ) . 
An assignment s for a formula S is a function which assigns to 
each variable an entity of the appropriate kind; thus s assigns to 
each individual variable in a formula S an individual constant, to 
each location variable in S a location marker, to each polarity 
variable in S a polarity, and to each relation variable in S a 
relation symbol. We shall allow assignments to be partial with 
respect to the set of all variables: to be an assignment for a given 
formula, s is required to be defined only for those variables 
occurring in the formula. Assignments therefore turn out to be total 
anchors. We shall write S[s] for the formula resulting from S when 
each variable in S is replaced by the value s assigns to it. Note 
that S[s] will always be a closed formula when s is an assignment for 
S. 
5.2.2 Semantics 
A sentence in the object language -- perhaps English or Aliass 
-- expresses a proposition when uttered in a situation d,ç. Barwise 
and Perry have made it easy for us to see what propositions are; 
utterances describe states of the world, or what the sincere speaker 
takes to be the state of the world. States of the world are known as 
situations, and on Barwise and Perry's ontology situations consist of 
objects having properties and standing in relations to one another. 
We shall understand propositions in terms of this internal structure 
to situations. Thus the proposition expressed by an utterance would 
be to the effect that a certain object has a certain property, or 
that certain objects stand in a certain relation, at a location.10 
An utterance of 
(4) Jackie is biting Molly. 
would express the proposition that Jackie stands in the relation of 
biting to Molly at a location that overlaps the discourse situation. 
The sentences (closed formulae) of a language L(,g,(,v) also 
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express propositions. A sentence 1 r a 1 expresses the proposition 
that a has the property r at the location 1 ; a sentence l r a b 0 
expresses the proposition that a does not bear the relation r to b at 
the location 1; and so on. 
A model for a formal language L(t , e , ) is an ordered pair 
= <X,V>, where X = 1 U Y, the union of the set -a of individual 
constants with the set Y of all sentences of L, and V is a function 
which assigns to each n -place relation symbol r, a subset V(r) of 
x Xn (y is of course just the set of location markers). Truth in 
the model is defined recursively: 
(M1) If r is an n -place relation symbol, 
ç1, ..., gm are n terms, and 1 is a location marker, 
then 
L ç1 çi,j 1 if <1,ç1,...,cn> E K(L); 
otherwise /k 14 1 r ç1 ... c 1. 
91/Y 1 r ç ... gm 0 if <1,ç1,...,2n> V V(r); 
otherwise /j/L {# 1 r ç1 . .. c O. 
(M2) If S and S' are closed formulae of L, 
xi. S& S' if lit S and II/ S'; 
otherwise 191 S & S. 
/14.. S v S' if S or 
otherwise 1/14 S v S'. 
S' 
Notice that truth for L is a property of sentences, not utterances: 
we have lost the property of efficiency, which both natural language 
and Aliass have. 
Consider now a particular language L(A, Z,,e ), with Jackie and 
Molly in and the relation of biting in Q . Since the discussion 
will be carried out entirely at the metalevel, I shall use 
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metalinguistic names 'j', 'm', and 'LB' respectively for the above 
mentioned real world entities, so that 1 rB j m 1 is a sentence of L. 
The proposition expressed by an utterance of (4) at d,c is also 
expressed by the sentence 1 rB j m 1 of L(,g , 6;, íe ) under 
interpretation by a suitable model '2 . We shall follow Richards in 
regarding the sentence 1 rB j m 1 of L not merely as expressing the 
proposition, but as a representation of that same proposition. 
According to the semantics that has been given, this proposition is 
true in the model ijZ = <X,V> if <l,j,m> e V(rB). 
5.2.3 The attitudes 
Since much of our interest concerns the semantics of the 
attitudes, we want to be able to represent the propositions expressed 
by sentences that report attitudes; (4) is a syntactically simple 
sentence. Thus, we need to ensure that the definition of the formal 
languages can be regarded as embracing the tools used in situation 
semantics to deal with the attitudes. 
The initial idea in situation semantics was to handle attitude 
reports by treating eg. belief as a relation between the agent and 
abstract situations. Thus 
(5) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
would, if uttered truly, convey the information that Ralph was 
belief- related to situations in which Ortcutt is a spy, and not 
belief- related to situations in.which Ortcutt fails to be a spy. 
This attempt for a semantics of the attitudes, chronicled in the 
ninth chapter of Barwise and Perry (1983), fails, the authors tell 
us,11 essentially because it makes no reference to our mental states, 
whereas folk psychology, which natural language reasonably reflects, 
does make this reference. A proper treatment requires incorporating 
mental states into the theory, so schemata and anchors are introduced 
and employed to represent mental states and capture the relevant 
constraints and generalisations. 
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Let us suppose that Ralph's belief is de re and the speaker 
uttering (5) is aware of this. We may, if we choose, assume further 
that Ralph knows who Ortcutt is; he is aware that Ortcutt leads a 
double life, simultaneously holding the office of mayor and spying 
for a foreign power. The utterance of (5) describes a situation e in 
situation semantics just in case 
(6) in e: at l: Br, Ralph, S; yes 
of, a, Ortcutt; yes 
where 1 = ç(believes), d,c I[Ralph] Ralph, d,c t[Ortcuttl Ortcutt, S = 
),12 
and 
E:= at h: spy, a; yes. 
We need therefore to ensure that our formal languages can represent 
indeterminates, event types, schemata and anchors. 
The definition of the languages L 4 , Q. ,/) already allows the 
kind of formulae that correspond to event types as sentences of L, 
and no further apparatus is needed, because the indeterminates of 
situation semantics correspond to the free variables of the languages 
L(g ,47,,óe) as presently defined. In fact, precisely the open 
sentences (ie. formulae with free variables) of L correspond to the 
event types of situation semantics. This is clear from the 
observation that variables and indeterminates perform the same 
functions: they identify the type of entity (individual, relation, 
etc.) occurring at a certain place in a structure, but do not specify 
which entity: that question is left open. (As no utterance of an 
indicative sentence describes a'situation type in the 1983 version of 
the theory, we need to make some modification to the grammar to 
factor out open sentences of L as ungrammatical: in the example 
above, the open sentence correlated with the schema S is not a 
grammatical sentence in isolation, but the sentence correlated with 
e, of which it is a subsentence, is grammatical.13) 
The situation type above corresponds to the open formula h spy 
x 1 of where the sets indexing L are appropriately 
- 135 - 
chosen for the example.14 Schemata are sets of situation types; 
since we are using operations on linguistic expressions to do at 
least some of the tasks for which Barwise and Perry use set theory, I 
introduced the sentence connective v when defining the languages 
L(,(, k,á) to represent this grouping of situations or situation 
types into a set. Since S is here a singleton, however, the sentence 
corresponding to E also corresponds to S. (This is nothing to worry 
about, since singletons and their members are sometimes identified.) 
Barwise and Perry often write the facts about the anchoring of 
indeterminates as part of the situation described. This is because 
if e0 is a situation in which an agent a is belief- related to another 
situation e', then representing the belief as 
in e0: at 1: Br, .á, S; yes 
where there is an anchor f such that S[f] Ç e', would be incomplete 
unless the anchoring facts are also part of to. Thus, in (6) 'of' 
denotes the relation that holds between an indeterminate x and the 
object f(x) it is anchored to. 
We can now say which sentence of IL( .8 , k , e) corresponds to the 
situation e of (6); written out in full, it is 
= (1 Br Ralph (h spy x 1) 1) & (1 of x Ortcutt 1). 
There are occurrences of variables in this formula, which, as a 
sentence corresponding to what Barwise and Perry write and speak of 
as an abstract situation (although it contains indeterminates and 
schemata) is supposed to be a closed sentence. Let s be the 
assignment which maps the individual variable x to Ortcutt and maps 
the location variable h to 1. The sentence p [s], which contains 
locations and individuals replacing the variables in 99, makes no 
sense, for it contains the subsentence 1 
1 of Ortcutt Ortcutt 1 
The relation 'of' is meaningful only when it holds between a 
variable and an individual constant. 
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Since we cannot really consider indeterminates and schemata as 
parts of the world, we cannot really have a situation here, although 
Barwise and Perry seem to think they do. If we applied the anchor to 
all indeterminates, the result would still not be a situation, for it 
contains the relation Br, which now relates the agent to a set of 
situations, but cannot be a part of the world, unless we think of 
abstract situations as in the world -- which we hesitate to do. The 
fact is that abstract situations are constructed out of pieces of the 
world: individuals, properties, and locations; an entity which is 
constructed in the appropriate manner out of pieces of the world and 
abstract, constructed entities is not a situation. 
5.2.4 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this section I said that the aim was to 
uncover the real nature of abstract situations; we have now shown 
that it is possible to define a language which parallels the level of 
abstract entities of situation semantics. (Although we actually 
defined a family of languages, we would ultimately choose just one of 
these for doing semantics -- L(, , Af) with )g identical to the 
class of individuals from situation semantics, Q identical to the 
class of properties, and equal to the class of locations.) The 
parallelism means that we can regard either the language L or Barwise 
and Perry's presentation of abstract situations, situation types, 
etc. as equally representative of the essence of at least the formal 
theory of situation semantics. 
We can tease out the result of regarding situation semantics as 
a language that requires interpretation in the manner shown above by 
asking what we have lost by doing so. Alternatively, this question 
can be turned around to ask what Barwise and Perry gain by using set 
theory to construct abstract entities that "classify" real 
situations. In fact, they gain nothing, because the two formulations 
are formally equivalent. Barwise and Perry's version does not 
explicitly contradict the philosophical and metatheoretical backdrop 
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attached to the formalism (their set theoretical formulation merely 
hides the language- dependence of their theory -- and everyone 
else's); otherwise there is no advantage gained. Because the 
difference lies at the level of the philosophical claims made about 
the formalism, Barwise and Perry have not provided a formal theory 
more suited for ecological semantics with its claim that meaning is 
in the world than the theory specified above. 
Barwise and Perry make two claims that are thrown into 
question: that meaning is in the world and that abstract situations 
classify real situations. We saw that there are problems for the 
view that meaning is in the world: the Object NP Problem (which is 
only part of a more general problem) shows us that regarding the 
references of sentences as having some structure and being built out 
of pieces contributed' by the constituent expressions means that the 
position of these pieces within the structure is correlated with, 
indeed (partly) determined by the syntactic structure of the object 
language sentence. The structures that are the references of (7) and 
(8) should be very similar -- identical in fact, except that the 
pieces corresponding to 'Jackie' and 'Molly' are interchanged when we 
pass from one sentence to the other. 
(7) Jackie is biting Molly. 
(8) Molly is biting Jackie. 
Either the meaning or the interpretation of 'Jackie' changes when we 
pass from (7) to (8). Now the interpretation, if it is Jackie 
herself, does not change; nor, therefore, can the meaning change.15 
Alternatively, if both meaning and interpretation remain constant, 
the construction of the structured entity that is the reference of a 
sentence needs help from the syntax as to which structure to build. 
It is generally recognised that such guidance from syntax is 
required (Partee, 1983); but that is to admit that meaning is not 
independent of the object language syntax. In defining L(,g, , )f), 
we have made explicit the fact that the interpretations of 
expressions are pieces that must be put together in particular ways 
to generate the interpretations of containing expressions -- in other 
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words, that interpretations have a syntax. 
Once this is established, it becomes clearer what the relation 
of abstract situations to real situations is: the relation is one of 
representation; abstract situations represent the way the world is or 
might be, or could have been but is not; some abstract situations 
represent impossible, because incoherent, states of the world. By 
thinking of the level of abstract entities as linguistic, we are 
again making explicit the fact that they represent things in the 
world, not "classify" them. 
5.3 Molecular situations 
5.3.1 Cooper's introduction of molecular facts 
To continue the investigation of this question of whether some 
of the semantic entities of situation semantics are quasi -linguistic, 
I shall consider a version of the theory developed by Robin Cooper 
and presented in his (1984) Cooper remarks that in Situations and 
Attitudes Barwise and Perry have proposed an account of VP negation 
only, and in this paper he extends the theory by adding a treatment 
of sentential negation. What interests us are the changes and 
additions to the theory that he makes in doing so. 
A remark on terminology is needed at this point. In this 
discussion of Cooper's work, I shall follow his use of the word 
'fact' to refer to the set theoretic entities used to represent real 
facts (what Barwise calls 'circumstances'). Barwise has been very 
much concerned with the relation between the set theory and the 
world, and attempts to distinguish them (but he is not careful 
enough!); it is rather puzzling, therefore, to find that Cooper quite 
simply uses the word 'fact', which for Russell and Barwise is the 
thing in the world, to refer to the set theoretic entity. 
Cooper begins by setting out a problem that has to be dealt 
with by any semantic theory of sentential negation. In the case of 
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VP negation, a sentence such as 'John did not see Mary' describes a 
situation s just in case a certain negative fact is in s, so that if 
one tried to add the corresponding positive fact to s, an 
inconsistent (ie. incoherent) situation would result. The problem 
Cooper has found concerns how to construct the semantics so that this 
property is preserved in the case of negation at the sentence level. 
To see what the problem is that Cooper raises for accounts of 
sentence negation, consider the following proposal for handling 
sentential negation in a situation semantics framework: 
(9) -S describes a situation s iff S does not describe s. 
If the proposal (9) is adopted, no particular fact is required to be 
present in s for -S to describe it, so that in general no 
inconsistency will arise by adding to s the positive fact occurring 
in every situation described by S. 
What negative fact or facts, then, should be in s for -S to 
describe it? As Cooper points out, if S is atomic, the required fact 
is the negative fact corresponding to the positive fact occurring in 
every situation described by S (where by corresponding I simply mean 
inverting the truth value). But if S is molecular, there is a 
problem: there is no single set of negative facts that -S should 
describe definable for every case simply in terms of S alone -- one 
has to look and see whether S is a conjunction, disjunction, etc. 
before one can say which are the relevant facts. But doing this 
gives up the property of compositionality. This is the problem that 
motivates Cooper's introduction of molecular facts. 
Cooper proposes that we should also admit as facts a number of 
molecular facts of various kinds, of which some examples follow. Let 
f and g be facts; then we also have: 
(10) a. <and, f, g, 1> 
b. <or, f, g, 0> 
The symbols 'and' and 'or' here represent relations between facts. 
That such a relation holds or does not hold is itself a real fact, 
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and thus something to be represented in the theoretical apparatus, in 
the form illustrated in (10). Since it would be inadequate to have 
an actual situation which contained a fact <and,f,g,1>, but did not 
contain f itself, there must be conditions that situations are 
required to satisfy in order to be actual. Structural constraints 
are therefore used to ensure that in any actual situation containing 
a molecular fact other facts hold about the constituents of that 
molecular fact, and so on recursively, until one or more atomic facts 
are constrained to be in the actual situation. 
Cooper has essentially relocated the rules governing which 
negative facts need to be in the situations described by utterances 
of -S; instead of looking at the internal structure of S to decide 
which set of negative facts is appropriate, the rules are formulated 
as structural constraints on actual situations involving molecular 
facts. To show the reader what these structural constraints are like, 
we display one example of a constraint: 
(11) For any actual situation s, if <and, f1, f2, 1> e s, 
then 
11 
e s and f e s. 
In his appendix, where a more formal account for a particular formal 
language is given, Cooper also has molecular facts of the kind <not, 
f, 1> and <not, f, 0>. 
16 
5.3.1.1 Reflection on the status of the semantic entities 
Having laid out these details of the system, Cooper reflects on 
what he has done: 
Have we not encoded part of the syntax of propositional 
logic in the semantic objects of our model theory by 
introducing conjoined facts? Have we not furthermore 
introduced something like part of a proof theory for 
propositional logic into our calculus of semantic objects 
by using structural constraints like those in [3]? 
(Cooper, 1984, p. 4) 
The additional structure in the model theory of situation 
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semantics is what makes it possible to represent partial 
information and to solve certain problems with 
propositional attitudes. [...] Yet this very structure 
which seems to be providing us with such intriguing 
semantic advantages is giving the model theoretic objects 
themselves a kind of syntax, a syntax which might bear 
important similarities to the syntax of the natural 
language being interpreted, as seems to be the case with 
this suggested analysis of conjunction. (Cooper, 1984, 
pp. 4,5) 
Cooper here tackles a very important point, one of central concern to 
us. We have been arguing that in building structure into the model 
theory, Barwise and Perry have made their semantic entities quasi - 
linguistic. If situation semantics is extended along the lines that 
Cooper takes, by adding in molecular facts, then the need for 
structural constraints on actual situations certainly means that yet 
another kind of syntax is being laid over the semantics. Cooper's 
development of the theory focuses our attention on conjunction, 
disjunction and negation, and on the fact that the syntax involved 
encodes a propositional logic. However, there is more syntax than 
this embedded in Cooper's semantics, a syntax which is closely 
related to that of natural language, and which is found at the 
subsentential level. 
Consider the formal system described in the appendix to 
Cooper's paper. One of the syntactic rules is VP -> Vt N (the 
grammar is a fairly simple one -- its purpose is to be illustrative), 
and the corresponding semantic rule is: 
I[ [Vt N]VP 1 = Uo( I[Vj , I[N]) ) 
A function m assigns interpretations to lexical items. An expression 
p( of type Vt is assigned by the interpretation function the value I[ 
[Y]Vt ÿ = <m(be), s, o, 1> and an expression ß of type N is given 
the value 1[ [(3]N ]1 = m( (3). Finally, the notation U 
( 1[Vt]( , I[N]S ) signifies that ([N]j is to be substituted for o in I[Vt]( 
at each occurrence. Notice how the semantic rule operates. The 
interpretation of a transitive verb D( in this system is a quadruple 
<r, s , o, 1> where r = m( p0 is the relation designated by Q(, 1 is 
the familiar truth value, and s and o are basically place holders 
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(called distinguished indeterminates). (So Cooper shows us this 
structure, which Barwise and Perry have not done, as we remarked in 
chapter three.) If ß is a noun phrase with I[ (t]( = m() = j, say, 
then K [ oq_., ]vp ](_ <r, s, j, 1 > . Cooper uses s and o and his 
unification operation U to perform essentially the same function that 
Barwise and Perry (1983) assign to distinguished indeterminates and 
settings. Therefore, the same kinds of question arise in this 
context: what are the semantic roles, and what is the exact status, 
of the indeterminates s and o? 
What Cooper has in fact done is to enlarge the context in which 
to ask this question; he has shown us that this basic question about 
the linguistic or other status of the semantics arises at the 
molecular level as well as at the subsentential level. The semantic 
value of a conjunction is 1[ [ p(]Conj ] _ <m(OC ) , f , g , 1>, which 
employs the distinguished indeterminates f and g -- but he could 
equally well have used s and o in this rule and modified the 
recursive definition 
([ [S1 Conj S2]s ]I = Uf(Ug( I[Conj]I , I[s2]I ), I[S1]( ) 
slightly to accommodate this. In fact he could have used any objects 
as place holders, for that is all the indeterminates are. But we 
must not be misled by his use of s and o in the one case (suggesting 
subject NP and object NP), and f and g in the other case (suggesting 
the first and second facts of the conjunction respectively). Is 
there more than the mere appearance of embedding the syntax of the 
object language expressions in Cooper's semantics? 
The real question remains.after any confusion surrounding the 
notation has been cleared out of the way: the question of whether or 
not the semantic level partially embeds the syntax of the language. 
The answer, it seems, is that to a large extent it does. It is not 
the actual objects used in the case of the indeterminates, for they 
are merely place holders, but the role that is assigned to them, that 
is crucial. The embedding occurs on two accounts. First there is an 
embedding at the level of the internal structure of situations; we 
have already commented on this above, pointing out that Cooper's 
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approach is essentially the same as Barwise and Perry's, and 
consequently the way in which the interpretations of the parts are 
put together requires to be controlled by something external to the 
interpretations themselves -- ie. a syntax must be imposed upon them. 
The second way in which Cooper's semantics embeds the syntax of 
the object language is by admitting molecular facts. Allowing facts 
like <and, f, g, 1> into the theory creates a semantic object 
corresponding to the sentence F & G where M( = f and 1[G]l = g. The 
object thus admitted is a set theoretic entity constructed from 
'and', two constituent facts, and a truth value, and we have been 
arguing for the essentially linguistic underpinings of this use of 
the set theory. In particular, we should notice that there are now 
two distinct molecular facts -- namely <and, f, g, 1> and <and, g, f, 
1> -- corresponding' to the the sentences F & G and G & F. In 
standard theory the level of syntax is finer than the semantics: 
there are, to stay with conjunction, two sentences but only one 
corresponding semantic object, the proposition to the effect that 
both F and G. Whether we are looking at extensions (truth values) or 
intensions (functions from possible worlds to truth values), there is 
no difference semantically between the semantic correlates of F & 
and G & F. But now in Cooper's theory we have two semantic objects, 
with a direct parallelism between these two semantic objects and the 
two sentences. 
The admission and use of molecular facts in situation semantics 
is, as far as I know, peculiar to Cooper (but see chapter six on 
Almog's recent work); yet if Barwise and Perry, or anyone else, do 
not want to take the same course, they have either to find an 
alternative solution to the problem of sentential negation, one which 
does not require molecular facts, or to refute Cooper's arguments 
that sentential negation needs to be handled in the semantics. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that Cooper does not 
consider that the apparatus he uses should be considered as a 
language -- rather, he explicitly rules it out: 
[...] I would point out that the model theoretic objects 
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of situation semantics are just that. They are not 
expressions of a language which then undergoes 
interpretation. (Cooper, 1984, p. 5) 
However, he does admit that the semantic entities of situation 
semantics may be able to perform the role normally undertaken by the 
level of logical form. The passage above continues: 
It may just be that situation semantics is providing us 
with a truly semantic theory which uses exactly the right 
kind of model -theoretic structures which we need to 
analyze natural language. It may allow us to do in the 
semantics the kinds of things that we thought we needed a 
level of semantic representation or logical form for. 
(Cooper, 1984, p. 5) 
Cooper interprets this state of affairs as meaning that semantics can 
take over the tasks performed by the level of logical form and still 
remain semantics; he does not consider that situation semantics may 
thereby lose its semantic status. 
Wittgenstein used the phrase 'logical form' to refer to the 
irreducible minimum which a picture of any kind shares with what it 
pictures.17 The notion of logical form for Wittgenstein is an 
integral part of the picture theory of meaning of the Tractatus 
Loqico -Philosophicus, which presents a theory about the relation 
between language and the world, or more generally, between a symbol 
system and that which it is used to represent. 
The notion of logical forni has since come to mean additionally 
a level of representation which displays the logical form of a 
proposition18 or assertion more explicitly than natural language, and 
for this purpose logical calculi are usually employed (echoes of 
Frege). If Cooper is right' and interpretations in situation 
semantics may be used as representations of the logical form of 
propositions, abstract situations are being given a representational 
role par excellence, and their relation to real situations is one of 
linguistic representation, not classification. 
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5.3.2 Quantification and molecular situation 
Cooper believes that situation semantics should attempt to 
handle sentence negation, and his treatment introduces new kinds, or 
forms, of facts into the semantics. Is it possible to argue that 
treating quantification requires the addition of yet more new kinds 
of facts or situations? Like Russell before him, Cooper finds that 
negative, conjunctive and disjunctive facts are all bound up 
together; but unlike Russell, Cooper is working with structured 
entities in the semantics and argues for introducing conjunctive and 
disjunctive (and negative) facts. Negation is also bound up together 
with the existential and universal quantifiers, so could, and should, 
we introduce more new kinds of facts -- "quantified facts "? In this 
section I present an argument, similar to Cooper's for conjunctive, 
disjunctive and negative facts, that we need to do so, and then 
explore how it might be done. 
5.3.2.1 The addition of general NPs and general propositions 
Singular propositions and singular terms can be dealt with 
conveniently in Barwise and Perry's semantics; but they say very 
little about general NPs such as 'someone' in the book.19 
Traditionally, a sentence such as 
(12) Someone has been smoking. 
has been assigned the logical form ¡xF(x) (neglecting aspect), which 
involves an existential quantifier. The conviction that the 
semantics of natural language should start with natural language, not 
mathematics or formal logic, leads Barwise and Perry to base their 
theory on the linguistic analysis of (12), that is, the structure NP 
VP, rather than the traditional logical form. The VP has its usual 
interpretation; but the NP, being a general NP, is a relation between 
a discourse situation d, speaker connections ç, sets of individuals 
X6, and situations e, rather than a relation between d, c, 
individuals a, and situations e, as with singular NPs.20 
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Although Barwise and Perry fail to define the semantics for 
general NPs in their book, it is possible to reconstruct the 
semantics they perhaps would have wanted to give (at that time), and 
this I shall now do for the quantifier 'some'.21 I shall work within 
the framework of Singular Aliass to add precision to the definition. 
We add the lexical item 'some' to the grammar, with SCat(some) = { X, 
Y }. Its meaning is given by: 
(13) d,c I[ some 1 s,e iff Y C Xó and Y 6' # Q. 
We need to add to the grammar the NP rule (14) below, which clearly 
parallels rule NP3 of Singular Aliass. 
(14) NP rule: if is the quantifier 'some', -rc is a PrPh 
and e is one of the event indeterminates, then ( ;-rc) 
is an NP with SCat = { Y , e }. We indicate this 
feature by writing q it)i. Its features Var, Tense, AF 
and RS are the same as those of TG. Its meaning is: 
i 
d, ç t[ ( T ) ]( 6, e iff there is an extension c' of 
so that Ia., = Ext ( rc, e . ) and d, ([ ]( 6' c,ç,s l,s 
Here Ext is just Barwise and Perry's function Ext, the set of all 
individuals which in e have the property denoted by 117; the 
definition is reproduced here for convenience: 
(15) 
d, C,sExt 
(-rs, e) = { á I d, c ([-rc]( S' , e, where s' agrees 
with s except possibly on a }. 
Such, we may suppose, is the semantics Barwise and Perry would have 
given. 
In defining this semantics for general NPs, I have really only 
modified Barwise and Perry's semantics for singular terms to handle 
sets of individuals in place of individuals. Essentially, the 
general NP 'some F' picks out of a situation all the individuals that 
are F in that situation, and then picks out some of these, ie. its 
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interpretation is a nonempty subset of all the individuals that are F 
in the situation described. 
The semantics is not complete for we have yet to define how a 
general NP and a VP or PrPh combine to form an S. The interpretation 
of a singular NP is an individual which is suited to fit into the 
"situation- with -a- hole ", which is essentially the interpretation of 
the PrPh; but general NPs provide us with a set of individuals. 
There are two possible ways of proceeding that immediately occur to 
one. First, we could just slot the set of individuals into the 
interpretation of the PrPh; such a solution, however, is 
unsatisfactory, for it would mean that an utterance of (12) has as 
interpretation situations in which a nonempty set of individuals 
possesses the property of having been smoking. Clearly, this is not 
what we want. The other course is to understand a sentence 
containing a general NP as describing a situation in which each 
individual in the set contributed by the general NP possesses the 
property contributed by the rest of the sentence. The interpretation 
of an utterance of (12) would then be a situation e such that 
in e: at 1: smoking, y1; yes 
smoking, y2; yes 
smoking, yn; yes 
where 1 = c(has been) and y 
a 
= {y1, y2, ynl. 
This completes the outline of the first attempt to provide a 
semantics for general NPs. We shall now evaluate the adequacy of 
this semantics. 
5.3.2.2 Inadequacy of the semantics 
There is with this semantics no particular fact in e that 
corresponds to the proposition expressed by (12), as ordinarily 
conceived. Cooper is convinced that sentence connectives such as 
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'and' and 'or' require us to introduce molecular facts (eg. <and, f, 
g, 1 >): just having the facts f and g in a situation is sometimes not 
enough. In arguing against (9) as the semantics for sentential 
negation, Cooper shows us that (16) is inadequate as the semantics 
for 'and': 
(16) S & T describes a situation s iff S describes s and T 
describes s. 
This is indeed the correct semantics if we do not admit molecular 
facts, but when we do, (16) is not strong enough to ensure that a 
particular conjunctive fact is in the interpretation of S & T. Can 
we argue similarly that (14) is inadequate as the semantics for 
'some' (and thus also against similar proposals for other 
quantifiers)? 
Cooper's argument is based on sentence negation and conjoined 
sentences; similarly, we can argue from cases involving sentence 
negation and quantifiers for the need to have some suitable single, 
definite fact in any situation described by an utterance of a 
sentence containing a quantifier. To show this, let us suppose that 
(14) is the appropriate semantics for 'some', and let us say that the 
semantics of 'no' would be parallel to (14) except that the set Y 
would always be required to be empty. The meaning of 'no' would 
therefore be given by 
d, ç l[no]I 6, e iff Y 
. 
Ç X. Sc Y 6= 9 
with SCat(no) _ { X, Y 
22 
What is necessary, we then ask, for a 
situation to be in the interpretation of an utterance of (17)? 
(17) No one has been smoking. 
Is it enough for situations in the interpretation of utterances of 
(17) simply not to assert or predicate of each of the individuals 
mentioned in them that they are not smoking? This is the only 
restriction we can place on a situation in the interpretation of an 
utterance of (17) at the moment, with a semantics based on (14); we 
can include no single definite fact in such situations corresponding 
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to the proposition expressed. Although adding in facts that specify 
that an individual has been smoking produces a situation that is no 
longer in the interpretation of the utterance, it does not produce an 
incoherent situation. The semantics fails this criterion.23 
Moreover, the semantics is inadequate in another respect. It 
turns out that the semantics formulated in (14) means that the 
interpretation of an utterance of (17) is the class of all situations 
which, for all individuals a e A, do not specify that a has been 
smoking. The interpretation of an utterance of 
(18) No suitor was able to string the great bow of Odysseus. 
is the class of situations in which no individual was able to string 
the great bow of Odysseus; this is not quite what we want -- we want 
the class of situations in which no individual who is a suitor (of 
Penelope) in that situation was able to string the great bow of 
Odysseus. In requiring Y= 9 as the only effective condition for 
the quantifier 'no', we have lost all reference to suitorship. Hence 
the interpretation of utterances of (18) is identical to that of an 
utterance of 
(19) No servant was able to string the great bow of 
Odysseus. 
We need to retain reference to the set X right up until the general 
NP is combined with the PrPh to form a sentence, rather than dropping 
that set once the general NP has been formed. The proper semantics 
for forming a general NP from a quantifier and PrPh -c is: 
(20) NP rule: if is the quantifier 'some', TC is a PrPh 
and e 
i 
is one of the event indeterminates, then (k-i 
is an NP with SCat = ( X, Y, ei ). We indicate this 
feature by writing (' -rc)1. Its features Var, Tense, AF 
and RS are the same as those of Tr. Its meaning is: 
d,Ç I[( 7,c)1]16',e_ iff Xa = d¡caExt(i',eis) and d,c 
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The result is that now situations in which a servant, but no suitor, 
is able to string the great bow of Odysseus will be in the 
interpretation of an utterance of (18), and situations in which a 
suitor, but no servant, is able to string the great bow of Odysseus 
will be in the interpretation of an utterance of (19). 
However, we still have no single definite fact in these 
interpretations, and this causes problems when we consider negation, 
as Cooper did. Cooper pointed out that the inadequacy of an account 
of sentential negation that utilises 
(21) -S describes a situation s iff S does not describe s 
is that there are no negative facts in situations in the 
interpretation of utterances of S that would make them inconsistent 
with other facts. Providing a semantics for sentential negation 
means adding conjunctive and disjunctive facts, because the 
subsentence S negated might itself be a conjunction or a disjunction. 
If we consider the case where S is a quantified sentence, we can 
argue for the need for "quantified facts" as follows. 
Consider the sentence 
(22) Not everyone in the palace failed to string the great 
bow of Odysseus. 
The initial 'not' tends to be read as negating the general NP rather 
than the whole subsentence. However, we shall understand this as a 
case of sentential negation, reading 'not' as 'it is not the case 
that', and considering the sentence therefore as having the logical 
form -VxFx (quantification implicitly being restricted to the domain 
of those in the palace). 
The semantics for general NPs we have provided means that the 
interpretation of an utterance of the subsentence 
(23) Everyone in the palace failed to string the great bow 
of Odysseus. 
contains situations e such that for all individuals y e Y = X6.= the 
set of all people in the palace, 
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in e: at 1: F, y; yes 
where 1 = c(failed) and F abbreviates 'failed to string the great bow 
of Odysseus'. What then should be the condition on situations in the 
interpretation of an utterance of (22)? Applying Cooper's argument, 
we need a nonempty subset Ye of X6 such that 
in e: at 1: F, y; no 
for all y e Ye; that is, situations in the interpretation of an 
utterance of (22) must specify that some individuals (ie. at least 
one) did not fail to string the great bow of Odysseus. If we merely 
require the weaker condition that there is a nonempty subset Ys of X 
such that e does not specify that y failed to string the great bow of 
Odysseus for each y E Ya, then (22) is consistent with (23). 
We have established that we must have facts <1, F, y, 0> in the 
interpretation of utterances of (22); the general problem Cooper has 
drawn our attention to is that there is no way to impose this 
condition through the rule for sentential negation -- when 'not' is 
combined with a sentence S, -- unless we admit molecular facts into 
the semantics. Cooper himself introduced conjunctive and disjunctive 
facts; similar considerations, as we have just seen, demonstrate that 
we need a definite positive fact in situations described by sentences 
containing 'some' and a definite negative fact in situations 
described by sentences containing 'no', and structural constraints in 
addition. The conditions that Ya (p, imposed on the meaning of 
'some', and that Yo..= 9, imposed on the meaning of 'no', are simply 
too weak: we need some specific fact in the described situation. 
5.3.2.3 The addition of "quantified facts" 
How might we add "quantified facts" to the semantics and what 
form should they take? Unlike the case of 'and', 'or' and 'it is not 
the case that', which Cooper introduced into the semantics encoding a 
propositional logic, the quantifiers require us to be able to 
quantify into the constituent facts of the new compound fact. The 
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logical form of (12) has traditionally been regarded as -]xF(x) -- 
consisting of an open sentence F(x), whose free variable is bound by 
a quantifier. Encouraged by the parallels we found between situation 
semantics and formal languages, we could try to represent the open 
sentence by a situation type E(a). This situation type is intended 
to correspond to the VP 'is smoking'. Assuming that only people 
smoke (in the intended sense of 'smoke'), so that (12) means that 
some person has been smoking, E would be 
E:= at 1: person, a; yes 
smoking, a; yes 
with 1 < ld. Pursuing this approach further, the existential 
quantifier -1x would be represented by an operator that binds the free 
variable (the indeterminate) thus: 'some(a)'. Our quantified facts 
would look like 
(24) a. <some(a), E(a), 1> 
b. <no(a), E(a), 1> 
We have perhaps adhered too closely to the logical form as 
represented in the predicate calculus: we arrived at (24a) as the 
fact corresponding to the sentence (12) by concentrating on the 
logical form .3xF(x), in which the quantification ranges over all the 
individuals in the universe. The English sentence 
(25) Some dog is barking. 
on the other hand is more naturally viewed as involving a case of 
restricted quantification, but can only be represented on this 
approach as ( .3x)(D(x) & B(x)), using D(x) for 'x is a dog' and B(x) 
for 'x is barking'. While this is basically the course followed by 
Cooper in his semantics for the indefinite article in Montague 
Grammar,24 it distorts the natural language syntax considerably. The 
"dog -ness" of (25) gets moved from the NP 'some dog' at the level of 
the syntax to the subsentence D(x) & B(x) in the logical form 
representation 3x(D(x) & B(x)). 
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To avoid this, Barwise and Cooper (1981) assign to a quantifier 
a family of sets, to a VP a set, and a sentence consisting of a 
quantifier and a VP is true if the set is in the family. If A is the 
universe of individuals, and D the set of dogs, then the NP 'some 
dog' denotes the family { X C A I X n D cp }. Each set X in this 
family will contain at least one dog, but there are other individuals 
in X too, a state of affairs dictated by the way truth is defined. 
We seek a representation of "quantified facts" which does not 
appear to involve quantification over the whole domain as (24) does. 
A more attractive alternative than (24), one which takes note of 
Barwise and Cooper (1981), would be to have facts of the form <some, 
D, B, 1> for the proposition expressed by an utterance of (25), where 
D and B are event types given by: 
D:= at l: dog, a; yes 
B:= at 1: barking, a; yes 
To make the indeterminate explicit, we should write 
(26) <some, D(a), E(a), 1 >. 
As used in this representation of molecular facts, 'some' is a 
relation between situation types (cf. Cooper's relations 'and' and 
'or' between facts). An utterance of (25) describes a situation in 
which there is a fact of the form (26): such a described situation is 
one where there is something (represented by the indeterminate) which 
is a dog and which is also constrained to be barking. 
Like Cooper, we need structural constraints to ensure that 
additional facts hold in actual situations. Recall that actual 
situations are abstract situations which correspond exactly to real 
situations. Clearly it would not do for an actual situation to 
contain the fact <some, D(a), E(a), 1 >, yet not to contain any fact 
<l, barking, á, 1> for some individual á E A (or indeed not to 
contain such a fact for some dog a e A). More formally, suppose (25) 
is uttered truly; then there is some real situation Lre in which a 
dog is barking, and further, if the present proposal for the 
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semantics of general NPs is adopted, each situation in the 
interpretation of this utterance of (25) will contain the fact (26). 
Since the utterance is true, one of these abstract situations must be 
actual, ie. it must classify eTe precisely. Suppose that e is this 
actual situation in the interpretation of (25); suppose further that 
e does not contain any fact of the form <1, barking, a, 1 >. Then, 
contrary to hypothesis, e is not actual, for there is an e' that 
classifies eTe but which is not part of e, namely e' = e U {<l, 
barking, á, 1>), where á is a dog which is barking in ere. (For e is 
actual if it corresponds to a real situation, and e corresponds to e 
if e classifies e and every e' that classifies e is part of e; see 
Barwise and Perry, 1983, p. 61.) Hence actual situations which 
contain facts of the form (26) must also contain certain particular 
facts such as <1, barking, a, 1 >. 
are: 
The structural constraints that we need for 'some' and 'all' 
(27) For any actual situation s, if <some, Q(x), E(x), 1> e 
s, then there is a set Y C X, Y Q, where X = { x l 
Q[x] C s }, and E[y] C s for all y E Y. 
(28) For any actual situation s, if <some, Q(x), E(x), 0> e 
s, then for any Y Ç X, Y Q, where -X = { x I Q[x] Ç 
s }, E[y] s for all y C Y. 
(29) For any actual situation s, if <all, Q(x), E(x), 1> E 
s, then for all y E X = { x I Q[x] Ç s }, E[y] C s. 
(30) For any actual situation s, if <all, Q(x), E(x), 0> E 
s, then there is a nonempty set Y Ç X = { x 1 Q[x] Ç 
s } such that E[y] .s for each y E Y. 
This completes the account of how "quantified facts" might be added 
to situation semantics. 
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5.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we have argued that situation semantics fails 
in practice to vindicate the claim that it views meaning as in the 
world independent of language. In the first section (5.1) we argued 
for this from a consideration of the function of the setting and 
indeterminates in the semantics and from the use to which the level 
of abstract entities is actually put: abstract situations become the 
object of study and hence they are not used to classify real 
situations, but enter as a level of representation between thought 
and real situations. 
In the second section (5.2) we showed how the level of abstract 
entities in situation semantics could be regarded as a formal 
language which must be interpreted, and we gave a standard model 
theoretic semantics for it. Thinking of situation semantics in this 
fashion shows that Barwise and Perry have gained nothing by using set 
theory and talking of meaning in the world; on the contrary it has 
the advantage of making explicit the linguistic and representational 
status of the abstract entities. 
Finally, in the third section (5.3) we considered Robin 
Cooper's extension of the theory, and introduced further kinds of 
abstract situations ourselves. The particular aim of this section 
was to show how more syntax or linguistic structure could be, or 
perhaps needs to be, embedded at the semantic level. 
The overall thrust of the chapter is to argue that situation 
semantics has not shown us how to do semantics with meaning located 
in the world independent of language, as promised, but is still 
committed to a concept of meaning, or of some level thereof, which is 
essentially linguistic or syntactical, and which therefore represents 
reality. 
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Chapter Six: Kaplan, Almoq and Direct Reference Theory 
6.0 Introduction 
We have been concerned with the nature and status of the 
various semantic entities in situation semantics; in particular, we 
have asked what sorts of thing propositions and abstract situations 
might be. The question about propositions exercised Russell 
considerably, and he thought hard enough about it as to change his 
opinions on the matter: 'in chapter four we charted the progress of 
his thought (section 4.1). Although Moore and Russell both argued, 
early in their careers, that propositions were parts of the world, 
this view was later abandoned because of the problem of explaining 
which part of the world (which proposition) was expressed by a false 
utterance: the problem was that propositions could be non -actual. 
From that time, propositions were considered not to be located in the 
world, but, as the Fregean theory became the ruling orthodoxy, were 
identified with Fregean senses; they were denizens of Frege's third 
realm -- public and capable of being grasped (they were intuitable), 
but neither physical nor mental. Then, from about 1970, David Kaplan 
began to produce work that challenged this view. His championship of 
direct reference semantics saw a return to having real world entities 
as constituents of propositions. 
One feature of situation semantics -- that basic and sometimes 
compound expressions refer to individuals and properties themselves, 
and that abstract situations are composed of these referents -- makes 
it almost impossible to refrain from comparing situation semantics 
with direct reference theory. Kaplan was influenced in his early 
years, like everyone else at that time, by the ascendency of Fregean 
semantics. It was 'the Golden Age of Pure Semantics ... with 
language, meanings, and entities of the world each properly 
segregated.'1 This influence peaks with Kaplan (1969); thereafter 
Kaplan, through his work on demonstratives and indexicals, elaborated 
the direct reference view with its employment of singular 
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propositions, which contain ( "bare ") individuals. From this 
perspective abstract situations are singular propositions generalised 
to contain properties, rather than extensions or intensions. It is 
this parallelism that motivates the comparison of direct reference 
theory with situation semantics. 
To pursue a detailed investigation of the relation of situation 
semantics to direct reference theory, I shall consider David Kaplan's 
work reported in 'How to Russell a Frege- Church' (Kaplan, 1975), 
which is a model example of the exercise of comparing and relating 
two theories. Kaplan was concerned in that paper to argue for the 
hypothesis that Frege- Church semantics plus haecceitism equals 
Russellian semantics; his technique is to relate the ontologies of 
the Russellian and Fregean theories. Since this work is important 
for any investigation of the nature of situation semantics and its 
relation to other theories, I shall first discuss his argument and 
results. This will enable us to lay out the Russellian and Frege - 
Church ontologies, to which we shall relate the ontology underlying 
Richards' theory. 
In section (6.2), I shall apply the same strategy to situation 
semantics, setting out its ontology and thereby relating it to the 
other theories. A full comparison will require the addition of a 
semantics for necessity and possibility to situation semantics, which 
I provide. Many features of the situation semantics approach should 
then become clear: for example, the roles of the various kinds of 
entity, where the intensionality is located in the theory, and in 
general the basic structure of the semantics. I shall also compare 
situation semantics to the other theories in terms of some other 
notions and issues that are central to Kaplan (1975); I have in mind 
here the questions of actualism and possibilism, essentialism and 
haecceitism, and the role of singular propositions. 
Direct reference theory has recently been analysed and extended 
by Joseph Almog, whose work I shall consider here. Direct reference 
semantics is a relation of situation semantics since both derive a 
great deal of inspiration from the work of Russell. Direct reference 
theory countenances the existence of singular propositions; however, 
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even singular propositions contain at least one constituent (the 
sense of the predicate) that is not part of the world, but still 
dependent on language. For all its breaking with Fregean semantics 
in other respects, Kaplan's theory remains one that ties the senses 
and references of some kinds of expression to language (hence sense 
and reference are not language- independent). Interestingly, in 
Almog's recent work properties of certain kinds are constituents of 
singular propositions. Thus the two theories, situation semantics 
and recent direct reference semantics, appear to have a good deal in 
common, and a comparison will illuminate the issues that concern us. 
6.1 Kaplan's (1975) Analysis 
Essentially, Kaplan's strategy is to set out the entities that 
each approach employs -- the ontology of each theory, -- to remark 
that Russell's is seen to be a small part of the Frege- Church 
ontology, and then to show how to reduce the Frege- Church ontology to 
that proper part of itself that corresponds to Russell's ontology. 
When this has been done, Kaplan claims, a comparison of the 
Russellian and reduced Frege- Church ontologies shows immediately that 
the difference between them is haecceitism. 
Kaplan's analysis in 'How to Russell a Frege- Church' is couched 
in terms of the possible worlds framework, which allows him to 
represent propositions as sets of possible worlds and to define the 
notions of necessity and possibility, which are crucial to the 
discussion of haecceitism.2 Since Barwise and Perry have not said 
anything about how these would be treated modalities in their work, I 
provide below an analysis of necessity and possibility in the 
situation semantics framework, an analysis which I believe remains 
faithful to the spirit of the situational approach to semantics. 
For his analysis Kaplan takes as representative of Russellian 
semantics Russell's early views, from 'On Denoting' and Principia 
Mathematica (the first edition). Additionally, the view he calls 
Fregean or Frege- Churchian is actually his own formalisation of 
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Frege's ideas. Throughout Kaplan works in the possible worlds 
framework and deals with the formal, model theoretic aspects of the 
theory: the intuitive understanding of the theory is not addressed.3 
The ontology underlying Russell's semantics consists of 
individuals, propositions and propositional functions. Russellian 
semantics, in one formulation, also makes use of attributes, which 
are special kinds of propositional functions. Kaplan describes 
attributes as relations in intension; although we can think of 
relations as things, once we have pulled them out of propositions we 
have destroyed their intensionality. An attribute, therefore, is 
(the semantic value of) a verb "in place" in a proposition, the verb 
plus the mysterious glue with which it binds individuals and itself 
into a proposition. 
For Russell, for example, the only basic intensional 
notion seems to be that of an attribute (or relation in 
intension). Propositions and propositional functions 
(which are distinct from attributes) are constructed from 
these and individuals. (Kaplan, 1975, p. 719) 
For Russell, an attribute combines with an individual to 
yield a (singular) proposition (here the Haecceitism 
comes into play). This suggests that an attribute can be 
represented as a function from individuals to 
propositions, that is, as the simplest kind of 
propositional function. (Kaplan, 1975, p. 728) 
Attributes are the source of the intensionality, but by reconstruing 
them and inverting the dependency between them and propositions, we 
can represent attributes as propositional functions and thereby 
transfer the intensionality to propositions. 
The ontology of the Frege- Church semantics consists of 
individuals, truth values, senses, and n -place functions to entities 
of any kind.4 The main task here, in reducing the ontology to the 
subpart corresponding to the Russell's, is to reduce senses. This 
enumeration of the Frege- Church ontology does not mention 
propositions, but if we identify propositions with the senses of 
sentences, we can relate the two ontologies. Truth values drop out 
of the theory if we move up a level in the intensional hierarchy to 
the level of senses of first order entities; in particular 
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propositions, though conceived differently from Russell, can be used 
to reduce the other entities. In the Frege- Church system, an atomic 
proposition consists of an attribute (the sense of a predicate) and 
individual concepts, whereas for Russell it was an attribute and 
individuals. Although the components are different, the Frege -Church 
proposition has the same structure as the Russellian proposition. 
Hence, if we can reduce the components, we shall have reduced the 
Frege- Church notion of a proposition to the Russellian one. 
A remark on Kaplan's terminology, which I shall adopt, would be 
illuminating. Although Kaplan speaks of 'reducing' the 'ontology' of 
the Frege- Church theory, what he actually does is to reformulate the 
theory, reorganising the relations between the various semantic 
entities. 
At this point I need to say something about how propositions 
are being conceived. For Russell an atomic proposition consists of 
an attribute and individuals; thinking of propositions like this, as 
Russell did, we take individuals and attributes as primitive -- not 
propositions. We are conceiving of Frege- Church propositions in the 
same manner, except that individual concepts replace individuals. In 
his formal reduction, however, Kaplan, who is working within the 
possible worlds framework, takes individuals and possible worlds as 
primitive, constructs propositions as sets of possible worlds, and 
then constructs ( Russellian) attributes as functions from individuals 
to propositions. Thus he has a very different representation of 
propositions, attributes, and how the constituents of propositions 
are related. 
The constituents of Frege- Church propositions are senses; an 
attribute is the sense of a predicate, and an individual concept is 
the sense of an individual. The possible worlds framework again 
induces Kaplan, in his reduction, to take individuals and possible 
worlds as primitive, construct propositions in the usual manner, then 
to reduce individual concepts as follows. In the possible worlds 
notation an individual concept is a function from worlds to 
individuals: given a world it either picks out a unique individual, 
or is undefined. This means that individual concepts can be 
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represented as functions from individuals to propositions: an 
individual concept c is represented by the function fc from 
individuals to sets of possible worlds (ie. propositions) defined by: 
fc(x) _{ w I Ç(w) = x). 
The Frege- Church attribute is simply represented by a function from 
individual concepts to propositions. 
Kaplan is able to reformulate both the Russellian and Frege- 
Church theories in a possible worlds framework, with individuals and 
possible worlds as primitives. In addition to the primitives, the 
reformulated theories each make use of propositions and propositional 
functions, with propositions the repository of intensionality. The 
reformulation of the Russellian ontology requires only propositional 
functions whose domain consists of n- tuples of individuals, but the 
reduction of the Frege- Church ontology requires in addition 
propositional functions whose domain contains other kinds of entity. 
The ontology underlying Richards' semantics includes 
individuals, predicate letters and function letters. Propositions 
for Richards are rather strange entities, built out of individuals, 
predicate letters and function letters by the operation of linguistic 
concatenation. In so much as they are constructions from more basic 
entities, they are not presumed by the ontology of the theory, but 
the operation of concatenation is performing the same role here for 
Richards as the "mysterious glue" that binds things together in 
propositions does for Russell. Richards thereby claims that the 
relation between a predicate (what Russell called the 'verb') and an 
attribute (a verb "in place ", a predicate in use in a sentence) is 
linguistic. 
We could carry out an analysis in Kaplan's style on Richards' 
theory too, although it is questionable whether the exercise is not 
pointless. Since Richards' semantics is Russellian, the operation is 
basically the same as Kaplan's reformulation of Russell: we take 
individuals and possible worlds as primitives, construct propositions 
as sets of possible worlds, and then treat predicate letters as 
functions from n- tuples of individuals to propositions and function 
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letters as functions from n- tuples of individuals to individuals. 
This reformulation reduces predicate and function letters to objects 
within Kaplan's basic Russellian ontology, but it inverts which 
entities in the theory are primitive and which constructed. We have 
given up the explication of the relation of constituents within a 
proposition, and returned that relation to obscurity by assuming that 
we have examples of the whole entity (propositions), discerning some 
of their parts (individuals), and treating the remainder (attributes) 
simply as functions from individuals to propositions. In addition, 
the natural way of understanding Richards' semantics avoids having to 
regard possible worlds as primitives. 
6.2 Application to situation semantics 
6.2.1 The Ontology of Situation Semantics 
The ontology underlying situation semantics consists of 
individuals, properties, locations, and truth values.5 Out of these 
Barwise and Perry construct an enormous number of other kinds of 
entities that are employed in the semantics. In the first instance, 
we shall be concerned only with situations, but later we shall need 
to consider some of the other constructed entities. Perhaps most 
conspicuous is the addition of properties6 and locations to the 
ontology. For the present we shall concentrate on the role of 
properties in the semantics, since there is plenty of restructuring 
to be charted with their addition alone. 
The ontology of situation semantics includes truth values, 
unlike Russell's, but like Frege's theory. However, truth values 
have a significantly different role in situation semantics than they 
have in the Frege- Church theory. whereas there they function as the 
references of sentences, in situation semantics they are neither the 
references of sentences, nor the references of anything else: their 
role, rather, is bound up with the representational (or modelling) 
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status of the formalism. 
To see what is going on, let us consider an extremely simple 
situation, that in which the only thing happening is that at a 
location 1, Jackie is biting Molly: 
e:= at 1: biting, Jackie, Molly; yes 
or, in a more formal notation, the situation e = (<1, <biting, Jackie, 
Molly >,1 > }.7 The five ultimate components of the situation are all 
primitive entities, the situation being a set theoretic construct. 
In contrast to, say, the Russellian theory, where there is something 
basic and irreducible about the proposition itself, having to do with 
how the constituents are related within it, the (abstract) situation 
in situation semantics is not basic. 
The Russellian or reduced Frege- Church notion of a proposition 
corresponds in a way more closely with the notion of a real situation 
or Russell's facts. There are no truth values involved in the real 
situation, and the relation among its constituents is similarly 
unclear and mysterious. Barwise and Perry regard their set theoretic 
entities as apparatus that is introduced in the classification of 
real situations: the truth values enter the formalism in this 
context.8 However, although they take this view, it is the formalism 
that is used to do the semantics of natural language, and which 
usurps the main role.9 
If we regard abstract situations as propositions, and we have 
argued that we can, then the set theory in Barwise and Perry's 
semantics has clearly taken on the main task of relating constituents 
within propositions; but the truth value does have a role to play in 
this. As Russell pointed out, there are two propositions 
corresponding to each fact; in the case of Jackie's biting Molly, 
there is the proposition one expresses by uttering 'Jackie is biting 
Molly', and the other one, expressed by uttering 'Jackie is not 
biting Molly'.10 We can represent these two propositions using 
abstract situations differing only in which truth value they contain. 
For Russell, the constituents of both propositions are the same, but 
they are differently related. The truth value in situation 
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semantics, therefore, takes over part of the work done by the 
relation of the constituents within the proposition on the other 
picture. 
Situations are normally represented as sets of situational 
sequences <1, y, i>. They can also be regarded as total functions 
from sequences <1, y, i> to truth values, simply by moving from the 
set to its characteristic function. For example, the situation above 
which has Jackie biting Molly would be represented by the total 
function f: Seq -> (0,11, where Seq is the class of all sequences 
<l,y,i >, defined by: 
1 if s = <1, <biting, Jackie, Molly >, 1> 
f(s) = 
0 otherwise. 
for all s e Seq. We have not thereby eliminated the curious role of 
the truth value in the specification of a situation. In fact, we are 
now dealing with two kinds of occurrences of a truth value, once as 
the i in the sequence <1,y,i >, and again as the values of the 
characteristic function. However, this second kind of occurrence of 
a truth value is due merely to the representation of sets as 
characteristic functions; moving back to representing situations as 
sets eliminates it. This should make us think about the first kind 
of occurrence of a truth value -- is it also eliminable? 
There is another way of thinking of situations: we could take 
the truth value i as the value which a partial function assigns to 
sequences <1, y >. With this representation of a situation, however, 
we do not obtain a characteristic function, because this new function 
is only partial and, crucially, we are interested not only in the 
sequences <1,y> to which it assigns 1, but also those to which it 
assigns 0. We cannot eliminate this first occurrence of a truth 
value by moving to a set, for the function is not simply 
characterising a subset of its domain. However, we can represent a 
situation as a pair of sets, the members of each set being themselves 
pairs <1,y>. Intuitively, the first set of pairs is the set of those 
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pairs which, on the partial functional representation of abstract 
situations, are mapped to 1, and the second set consists of those 
mapped to O. For example, the situation above with Jackie biting 
Molly would be represented by the pair 
<{ <1, <biting, Jackie, Molly >> }, 9> 
and the situation 
e:= at 1: r, a, b; yes 
r', á; no 
at l': r ", á, c; yes 
would become 
< { <1, <r,á,b >>, <l', <r ",á,ç >>}, { <l', <r',á >>} >. 
We have eliminated truth values from the representation of abstract 
situations altogether. Nonetheless, this reformulation of the 
representation of abstract situations should make clear what the role 
of the truth value in situation semantics is. 
The "truth value" does not signify that something is the case 
or is not the case. Unlike the role of the truth value in Fregean 
semantics, where if a sentence designates 1 it is true, in situation 
semantics the "truth value" is simply a means of classifying pairs 
<1, y.> in one of two ways without being committed to the truth of 
those relations classified with 1; "truth" is relative to the 
abstract situation involved and abstract situations can be non- 
factual, even incoherent. Contact with reality occurs only at the 
level of the structure of situations. The role of the "truth values" 
0 and 1 in situation semantics is thus very different from the role 
which they have in Fregean semantics. 
Reformulating situation semantics in the attempt to make it 
conform with the Russellian ontology of individuals, propositions, 
and propositional functions, we have to allow locations as well. 
This should be unobjectionable; Kaplan has places and times in his 
theory (Kaplan, 1979), and when indexicality is accepted as something 
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to be accounted for, locations seem natural and inevitable. Whereas 
Kaplan constructs propositions from possible worlds, it seems more 
natural that in reformulating the ontology of situation semantics we 
should construct propositions from "possible situations ". But what 
are these possible situations? They cannot be abstract situations, 
since the point of the reduction is to eliminate properties and 
abstract situations are constructed out of properties and other 
primitives. Nor can they be real situations, for there are not 
enough of these. (Hence my motivation for calling them possible 
situations -- they must be distinguished from both abstract 
situations and real situations.) In the possible worlds framework 
Kaplan employs, possible worlds are primitive; we could similarly 
take possible situations as primitive, but there is a more desirable 
alternative. Since possible situations could be constructed from 
possible worlds by thinking of a possible situation as a set of 
possible worlds,11 we can dispense entirely with the notion of 
possible situations and construct propositions directly from possible 
worlds. Indeed, since both propositions and possible situations can 
be constructed from possible worlds, what is the difference between 
them? 
One might be inclined to think that properties can now be 
represented as functions which map a location and a sequence of 
individuals to a proposition; this is not so, for we have forgotten 
truth values. In the theories Kaplan deals with, negation is like 
conjunction and disjunction: a sentential operator; in situation 
semantics, however, Barwise and Perry treat only VP negation, so that 
we have to handle propositions such as that Jackie is (definitely) 
not biting Molly, in addition to the proposition that it is not the 
case that Jackie is biting Molly. A property can be combined with a 
location and a sequence of individuals to yield two distinct abstract 
situations: 
<l, r, á1, ..., án, 1> 
<l, r, ..., án, 0> 
The proposed representation of properties as a function from a 
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location and a sequence of individuals to a proposition is therefore 
too coarse. 
The simplest solution is to represent properties as functions 
from locations, sequences of individuals and "truth values" to 
propositions. It is also possible to use the method of eliminating 
the "truth value" outlined above, if one does not like this reference 
to "truth values "; the elements in the domain of these functions 
which represent properties will be more complex in this case, but 
there is no essential difference. For example, employing "truth 
values ", a property r is represented by a function fr: 
fz(1,a1,...,an,1) = the'proposition that a1,..., an stand in 
the relation r at 1. 
fr,(1,á1,...,an,0). = the proposition that á1,..., an 
(definitely) do not stand in the relation r at 1. 
Alternatively, the function may be written as follows, eliminating 
reference to "truth values ": 
fr(<1,a1,...,an >, 9) = the proposition that a1,..., an stand 
in the relation r at 1. 
fr(9, <l,á >) = the proposition that a1,..., án 
(definitely) 
á 
do not stand in the relation r at 1. 
The ontology is thereby reformulated in terms of individuals, 
locations, and propositions.12 
6.2.2 The addition of necessity and possibility to situation 
semantics 
In order to carry through a full analysis, we need to be able 
to consider in situation semantics sentences of the form 'Necessarily 
S' (C)S; henceforth I shall use the box CI to represent necessarily 
and the diamond d to represent possibly). This is something we 
cannot do with the Barwise and Perry theory as it is at present, 
therefore I have extended that theory by adding to it a semantics for 
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necessity and possibility. In all this I shall treat both D and 
as sentential operators. Although I deal with both notions, one is 
not thereby prevented from either defining one in terms of the other, 
or taking both primitively, as one pleases. 
To prepare the way for our analysis of necessity and 
possibility, consider the following point about the sentence 
connective &. Usually in model theoretic semantics the truth 
conditions for atomic sentences are defined first and then the truth 
conditions of molecular sentences are recursively defined in terms of 
their parts. In the case of &, the clause defining the connective 
would be: 
C9L S & T iff S and C.51_ T. 
Now, in situation semantics, we could keep this clause; however, 
because sentences (more exactly, utterances) designate classes of 
situations, there is another method open to us for defining the truth 
conditions of a molecular sentence S & T than in terms of the truth 
conditions of its subsentences. The truth conditions of S & T can be 
given directly: 
114J--d,cS&T iff (-]e)(ee (Mo n 
d,cI[ S&T] )). 
We can do this because S & T has a meaning and an interpretation of 
its own, a relation between utterance situations d,c and described 
situations e. Situation semantics is very much concerned with 
linguistic meaning, and it is this meaning that is recursively 
defined, rather than the truth conditions or reference.13 Of course, 
care is taken so that IES & T]j.is defined in such a way that the two 
definitions agree. 
We might expect the same two possibilities to be open to us in 
adding necessity and possibility to the semantics. To set out the 
two possibilities, we have, firstly, the conventional (indirect) 
approach, here formulated in the usual possible worlds notation: 
(1) i,]S iff (Vw' ) (w' e W & wRw' -> ( w, a) 
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(2) ( oS iff (Aw' ) (w' E W & wRw' & (, S) 
The sentence CSS is true in a world w iff the sentence S is true in 
all accessible possible worlds w'; O S is true in w iff S is true in 
at least one accessible possible world w'. Now, we do not have 
possible worlds in situation semantics; nonetheless, this definition 
suggests how we might deal with necessity and possibility using 
classes of possible actual situations. I will show how to 
.in e-r- po-ate incorporate this "possible worlds" conception of 
necessity into situation semantics. 
There is another way to provide a semantics for necessity by 
defining d,c i[ ö S]1 e, which may seem more in the spirit of situation 
semantics.14 On this approach we introduce the notion of a possible 
option, which is a relation between two abstract situations. We 
shall write ePOe' to mean that e' is a possible option from e; the 
import of this notion is that if e is actual, then the world, or part 
of it, might be (or might have been) like e': e' is possible. The 
relation PO between situations is analogous to the relation of 
accessibility between possible worlds. We shall also write e' E 
P0(e) for ePOe' and use P0(e) for the class of abstract situations 
possible relative to e. The meanings of i1 S and S are then 
(3) d,ç (B 1S1 e iff (Vi') (e' e PO(e) -> d,ç I[5]I e') 
(4) d,ç I[Q5]( e iff (je' ) (e' e P0(e) & d,ç I[S]( e') 
I shall now define the notions of necessity and possibility in the 
way promised, which encodes the possible worlds conception of these 
notions; then I shall show that it and the way just outlined are 
equivalent. 
We do not have possible worlds in situation semantics; in fact, 
we do not even have an actual world in the semantics as laid down in 
Situations and Attitudes. What we do have are actual situations. A 
model IL is an ordered pair <M,Mo >, where M0 is a class of actual 
situations and M is the class of corresponding factual situations. 
(In fact, it is redundant to mention M in specifying the model, since 
the definition of truth mentions only M0, and the constraints on M 
and MQ mean than M can be derived from M.) The class M0 specifies 
- 170 - 
the way the world is, and thus plays the same part as the 
distinguished member G of the set of possible worlds K in Kripke's 
(1963) notation. This suggests that we can capture necessity by 
expanding the concept of a model, so that there are not only classes 
M and Mo, the factual and actual situations, but a family of pairs 
<Nr, M> of "possible factual" and "possible actual" situations 
respectively, with a distinguished pair, written <N0,M0 >, which tell 
us the way the world is. 
In the first stage of extending the model theory, we assume 
that in all possible states of the world (all possible worlds) the 
same individuals, properties and locations occur. (This assumption 
will simplify the analysis; later we shall drop it.) A stage one 
model is a triple <MO, ',R >15, where /Nis a family of classes MA of 
abstract situations (the classes of possible actual situations), MO 
is a distinguished member of, and R is a relation of relative 
accessibility between classes Mft. Given classes A, R, and L of 
individuals, relations and locations respectively, and a class t of 
all abstract situations generated from them, each M e *twill 
determine a subclass N of E of factual situations. Naturally, for 




will have to satisfy certain 
conditions, namely Barwise and Perry's four conditions on models 
(S &A, p. 60). 
The concept of necessity we are to formulate requires us to 
relativise the notion of truth to a class Mz,,, and to think of 
utterances being true with respect to possible states of the world. 
States of the world are specified by the classes M e *. We will 
signify that a sentence S uttered on an occasion represented by á,Ç 
is true relative to the class Mt in a model _ <M0,'yYjß> by writing 
M 
1=d`c S. 
(I shall use a Gothic letter rather than CSC for the new situation 
semantics models.) The definition of truth in the distinguished 
class MO remains the same as it was: in our new notation this becomes 
(5) ):1 1=á0c S iff (3e) (e e Mo CI d,c l[s_]l ) 
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Truth relative to an arbitrary class M, e 4( is similar, as one would 
expect, and is given below as (6). Finally, the truth of a sentence 
DS relative to an arbitrary class M, E 'tis given by (7): 
(6) " 1=á,c S iff (je) (e e (M n d,c lLsll ) ) 
(7) 
-611=á c hS iff (f 9 )() E m & M RM -> 
Clause (7) incorporates the a relation R of relative accessibility 
between classes e '. 
To show that this conception of necessity and possibility, 
which I shall call 'the PW conception', is formally equivalent to 
that embedded in the semantics via definitions (3) and (4), which 
represent what I shall call the SS approach', we need to relate the 
model theoretic apparatus of the pairs <N,M> that we have here to 
the possible options apparatus of the SS approach. 
We mean by e' e PO(e) that if e is actual (e E Me), then the 
state of the world specified by e' is possible. What does this mean 
in the PW approach? An important qualification is that e' E PO(e) 
need not be a possible actual situation in PW terminology, it might 
be merely a possible factual situation: we require e' E but not 
necessarily e' E Mme. Formally, therefore, we have: 
(Ve')((-30(g. E Mo & e' E P0(0) -> ) ("A e m & MCRM.,, & e' 
E N, ) ) 
The PW conception of possibility revolves around the notion of 
accessibility between total specifications of the state of the world 
by means of the classes Mme: MoRMt means that the state of the world 
specified by M, (effectively the situations in Nom) is possible, given 
that Mo is the actual state of the world. If e' E Nom, it is a 
possible state of the world, so that we require e' to be a possible 
option from some actual situation, thus: 
(ve')((i")(,(4 E m& MflRM,/& e' E N) -> (-10(e E MC & e' E 
PO(e))) 
Combining these two conditionals we have, therefore: 
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(8) (Ke')((3e)(e e No & e' E P0(e)) <-> (3 
/ 
µ )(it e m & MORM 
&e' eN7/4')) 
which forms the basis for proving the equivalence of the two systems. 
We shall demonstrate the equivalence with respect to 
possibility, by showing that the truth conditions for an utterance of 
Oy at <d,c> are equivalent. On the SS approach we have: 
(9) 1=d0 pcP 
<_> (At) (g. e (M0 n 
c([0(P]I )) 
<=> (3e) (e e No & (3e' )(t' e PO(e) & d,ç 'WI e' ) 
<=> (')(-3.)( e e No & e' e PO(e) & d,ç ![y]( e' ) 
On the PW approach we have: 
(10) =MO a 
<_> (-3 µ ) ( )Ll e m & MORMt, & 
1 
dl`c CC ) 
<_> (3)u)(J+.t e m & MORM)& (At' )(t' e M,, n d,c ([pio 
<_> (3e') (aµ m&%RMtt&e' eM,&d,çl[Cp](e') 
The equivalence of the last lines from each of (9) and (10) follows 
from (8). 
This equivalence shows that the model theory of situation 
semantics, for all its strangeness, is fundamentally not so different 
from standard model theory. Embedding the concepts of possibility 
and necessity within situation semantics in the natural situational 
way (our SS approach) is equivalent to the standard possible worlds 
conception of the notions (which was formalised by our PW approach). 
In possible world semantics, there are generally possible 
individuals considered to exist in other possible worlds which do not 
exist in the actual world -- Pegasus, for example. If we are going 
to incorporate this feature into our semantics, we must let 14),e '1« 
determine the class A of individuals that would exist in the world, 
if the actual situations were just as Mit specifies. Similarly, if we 
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thought it necessary or desirable for the actual properties and 
locations we find in the world not to be fixed, but also to vary, if 
the world were different, M1" would additionally determine classes Rr 
and L . A stage two model, which I shall not develop here, but leave 
to the reader, would incorporate these features. suffice it to say 
that allowing this variation in which individuals there are (and 
perhaps also which properties and locations there are) does not 
affect the basic structure of the definition of truth in terms of the 
interpretation, which remains as it is above, in (6) and (7). 
The acceptance of singular propositions entails haecceitism. 
We have argued that abstract situations correspond to propositions; 
now, an abstract situatión contains individuals themselves (the 
"bare" individuals), so situation semantics is committed to singular 
propositions. Therefore the semantics is haecceitist. Although we 
do not have possible worlds in situation semantics, we have the 
classes M of possible actual situations, and we might wonder whether 
an individual a e A is identical with another á' e Ay. To be 
faithful to Barwise and Perry's approach, the set of all possible 
individuals is the set A = 
U 
Ate; all individuals are present at once, 
so that á e A is á' e A if and only if a = a'. Any overlaps are 
metaphysically real, and the semantics is haecceitist. 
6.2.3 Where is the intensionality located? 
An interesting question to put to situation semantics is: Where 
is the intensionality located in the theory? In investigating this 
matter, for which the analysis of the previous section is helpful, I 
shall also consider, for comparative purposes, the location of 
intensionality in the other theories we have been looking at -- 
Russell's, Richards', and the Frege- Church theory. First let us see 
what the concept of intensionality involves. 
Primary examples of intensionality occur with modal contexts 
and attitude reports: verbs of propositional attitude are regarded as 
intensional operators, creating intensional contexts. Intensionality 
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is made the explanation for the failure of the principle of 
substitution of coreferential singular terms, as in 
(11) The ancient Egyptians believed the Morning Star was 
visible in the morning. 
(12) The ancient Egyptians believed the Evening Star was 
visible in the morning. 
Intensionality in Fregean theory is located at the level of sense, 
and thus comes into play in any context where the sense of an 
expression is made to function as its semantic value. 
It has been supposed that what is needed to deal with 
intensionality is a more refined concept of meaning (for the semantic 
explanation of the failure of substitutivity is that distinct 
singular terms introduce distinct references, when there is only one 
physical object). The machinery of possible world semantics is an 
attempt to grasp such a finer notion of meaning. In an extensional 
semantics, where the meaning of a predicate F is its extension, a set 
of individuals, it is impossible to distinguish semantically between 
coextensive predicates F and G, for they are assigned the same set of 
individuals. If it is contingent that F and G are coextensive, so 
that they might not have been so, then an intensional semantics can 
distinguish between them, for the meaning of a predicate in such a 
semantics may be identified with a function from possible worlds to 
sets of individuals, and F and G will not be assigned the same 
function, for by hypothesis in some possible worlds at least, they 
will have different extensions. 
Since for Russell the proposition is a complex consisting of an 
attribute and individuals, if either an individual or the attribute 
is exchanged for another, different one, the resulting proposition is 
distinct. Thus different terms which designate the same individual 
can be substituted without changing the proposition expressed by the 
containing sentence, for only that individual, and not the terms 
themselves, is a constituent of the propositions. The expectation of 
this is what gives rise to the puzzle of opacity in intensional 
contexts. If a language contained coreferential verbs or predicates, 
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they too could be interchanged without altering the proposition 
expressed. 
We can illustrate this point in Richards' theory, where 
predicates of the formal language L are interpreted as the attributes 
of the proposition. For example, the two embedded sentences in 
(13) Galileo said that the Earth moves. 
(14) Galileo said that the Earth orbits. 
are represented differently in a language L(Q ,` -,-g), for which the 
sets , ^4- and t contain a suitable number of entities or the right 
kind for our example. Following Richards closely (Richards, 1974, p. 
437), the propositions are, respectively, 
(15) Said(c1,F(Moves(ç2))) 
(16) Said(c1,F(Orbits(c2))) 
where ç1 is Galileo, c2 is the earth, F is interpreted as 'that', and 
Said, Moves, and Orbits are interpreted as 'said', 'moves' and 
'orbits' respectively. 
For a given object language, there will be some languages 
L(Q, -A ) such that we can find a one to one mapping between of the 
predicates Pk Q of L and the verbs Vk in the object language such 
that if p is a proposition expressed by a sentence S(Vk) in which Vk 
occurs and Vk is mapped to pk, then there is a formula Pk of L which 
also expresses the proposition p and Pk occurs in (P In these 
cases the intensionality is located with the predicates. It appears 
that this is intended in Richards' theory. But the intensionality is 
located there, because that is where Richards has decided to place 
it. The pragmatic part of his theory is designed to get away from 
the many various object language expressions that can designate a 
single individual, and to deliver the individual itself as the input 
to the semantic component. Nothing similar is the case with 
predicates and verbs.16 We can imagine extending the pragmatic 
component so that utterances were scrutinised also with respect to 
the verbs employed; if there were a canonical representation for the 
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concepts expressed by verbs, then we could use these as the 
predicates of L and in certain cases utterances of sentences which 
contain distinct verbs would nonetheless express exactly the same 
proposition (thought of as a formula of L). Suppose G(x) is a 
predicate (perhaps expressed in the language of physics) that is 
satisfied by the earth in virtue of its revolutions around the sun; 
then the proposition expressed by utterances of each of (13) and (14) 
would be represented thus: Said(c1,F(G(c2))).17 
From this perspective situation semantics is a theory of 
considerable interest, for it takes properties to be primitive, and 
abstract situations are constructed out of them. If we had two 
utterances which, although utilising different verbs in the object 
language, referred to one and the same property, the same proposition 
would be expressed in each case. Unfortunately, however, it seems 
that we are far from having a set of canonical properties; properties 
seem to be proliferated when required, one corresponding to each 
object language verb. This remark applies to the ecological 
psychologists as much as to Barwise and Perry. 
Barwise and Perry have acknowledged the influence of Gibsonian 
or ecological psychology on their metatheory, and the question of 
where the intentionality is located has been asked with respect to 
ecological psychology (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981), so the issue is 
worth considering here. Properties in Gibson's work (and the same is 
true of situation semantics) are intentional, since the notion of 
property identity goes beyond extensions (which individuals have the 
property): coextensive sets may be the extensions of distinct 
properties.18 In the context Fodor and Pylyshyn consider, the 
problem of intensionality manifests itself in the fact that an object 
can enter into cognitive behaviour as a causal factor in different 
guises -- as the Morning Star or as the Evening Star, for example. 
Fodor and Pylyshyn argue that we should use mental 
representations to deal with intentionality, but Gibson, they say, 
eschewing mental representations, is attempting to deal with the 
problem by 'proliferating properties'. They locate the 
intentionality in Gibson's theory firmly with the properties. A 
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single astronomical object, Venus, has two presently relevant 
properties: the property of being the Morning Star and the property 
of being the Evening Star. When the ancient Egyptian astronomers 
observed Venus in the morning and had thoughts about it, on Fodor and 
Pylyshyn's view they were internally representing it as the Morning 
Star; but on the Gibsonian view they were perceiving it as 
instantiating the property of being the Morning Star. Properties 
have taken over the intentional role that is performed by mental 
representations in cognitive science theories. 
6_3 Almoq's recent theory' 
Joseph Almog (1983) has placed the direct reference theory in 
its historical context, extended the theory, and explained its 
significance as he sees it, thus making that paper an important 
contribution to one of our central issues: the status of the semantic 
entities. Almog sees as a particularly important aspect of Kaplan's 
views the separation of how the meaning of an expression determines 
its referent from the modal value of the expression; for Fregeans, 
sense is expected both to determine reference and represent the modal 
value of an expression.19 According to Almog, Kripke and Putnam do 
not depart from this basic Fregean picture, despite their original 
contributions to the causal theory of names and natural kind terms. 
A considerable body of work in the Fregean tradition has emerged, 
incorporating the Kripke - Putnam criticisms of description theories, 
and which Almog dubs as the neo- Freqean survival. 
Kripke and Putnam argued against the description theory as a 
picture of how the references of names and natural kind terms are 
determined. The new theory, for the pictures of reference that 
Kripke and Putnam offer are in the relevant respects the same, is a 
causal theory. The description theory of names went hand in hand 
with a Fregean semantics -- the sense of a name was the associated 
group of descriptions, which determined which individual was the 
bearer of the name. 
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The causal theory of names teaches that a name is attached to 
an individual at a "baptism" (Kripke, 1972; Devitt, 1974, 1981); that 
that individual is the referent of the name, and that reference is 
preserved (under normal circumstances) via the series of links that 
results as more and more speakers learn the name, either directly 
from those who were present at the baptism (or have otherwise been in 
physical contact with the referent20), or indirectly from other 
speakers who have learned the name. There is thus a chain of 
connections from current users of a name all the way back through 
history to the referent. 
The relation between names and descriptions within the causal 
theory is the reverse of what it was with the descriptive theory; the 
name 'Aristotle' does not refer to Aristotle in virtue of 
descriptions associated with it, eg. the teacher of Alexander. 
Rather, there is a causal chain reaching back from our use of the 
name today to Aristotle himself. 
Hilary Putnam has argued that essentially the same mechanism 
determines the references of natural kind terms: 'water', 'gold', 
'lemon', 'tiger', etc. The reference of 'water' is not whatever 
satisfies the description 'the stuff that fills rivers and lakes, 
that animals drink, etc.', since on Twin Earth XYZ satisfies this 
compound description, but is not water; rather, 'water' refers to all 
samples of liquid which share the essence as the liquid which the 
term 'water' was first used to name, and which (we believe) is water: 
H20. Natural kind terms are in a certain sense indexical. 
The problem with the Fregean theory, given the general 
acceptance of Kripke's and Putnam's arguments for the stability of 
names and natural kind terms, is that the senses of these expressions 
would designate, in other possible worlds, other individuals and 
other natural kinds. The neo- Fregean response, therefore, has been 
to modify the senses of such expressions accordingly, to rigidify, 
apriorise and socialise senses, as Almog states (Almog, 1983, p. 11). 
The sense of the name "Kripke" in neo- Fregean theory is: 
The actual individual standing at the end of the chain 
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leading to the actual use by the agent of "Kripke ". 
(Almog, 1983, p. 11) 
Almog considers this neo- Fregean survival as indicative of the 
failure of Kripke's and Putnam's arguments to tackle the roots of 
Fregean theory; he improves on their arguments by proposing a 
fundamentally different mechanism for reference. With Kripke and 
Putnam, the referents of names and natural kinds is seen to be 
determined not by description, the Fregean stratagem, but by causal 
chains; but this is demonstrated by a consideration of various 
examples involving other possible worlds or Twin Earth, ie. by 
considering the modal properties of these expressions. In contrast, 
Almog remarks, Kaplan's ,work is distinguished by a concentration 
firstly upon the mechanism of reference, the modal properties of 
expressions arising as a corollary. 
Using the semantics of necessity and possibility developed in 
section (6.2.2), I intend to explore the relation between reference 
and modality in situation semantics. Finally, I want to point out 
similarities between situation semantics, Almog's views on the future 
of direct reference theory, and Robin Cooper's recent work on 
sentence negation in situation semantics, discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
6.3.1 The mechanism of reference 
There are several points about Almog's view of the direct 
reference theory that we must understand. The first point concerns 
the determination of which proposition is expressed by an utterance. 
A sentence uttered in a context (or taken with respect to a context) 
expresses a proposition. If we employ the possible worlds idiom,21 
and thus regard modal operators as shifting evaluation to other 
possible worlds, then for Almog, as for Kaplan (1977), such shifts 
can happen only after the proposition has been determined, or at 
least only after the contributions of directly referring expressions 
have been determined, and it is always this same proposition, fixed 
once and for all, that 
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evaluated at these other worlds.22 
This is the view that Kaplan's work on demonstratives and 
indexicals has given rise to. Almog, correctly in my opinion, 
believes it crucial to distinguish descriptive material operating as 
a sense and as a reference fixer (Almog, 1983, p. 22). The case of 
singular terms is more familiar and our intuitions clearer, so we 
shall consider that case, but Almog wants to extend this view to 
atomic predicates (cf. Almog, 1981, 1983, p. 45). 
The reference of a name is not decided or determined by a 
function which returns individuals as values, even if it is the same 
individual in every possible world (or alternatively, every possible 
world in which the individual exists) -- the meaning of a name is not 
a constant intension, in other words. We have to relinquish any idea 
of reference fixing as a qualitative search through a domain for the 
appropriate individual. Such qualitative searches are in order for 
determining the truth or falsity of sentences containing bound 
variables: we are looking for an individual to make a sentence true 
(the existential quantifier), or we are checking that all individuals 
in the domain make the sentence true (the universal quantifier). 
Instead, directly referential terms are comparable to free variables 
(as Kaplan pointed out in the preface to 'Demonstratives', p. 2). 
Rather an open sentence like 'Fx' is sensitive only to 
the assignment, an assignment which fixes an object for 
'x'. The difference is crucial: the search through the 
domain of existents of a given world is a search which 
makes the extension of the formula (its truth value) 
dependent on facts of that world. The assignment is 
operating at a different level: it functions as a 
linguistic stipulation. As such it does not rely on 
facts. Rather it performs a decision to assign an object 
to a symbol, period. This decision comes before we look 
at any facts. ( Almog, 1983, pp. 16,17) 
The mechanism for fixing the reference of singular terms is a rule 
expressed in the metalanguage. This is Almog's strategy for getting 
away from reference being fixed by something like 







'dthat(the F)', when represented in a possible worlds framework, as 
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found in Kaplan (1979), degenerates into a constant intension and is 
indistinguishable, as far as the representation is concerned, from 
something which happens to have the same extension in all possible 
worlds. 
This view entails the reinstatement of singular propositions, 
because the reference fixing rules determine an individual, a "bare" 
individual and not an individual under a concept, as a constituent of 
the proposition expressed. For the Fregean there are no singular 
propositions; the proposition contains individual concepts as 
constituents. When we evaluate a Fregean proposition at a possible 
world, the individual concept determines an individual (supposing we 
do not have an empty term), the intension of the predicate determines 
an extension, and the utterance is true if the individual is in the 
extension. This is a different conception of a proposition and how 
the truth of an utterance is evaluated; we only contact individuals 
at the moment of evaluation. The direct reference view supposes that 
we can refer directly to an individual, and that when we do the 
individual himself becomes a constituent of the structure evaluated. 
An example will help to show the difference between the direct 
reference view and Fregean theory. On the latter theory, terms refer 
to their referents via mediating senses, which have typically been 
viewed as operating as descriptive material. Hence, for our example, 
we shall focus on a description, 'Priam's eldest son'. According to 
the Fregean theory an utterance of 
(17) Achilles chased Priam's eldest son around the walls of 
Troy. 
is true in a possible world if Achilles chased whoever is Priam's 
eldest son in that world around the walls of Troy.23 In worlds where 
Hector is Priam's eldest son, the utterance is true (in such worlds) 
if Achilles chased Hector around Troy; in worlds where Aeneas is 
Priam's eldest son, the utterance is true if Achilles chased Aeneas 
around Troy. On the direct reference theory the proposition is 
determined before evaluation takes place: we find whoever is Priam's 
eldest son in the world of the context of the utterance, and that 
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individual becomes a constituent of the proposition expressed by the 
utterance. The mechanism whereby the reference of the definite 
description 'Priam's eldest son' is fixed, according to the direct 
reference theory as expanded by Almog, is that the atomic 
constituents of 'Priam's eldest son' refer directly to their 
references (pieces of the world): 'Priam' to Priam, 'son' to the 
property of sonhood, and 'eldest' to a function which maps the 
property of sonhood into the property of eldest sonhood. We obtain a 
complex property (being the eldest son of Priam) which Hector 
instantiates uniquely, so that the description refers to him. The 
proposition expressed by an utterance of (17) is accordingly that 
Achilles chased Hector around the walls of Troy. Hence, in each 
possible world, the utterance is true in that world if and only if in 
that world Achilles chased Hector around Troy, even if Priam's eldest 
son in that world is Aeneas. 
In extending the direct reference view, Almog proposes that 
natural kind terms refer to the kinds in question, and that these 
kinds are constituents of the proposition expressed (see Almog, 1981, 
1983, section 7): 'Propositions generated by "a is a(n) N" where "N" 
is a natural kind term, have the kind itself in the corresponding 
place.' (Almog, 1983, p. 47) Kind here means a property in the 
situation semantics sense, something that can be a part of a 
proposition. It is not surprising that where predicates are 
concerned, Almog begins with natural kind terms -- he had treated 
them in Almog (1981). 
Care is taken throughout this paper to point out that one can 
share the direct reference view in semantics, and yet be anti - 
essentialist in metaphysics. One can hold that an utterance of 
(18) Bagheera is a panther. 
determines a proposition with Bagheera and the kind Panther as 
constituents; if one wants to, one can say that there are possible 
worlds where Bagheera does not stand in the kind membership relation 
to the kind Panther: this is a metaphysical question, not a 
semantical one. 
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Almog takes a new view about the role of causal chains in the 
determination of a proposition when a sentence is taken at a context. 
Whereas Kripke and Devitt see the role of causal chains as preserving 
and determining the references of expressions across speakers and 
times, for Almog their role is to preserve and determine the meaning 
of expressions. On Almog's view, causal chains have no semantic 
role; rather they have a pre- semantic task, operating on words gua 
pieces of syntax to give them meaning. 
Kaplan's view in his (1977) was that linguistic meaning may be 
identified with the character of an expression, which is a function 
from contexts to contents. Almog retains this view, but locates the 
point of action of causal chains outside this sphere, so that causal 
chains now assign characters to expressions: 
Rather, the chain decides which meaning "Kaplan" is going 
to have before we get to any context. It stipulates that 
the word is going to mean such -and -such. This is a pre - 
semantic task: we take syntactic shapes and decide which 
language [word] we are going to operate with. It is the 
stage where we can stipulate that "I" will mean: the - 
addressee-of- the -context, or "leg" will mean what "tail" 
standardly means. (Almog, 1983, p. 56) 
Kaplan introduced a third level of meaning -- character -- into 
semantics; Almog (1984) proposes a fourth level, which he calls the 
level of interpretation (not to be confused with Barwise and Perry's 
use of this term). The interpretation of an expression is a function 
from a set of admissible dictionaries to characters; admissible 
dictionaries play the same role at this level as possible worlds play 
at the level of of character. The fourth level is that at which the 
character of an expression is decided, 'the stage where we can 
stipulate that "I" will mean: the -addressee -of- the - context ...'. The 
idea is formalised in Almog (1984). 
Situation semantics and direct reference theory are very 
similar with regard to the mechanism of reference. Barwise and 
Perry's conviction that meaning is in the world leads them to 
construct set theoretic entities that can function as the 
interpretations of expressions and represent the informational 
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structures so important for their metatheory. Their belief in the 
objective existence of information results in a semantics where the 
interpretations of expressions are determined (by the meanings of 
these expressions) quite independently of the actual state of the 
world. 
When the semantics for necessity and possibility in situation 
semantics that I gave (section 6.2.2) is compared with Almog's 
remarks on possible world semantics, we find that a proposition (the 
interpretation of a sentence, a class of abstract situations) is 
firstly determined, then this proposition is "taken to other possible 
worlds" (ie. evaluated with respect to other possible states of the 
world, as specified or encoded by the M, for ,A4 e m). The 
definition of truth for sentences S, Cl S, and a S with respect to an 
utterance situation d,c was: 
(19) =á 0 S i f f ( e ) ( e E 
( MO ii d , c 1[5-]i ) ) 
(20) 1=á0C S iff (Vic )( E m& 
MORMi`-> 
( I=ákC S_) 
, 
( 21) 1=á0C os if f (-] ) (u e m& MORM/" & Ó =ác S) 
Inspecting these definitions we see that it is the interpretation 
d,c1[ 
]t that is crucial to determining the truth or falsity of US 
and S at d,c; and 
d 
cffS](, or at least the minimum situation of 
that class, is determined solely by the individuals, properties and 
locations picked out by the expressions and connections c. There is 
no semantic role for the Mr in determining the proposition -- M,has 
a role only in determining the truth or falsity of the utterance. 
This is not surprising, since in situation semantics we have all the 
pieces of the world we need to construct singular propositions. 
6.3.2 On the nature of propositions 
Almog gives the name 'Objectified Structuralism' to his view of 
the nature of propositions, for propositions have structure and are 
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objective, in the sense that they contain actual objects as 
constituents. Propositions are structured in two ways: 
(i) They reflect the syntactic structure of the sentences 
that express them. 
(ii) They reflect the nature of the objects referred to by 
the constituent phrases of the sentences. 
On Almog's conception propositions reflect the syntactic structure of 
the sentences that express them, because each atomic constituent of 
an object language sentence refers directly to some constituent of 
the proposition expressed, whether it be an individual object, a 
property, or something else; the proposition expressed by the whole 
utterance is constituted out of these pieces. Expressions other than 
terms and predicates can refer directly; Almog says:24 
I believe that other locutions, not discussed here, are 
also directly referential. For instance, I believe that 
both the modal sentential adverbs [ "Necessarily "] and the 
classical logical connectives [ "and ", "or ", "not ", etc] 
are directly referential. They can be represented in a 
purely Russellian ontology by using special kinds of 
propositional functions. (Almog, 1983, p. 67, footnote) 
Unfortunately, Almog does not spell out how he is going to do all 
this, but hopes to present this material in a later version. 
We are reminded of Robin Cooper's semantics by the idea that 
logical connectives like &, v and - operate on propositions to give 
other propositions. In the atomic case Almog's propositions look 
very like Barwise and Perry's situations and Cooper's facts: for 
Almog an utterance of 'Bagheera is a panther' expresses the 
proposition containing Bagheera and the natural kind pantherhood. 
These are the constituents of the proposition, but the proposition is 
more than the set of these two entities: there is some application of 
the natural kind to the individual. Russell realised as much when he 
spoke of some ultimate notion of assertion. Almog tells us that 
these two entities, Bagheera and the natural kind pantherhood, are 
the constituents of the proposition than Bagheera is a panther,25 but 
he does not show us how he represents propositions. There are 
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essentially only two possibilities: either he constructs propositions 
out of these constituents, in which case he has to represent the 
proposition in some manner. We might as well choose the form 
<pantherhood, Bagheera, 1 >, or perhaps <pantherhood, Bagheera >, at 
which point the parallelism with situation semantics becomes obvious. 
Almog's structured propositions look very like Barwise and Perry's 
abstract situations. Alternatively, propositions may be regarded as 
primitive, and one of the constituents is absorbed by the ultimate 
notion of assertion to give a propositional function. This second 
possibility is not really what Almog wants, for he regards Bagheera 
and the natural kind pantherhood as constituents; to think of 
pantherhood as a propositional function which maps Bagheera to the 
proposition that Bagheera is a panther regresses on the direct 
reference tenet that.'panther' refers directly to a kind, a property. 
The molecular case seems to be different. Whereas Cooper 
constructs compound facts <and, f, g, 1> by putting the constituents 
together in a structure, Almog seems to prefer the alternative 
representation for molecular propositions. The logical connectives, 
for example, refer directly to propositional functions, which map the 
contained subsentences (or the propositions they express -- see note 
26 below) to the proposition expressed by the entire sentence. 
Almog could follow Kaplan (1975) and represent propositions as 
possible worlds, since Kaplan's work has greatly inspired him; but 
his dislike of the possible worlds framework would council against 
this representation. 
Almog's view is that the meaning of a sentence determines the 
proposition expressed as soon as the context is fixed, which is 
identical to Barwise and Perry's view. For Almog all atomic 
expressions refer directly to some propositional constituent, so that 
the entire proposition is determined at the context. As we saw above 
in relating the direct reference and Fregean views of propositions, 
the view that referents are referred to directly and determined at 
the context means that there must be some part of the world that can 
be the referent and which is a constituent of propositions: the 
referent cannot be something else that determines a part of the world 
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when we reach the point of evaluation. This feature of direct 
reference theory makes it a close relative of situation semantics. 
Point (ii) about the structure of propositions reminds us of 
the discussion of Russell and situation semantics: Almog's 
propositions contain parts of the world as constituents, objects and 
properties. Almog conveniently states his ontology in the following 
passage: 
We take objects and properties as basic. They are the 
propositional constituents of singular propositions. The 
mechanism of reference correlates a sentence with the 
proposition it happens to express with respect to: [i] A 
given historical chain of uses of the expressions in the 
sentence, and [ii] A given context of use. Thus we 
operate with: Sentences, causal chains which assign 
reference rules to expressions, reference -rules, contexts 
to which those rules apply, and finally, the propositions 
which are the output of those applications. (Almog, 1983, 
p. 60) 
Much of this apparatus is used to determine the proposition 
expressed, and would thus be consigned to pragmatics on the narrow 
view of semantics. What remains are objects, properties, and 
propositions. 
6.3.3 The representational status of singular propositions 
According to Kaplan's definition in the preface to 
'Demonstratives' (p. 1), a singular proposition is a proposition 
expressed by a sentence that contains at least one directly 
referential term. Thus, a singular proposition is just a proposition 
which contains parts of the real world among its constituents. 
Originally, these parts were restricted to individuals designated by 
singular terms, but Almog has since expanded what the parts can be to 
include properties designated by atomic predicates, thus making the 
theory very like situation semantics. 
The following question arises for any theory that admits 
singular propositions: if propositions are representations of 
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possible states of the world, or parts thereof, how can propositions 
be singular? If the proposition that Socrates is mortal contains 
Socrates himself, how can part of it represent Socrates? 
Our initial response is to say that the proposition can be 
both representational and singular -- singular because is has 
constituents that are parts of the world; and representational 
because these constituents are held together by some operation or 
structure that is not in the world (thus the proposition as a whole 
is not in the world). This operation may be modelled by the 
concatenation of expressions in a language (as Richards does), or by 
sets generated from urelements (as Barwise and Perry do). Richards 
takes only individuals as pieces of the world, Barwise and Perry 
additionally regard properties and locations, which they use to 
construct propositions (abstract situations), as in the world. 
Cooper's extension of the theory increases the furniture of the world 
slightly by adding relations designated by the logical constants. 
I have argued that the set theoretical glue of situation 
semantics must be assimilated to the linguistic case. When the 
various elements of a proposition are bound together within the 
proposition, the result is a structure that typically represents a 
possible, if not actual, state of the world. That some -- indeed all 
-- of these elements, when considered in isolation, are parts of the 
world itself does not prevent this. We noted above, especially when 
we defined the semantics for the abstract level of situation 
semantics considered as a language (5.2), a tension between Jackie, 
for example, as physical object and as an expression of the languages 
we were defining. If there are singular propositions, then 
constituents of it which are pieces of the world seem to change 
status when fully integrated into the proposition. If the nature of 
the proposition is unclear, as it was for Russell, then, at least in 
the case of the verb, something gets lost between considering a piece 
of the proposition, firstly, in place in the proposition and, 
secondly, by itself. On the other hand, if the proposition is 
explicitly linguistic, as with Richards, we can see more clearly what 
is going on with all the constituents. The contrast is between an 
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entity as part of the world and as an expression in a language. 
Physical objects qua individual constants, ie. when integrated into 
propositions, require to be given a meaning (in the model -theoretic 
sense), and hence have a representational role -- even if they 
represent themselves. 
Almog's proposed semantics is no different from the others in 
the case where an atomic sentence designates an atomic proposition. 
His terms contribute individuals, atomic predicates contribute 
properties, and other predicates contribute logical complexes; all 
these pieces have to be combined, and the situation is the same. 
The molecular case is, slightly different. Cooper represents a 
molecular proposition in the form <and, f, g, 1 >, introducing another 
primitive, 'and', and uses the set theory to construct the molecular 
proposition from its constituents, ie. the new primitive relation 
designated by 'and', two propositions f and g, and a truth value. My 
point about aggregates of entities -- there must be a non -world 
element somewhere -- applies equally to this approach as to the 
atomic case. Indeed, Cooper's representation of molecular 
propositions (molecular facts) assimilates this case to that of 
atomic propositions: in both a relation holds or does not hold among 
several entities. 
Almog could do something different at the molecular level, 
though it is not entirely clear, for he does not present his 
analysis. His remark that, for example, the conjunction operator 
would directly refer to a propositional function implies that in his 
system we obtain the new proposition directly: the new proposition is 
P (f,g), where e is the propositional function and maps the 
propositions f and g to the new proposition.26 By emphasising 
propositional functions, Almog models his semantics at the molecular 
level on Russell and Kaplan, not the Barwise, Perry, and Cooper 
approach: the latter construct propositions set theoretically from 
various pieces; the former isolate only some constituents and treat 
the remainder of the proposition as a function from these 
constituents to the proposition. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter we compared situation semantics with direct 
reference theory. To make the comparison as illuminating and useful 
as possible, we employed the technique of Kaplan (1975): to formulate 
the 'ontology' (in the sense in which Kaplan uses this term) of each 
theory, and then to investigate ways of reducing or reformulating the 
ontology of one theory to bring it into line with that of the other. 
To increase the scope of the analysis, I provided a semantics of 
necessity and possibility within the situational framework. 
At the abstract level, situation semantics and direct reference 
theory have much in common, and the more so with Almog's development 
of the direct reference view. The family resemblances between 
situation semantics and direct reference theory consist in the 
inclusion of real world entities in propositions and the view that 
propositions are structured entities. Differences exist too: the 
proposition, as a class of abstract situations, is the semantic value 
of an utterance in situation semantics, whereas Almog could still 
maintain that utterances, although expressing propositions, designate 
truth values. Moreover, whereas Barwise and Perry claim that their 
theory places meaning in the world (a claim which we seriously 
question) Almog is free to declare his affiliation to the view of 
meaning as language- dependent. 
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Chapter Seven: The Attitudes 
7.1 Attitude reports: introductory 
Throughout this thesis we have been examining some aspects of 
situation semantics to discover what the theory is and as a 
preparation for investigating what new insights the theory can offer 
us regarding the traditional puzzles of the attitudes. It is now 
time to focus more explicitly on the attitudes themselves, that is, 
on the semantics of sentences which report attitudes and the semantic 
behaviour of expressions in what are known as propositional 
attitudinal contexts.1 Attitude reports are utterances of sentences 
containing attitude verbs, like 'believes', 'knows', 'doubts', and 
'sees that'. The following are typical attitude reports: 
(1) John believes that Venus is closer to the sun than the 
earth is. 
(2) John knows that Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister 
in 1979. 
(3) Ralph doubts that the man seen on the beach is a spy. 
I shall ask how situation semantics affects our understanding 
of the attitudes, whether it provides us with new tools for their 
analysis, and, if so, what further illumination we now have (this we 
shall do in the next chapter). First, however, I want to discuss the 
semantics of propositional attitude contexts in fairly general terms 
and to formulate the issues as they affect us in the present work. 
7.1.1 The failure of substitution of coreferential terms 
A major problem that the attitudes pose for semantic theory is 
that they (apparently) violate Leibniz' Law2 -- what we would 
normally regard on an innocent view as coreferential expressions are 
not substitutable salva veritate in propositional attitudinal 
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contexts, at least that is our intuitive judgement. For example, 
when both (4) and (5) below are understood as referring to a period 
of time before Oedipus discovers the truth, we are straightforwardly 
inclined to think (4) is true, but (5) is false. 
(4) Oedipus believed that he married Jocasta. 
(5) Oedipus believed that he married his mother. 
This observation is extremely serious, for Leibniz' Law expresses a 
fundamental principle of referential semantics. 
The basic problem with belief attributions was given classical 
expression by Quine (1956); since then an enormous amount of energy 
and thought has been devoted to a solution, so far without success. 
Quine called propositional attitude contexts '(referentially) 
opaque', to contrast them with transparent, extensional contexts. It 
is possible to regard this term merely as a label for the problematic 
phenomenon; however, to call the problem by its full name, 
referential opacity, already suggests that the phenomenon is being 
viewed from an non -innocent perspective. For the references of 
expressions, the idea is, are no longer their ordinary references, 
the references that they have in transparent contexts. 
The problem is often thought of in terms of the traditional 
distinction between de re and de dicto readings of singular terms.3 
When the sentence is given the de dicto reading, coreferential 
singular terms are generally held not to be intersubstitutable in 
attitude contexts; on the de re reading, they are generally held to 
be intersubstitutable (but see the section below on Burge, who 
disagrees). Our objection to 
(6) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
as suitable for reporting Ralph's belief in Quine's story requires us 
to give it the de dicto reading -- there is no problem with the truth 
of (6) on the de re reading. The thought here is that a de re 
attitude report involves the individual object itself, not the object 
under a description, and thus the report remains true when another 
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coreferential singular term is substituted in the embedded sentence, 
the attitude report remaining de re. The de dicto attitude report, 
on the contrary, does not involve the "bare" object. The de dicto 
reading presents the object under a particular description, while the 
de re reading does not. 
This matter should become clearer when we consider some 
proposals for the logical form of de re and de dicto cases of belief. 
Quine represents the two senses of belief, the de dicto (notional) 
and de re (relational) senses respectively, as: 
(7) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
(8) Ralph believes z(z is a spy) of Ortcutt. 
(Quine, 1956, p. 104) The analysis of de re belief is in terms of a 
relation between Ralph, a property or attribute and an individual 
(Ortcutt). In the de dicto case, the individual is absorbed into the 
attitude to give a proposition. Opacity is restricted to 'that 
Ortcutt is a spy' in (7) and 'z(z is a spy)' in (8). Hence, Ortcutt 
occurs in a referentially opaque context in (7), where it is not 
eligible for substitution, but in a transparent context in (8), where 
it is. There seems to be a correlation between the de re /de dicto 
distinction and the success or failure of substitution. 
Brian Loar (1972) adopts an approach which is similar to 
Quine's representation of the relational or de re sense of belief and 
uses this representation as the basis for an explanation of both 
readings. Loar's point is that singular terms can make an additional 
contribution beyond their referent. To believe something of an 
individual under a certain description is to have a conjunctive 
belief with regard to the individual. Beliefs are represented as a 
relation between the agent, an open sentence, and an individual (or 
sequence of individuals). What is interesting about Loar's proposal 
is that even de dicto belief involves the object itself: the 
difference in the two forms of belief is not in how the object enters 
into the belief (or whether it does), but in what is believed of it. 
In Loar's notation, we may represent beliefs Ralph might hold as 
follows: 
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(9) a. B(Ralph, "x is a spy ", the man in a brown hat) 
b. B(Ralph, "x is a spy", Ortcutt) 
(10) B(Ralph, "x is the man in the brown hat & x is a spy', 
Ortcutt) 
Loar's belief relation is extensional; Ortcutt himself occurs in the 
third place in all three formulae, so this analysis makes (9a) and 
(9b), both instances of de re belief, equivalent. The de dicto 
belief is set apart from these because the open sentence it involves 
is quite different. 
Tyler Burge takes issue with the view that the de re /de dicto 
distinction is marked by the substitutivity, or failure thereof, of 
coreferential singular terms, at least when the criterion of 
substitution is applied to surface structures (Burge, 1977). Burge 
claims, convincingly, that substitution fails in some cases which are 
nonetheless instances of de re belief. An example Burge provides is 
that of a man seen at a distance in a swirling fog; surely, he says, 
any beliefs that we subsequently hold about the man based on this 
encounter are de re. 
Consequently, Burge is drawn to characterise de re /de dicto 
distinction in terms of the extent to which the belief is 
conceptualised: a belief is de re if the agent cannot describe the 
object of his belief so as to individuate it fully, that is, if he 
cannot describe it without recourse to indexical reference. 
A de re belief is a belief whose correct ascription 
places the believer in an appropriate nonconceptual, 
contextual relation to objects the belief is about. 
(Burge, 1977, p. 346) 
A belief is de dicto if the agent can individuate the object of his 
belief in purely descriptive terms. Burge summarises his view: 
More generally, purely de dicto attributions make 
reference to complete propositions -- entities whose 
truth or falsity is determined without being relative to 
an application or interpretation in a particular context. 
De re locutions are about predication broadly conceived. 
They describe a relation between open sentences (or what 
- 195 - 
they express) and objects. (Burge, 1977, p. 343) 
Such a view of the two kinds of attitude report partly explains why 
coreferential terms are generally intersubstitutable in de re 
reports, but not intersubstitutable in de dicto reports. 
These writers treat the difference between de re and de dicto 
belief as follows. Quine's analysis allows us to separate Ortcutt, 
the individual, from the remainder of the proposition with cases of 
de re belief, so that occurrences of a singular term designating the 
individual are extensional and hence available for substitution. 
Loar's analysis allows the singular term designating the individual 
not only to determine the individual, but also to contribute to what 
is predicated of him. ' Finally, Burge analyses the distinction in 
terms of the manner in which the agent individuates the object. In 
different ways these writers have tackled the question of wherein 
lies the difference between the two kinds of belief. 
7.1.2 Cognition and the failure of substitution 
Where attitude reports are understood in terms of the agent's 
having an attitude towards something (typically a proposition, 
however this is understood exactly), there is always the tendency or 
temptation to explain the referential opacity of singular terms in 
attitudinal contexts as involving the agent's perspective on the 
state of affairs to which he is related. It seems that the agent's 
perspective, in some circumstances at least, is the crucial factor 
that influences our intuitive judgement of truth conditions. Thus, 
if, from a distance, Ralph sees a man in a brown hat acting 
suspiciously and comes to believe that the man is a spy without 
recognising the individual, who is in fact Ortcutt, and if we know 
all this, then we would normally assent to an utterance of 
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(11) Ralph believes the man in a brown hat is a spy. 
but object to an utterance of 
(12) Ralph believes Ortcutt is a spy. 
on the basis that Ralph either does not know Ortcutt or does not 
recognise him. 
However, our judgement of the truth or falsity of (12) is 
notoriously sensitive to context. If the addressee does not know 
Ortcutt, our judgement is likely to be that the utterance is false; 
if the addressee does know Ortcutt, we are more likely to allow that 
the utterance is true. In this last case Ralph is thinking of 
Ortcutt, although not as Ortcutt, when he thinks of him as a spy. 
At least part of the explanation for this state of affairs 
seems to be as follows. The speaker has several ways of referring to 
Ortcutt: as Ortcutt, as the man in the brown hat, as the man seen at 
the beach, etc. What makes him choose one particular referring 
expression rather than another? Something like Grice's maxim of 
cooperation4 is probably operating. There are numerous possibilities 
regarding how the addressee is situated with respect to the various 
referring expressions that the speaker could use: whether or not he 
knows Ortcutt; whether or not he knows that Ortcutt is the man in the 
brown hat; whether or not he knows that Ortcutt is the man at the 
beach; etc. If the addressee does not know Ortcutt under any of 
these descriptions, he will not come to know of whom Ralph has a 
belief simply by hearing the embedded sentence 'Ortcutt is a spy', 
and this will be true irrespective of which referring expression is 
used. The information which the addressee is able to extract from 
the utterance partially governs the speaker's choice of referring 
expression. When each referring expression carries the same 
information for the addressee, the speaker is free to choose that 
expression which best captures how Ralph thinks of Ortcutt; hence 
under these circumstances the speaker would normally be expected to 
utter (11). If, therefore, the utterance is an utterance of (12), we 
suppose that the speaker is claiming that Ralph's belief is of 
Ortcutt as Ortcutt, and this claim we know is false. 
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Consider another case of how the addressee is situated, this 
time where the addressee knows Ortcutt, as mayor and as the man at 
the beach, but is unaware of his espionage activities. The speaker, 
to be cooperative (that is, to communicate fully the intended 
information), must use either 'Ortcutt', 'the mayor' or 'the man at 
the beach' or an expression which identifies Ortcutt in his role as a 
public figure in referring to Ortcutt. The constraint to be 
cooperative with the addressee overrides the constraint to be 
accurate about how Ralph thinks of Ortcutt.5 
At the beginning of his analysis Quine draws the distinction 
between the relational and the notional senses of belief in non - 
cognitive terms. With respect to 
(13) Hx)(Ralph believes that x is a spy) 
(14) Ralph believes that (4x)(x is a spy) 
he says: 'The difference is vast; indeed, if Ralph is like most of 
us, [14] is true and [13] is false.' (p. 102) When he reluctantly 
brings intensions into the picture later, they are intended as more 
refined tools with which to get a firmer grasp on the meaning or 
reference of the embedded sentence. There is nothing particularly 
agent- relative about his approach, nor does he attempt to use 
intensions, or a refinement of them, to capture the agent's 
perspective on the state of affairs he is related to. 
Other writers appeal explicitly to cognitive and conceptual 
factors. While I clearly cannot deal with all the proposals by those 
who believe the agent's perspective has a role in the semantics of 
attitudinal contexts, I do want to mention Hartry Field's conceptual 
role semantics,6 Colin McGinn's dual structure approach to content,7 
and the explicitly epistemological character of Esa Saarinen's 
semantics for the attitudes.$ These writers incline to the view that 
we should include a cognitive component in meaning in order to 
explain the phenomena associated with referential opacity. 
The roots of this strategy go back to Frege. His notion of 
sense was introduced to explain the difference in informativeness of 
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such sentences as 'Hesperus is Hesperus' and 'Hesperus is 
Phosphorus'. Since the references of these proper names are 
identical, a theory of meaning that notices only the external 
significance of expressions fails to account for the discrepancy 
between the informativeness of the second sentence and the 
uninformativeness of the first. Sense, operating as a mode of 
presentation, has become (for some people) permeated by cognitive 
notions and factors. The notion of sense has been put under enormous 
strain in being called upon to perform a number of widely differing 
tasks, ranging from determining the referent (concerned with external 
meaning), through being what it is that the speaker knows when he 
understands an expression, to capturing the mode of presentation 
(concerned with "cognitive meaning "). 
Not everyone, however, shares this view of the notion of sense; 
indeed dissenters from the view are found even within the Fregean 
camp. Gareth Evans and John McDowell have a rather different 
conception of sense, one which is highly critical of loading sense 
with cognitive factors. John McDowell has made some very apposite 
remarks on this issue of the role of cognition in both meaning and 
the theory of meaning. In McDowell (1977) he begins by asking what 
we want the notion of sense for; his answer is that the task of a 
theory of sense, within a total theory of language, is to fix the 
content of speech acts. People produce linguistic behaviour, which 
we are interested in understanding. This understanding is 
essentially an interpretation for the speech acL or utterance event, 
described originally as 'He made the noises ...', is redescribed in 
terms of what the speaker said. The role of the notion of sense, 
therefore, is to help us interpret people's linguistic actions.9 
To find a means of specifying the content of utterances, 
McDowell adopts a Tarskian truth theory. As the title of his article 
suggests, McDowell is concerned primarily, but not exclusively, with 
proper names. A Tarskian truth theory will contain axioms and entail 
theorems like the following: 
(15) 'Hesperus' denotes Hesperus. 
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(16) 'Hesperus is visible' is true iff Hesperus is visible. 
The critical point for McDowell's conception of sense is that the 
predicate whose application to object language sentences is governed 
by the theorems that the theory entails can be written 'is true' (as 
in (16)), because the used sentences (those on the right hand side) 
specify the content of potential utterances. It is this fact that 
means that the truth theory can serve as a theory of sense, not the 
fact the theory is a truth theory. 
The "austere" conception of sense, as McDowell calls his view, 
takes one formulation of a Tarskian truth theory, which gives the 
references of expressions in a language, and makes it serve as a 
theory of sense. Thus (15), but not 
(17) 'Hesperus' denotes Phosphorus. 
is suitable to serve as part of a theory of sense. We can 
discriminate between (15) and (17), which are equally valid 
expressions from the point of view of the theory of reference, 
because we are using the theory to fix the content of utterances and 
to understand speakers.10 
Gareth Evans also espouses this conception of sense, applying 
it to the theory of demonstratives (Evans, 1981) and a variety of 
singular terms (Evans, 1982). Succinctly stated, the idea is: 
Although a theory of meaning for a language must give the 
senses of expressions, we are not to think of the theory 
of sense as a separate tier, additional to and 
independent of the theory of reference. If sense is a 
way of thinking of reference, we should not expect to be 
given the sense of an expression save in the course of 
being given the reference of that expression. Rather 
than look for a theory quite independent of the theory of 
reference, we must take one formulation of the theory of 
reference -- the formulation of the theory which 
identifies the references of expressions in the way in 
which one must identify them in order to understand the 
language -- and make it serve as a theory of sense. 
(Evans, 1981, p. 282) 
Having said what the Evans -McDowell conception of sense is, we 
are in a position to think through its rejection of the view that 
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cognition has a place in the explanation of opacity. The view of 
sense in question emerges from the Quinean perspective of the radical 
translator attempting to interpret the presumed utterances of 
"natives ". Because of this, and because the notion of sense is 
designed to help us to make sense of speakers through fixing the 
content of utterances, it is essentially descriptive of the empirical 
situation. McDowell remarks: 
We can picture the failures of substitution and the 
differences in sense as, jointly and inseparably, 
products of our attempts at principled imposition of 
descriptions in terms of speech -acts, and explanations in 
terms of propositional attitudes, on to the hard 
behavioural facts about linguistic and other behaviour, 
with the point of the imposition being to see how sense 
can be made of speakers by way of sense being made of 
their speech. In this picture, the differences in sense 
are located no deeper than the failures of substitution. 
(McDowell, 1977, p. 157) 
Yet the Evans -McDowell conception of sense has not abandoned 
(close) contact with the agent's cognition. Both Evans and McDowell 
would argue that it is still Freqe's notion of sense they are working 
with (rather than, says, Church's or Dummett's interpretations of 
Frege), and that sense is bound up with understanding, as Frege 
held.11 
McDowell's concept of what sense is, worked out against the 
background of what sense is for, leads him to see it not as 
explanatory of the failure of the substitution of coreferential 
expressions, but as a description of that failure. The phenomenon of 
referential opacity, therefore, remains unexplained by the notion of 
sense. 
We have been asking the question, Does cognition have anything 
to do with opacity? Where is the problem of referential opacity 
fundamentally located? We have seen, admittedly briefly, that one 
answer is to view opacity as stemming from the involvement of the 
agent's cognition in his attitude in a way that influences our 
judgements on the truth or falsity of utterances reporting that 
attitude. On this view, semantics can only handle opacity by 
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allowing some semantic role for a component of meaning intended to 
capture the relevant features of the agent's cognition. Those who 
advocate this approach would claim that the resultant semantics 
captures the relevant inferences.12 McDowell cautions us against 
this approach, arguing that the notion of Fregean sense, while it 
has independent justification, is not justified merely by the hope 
that it will be able to explain the failure of substitutivity in 
propositional attitude contexts. An alternative motivation for the 
notion shows clearly that differences in sense are descriptive of the 
failure of substitutivity. 
Does the agent's cognition have a major role to play in the 
semantics of the attitudes? The question here is the correct 
analysis of attitude reports: how should they be understood? This is 
the context in which we should see Barwise and Perry's contribution 
to the field, for they want to use the concept of information to 
solve the attitude puzzles. Information, enabling one hopefully to 
make the necessary distinctions without appeal to the agent's 
perspective, concepts or mental representations, will constitute the 
basis for an innocent semantics. 
7.2 Innocent semantics and the attitudes 
Barwise and Perry have espoused innocent semantics and claimed 
that they can give an innocent semantics of the attitudes. Now, 
clearly, there is no possibility in innocent semantics of adding to 
meaning a component that is supposed to capture the agent's 
perspective on an object or state of affairs. Instead, Barwise and 
Perry have declared their conviction that the puzzles with attitude 
reports do not require us to invoke the agent's perspective, their 
adopted strategy for the attitudes being expressed by the principle 
of the Priority of External Significance: 
The mental significance of language, including the role 
of sentences embedded in attitude reports, is adequately 
explained by their external significance, properly 
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understood. (S &A, p. 42) 
The semantics for the attitudes that they settle upon in the 
end involves the notions of indirect classification, which they 
define informally as 'the exploitation of patterns and constraints to 
classify one situation with another', (S &A, p. 225) and of cross - 
classification. The situation described by the embedded sentence of 
an attitude report is intended to classify the agent's cognitive 
situation by exploiting constraints of folk psychology. The verb 'to 
classify' was first used of the relation borne by an abstract 
situation to a real situation (though without a clear statement of 
what it was supposed to mean). Here Barwise and Perry mean a 
relation between two abstract situations: the embedded sentence 
designates one abstract situation, which bears some relation to 
another abstract situation, the precise relation being determined by 
the attitude involved. 
We are describing the agent's beliefs by comparing the 
external significance of those beliefs with the external 
significance of the embedded sentence in our attitude 
report. (S &A, p. 258) 
This, in outline, is the strategy Barwise and Perry hope will deliver 
an innocent semantics of the attitudes. 
7.2.1 Is innocence forced to compromise? 
The exposition of the semantics of the attitudes in Situations 
and Attitudes bears marks of the historical development of the 
material. We are presented in chapter nine with an account in terms 
of the agent bearing relations to various courses of events; thus: 
'Attitude reports involving the phrases KNOWS THAT and BELIEVES THAT 
report on an agent's relations to various courses of events, 
relations determined by her state of mind at the time. They do not 
refer directly to these states of mind.' (p. 213) These relations 
are denoted SO, BO, KO, etc. Another approach is developed in 
chapter ten because of difficulties encountered in the first 
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approach. The view which understands attitudes as relations to 
abstract situations cannot provide a full and satisfactory 
explanation of the attitudes, for the agent's cognitive situation has 
to be taken explicitly into account when one faces up to the problems 
of the attitudes. 
Chapter ten of Situations and Attitudes consequently divides 
into two main sections; the first sets out how to represent the 
mental, and makes use of "concepts" to represent beliefs and other 
attitudes. A concept is an ordered pair of an indeterminate and an 
event type, or schema, thus: <o, S(o,...) >; it is used in the theory 
to model or represent the way the agent thinks of objects or states 
of affairs. Schemata specify relations holding between the object 
and other individuals, and thus represent the way agents think of the 
object. For example, suppose John believes that Susan is prettier 
than Mary, and suppose Mary is his sister. John's belief may be 
represented as in either el or e2: 
e l:= at l: Br, John, 51; yes 
of, a, Susan; yes 
of, b, Mary; yes 
e 2:= at 1: Br, John, S2; yes 
of, a, Susan; yes 
where 
S1:= at h: prettier -than, a) 
52:= at h: prettier -than, a 
sister -of, b, i; yes 
b; yes 
b; yes 
By this stage we have surely begun to question whether Barwise and 
Perry are still doing innocent semantics. 
It is claimed that schemata must be introduced in order to 
capture various uniformities and constraints. We are offered such 
examples as 'A mother who believes that her baby is hungry will feed 
it'. The motivation is that one must be able to abstract away from 
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individual cases of a particular mother (eg. Lynn) believing her baby 
(Erin) is hungry and being disposed to feed it, to capture the 
generality of the observation; we also need to capture the mother's 
perspective -- Lynn will only feed Erin when she thinks of him as her 
baby, not if she comes across him in unfamiliar circumstances and 
does not recognise him. And such abstraction leaves us with indexed 
situation types (ie. situation types containing the roles i and h , 
which are distinguished in that they are always anchored to the agent 
and the location of the belief respectively). 
Concepts give Barwise and Perry a finer network of relations 
with which to describe what is going on, than the mere objects and 
relations that there are in the world: pure external significance 
simply does not cut reality fine enough for the semantics of the 
attitudes. Of course, Barwise and Perry anchor schemata, but nothing 
would be gained by introducing this finer mesh of relations and 
immediately replacing it with anchored schemata, which are just 
abstract situations (provided all the indeterminates are anchored), 
for that is to return to the grosser network of extensional objects 
and relations. In fact, in Barwise and Perry's semantics, the object 
of the attitude is the unanchored schema and the relation that holds 
between the agent and the object of the attitude is the represented 
relation Xr.13 The attitudes are no longer viewed as relations to 
(abstract) situations, but to schemata: anchoring only happens after 
the agent has been related to the schema. 
Consider the sentence 'John believes that Cicero denounced 
Catiline'. The schema here is a singleton S, whose member is the 
event type E: 
E:= at 1: denounces, a, b; yes 
The whole sentence describes the situation e0: 
e0:= at 1: Br, John, S; yes 
of, a, Cicero; yes 
of, b, Catiline; yes 
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of, 1, l'; yes 
where 1 = c(believes), 1 o lam, and 1' < ld. Now abstract situations, 
as distinct from event types, are constructed from individuals, 
relations, locations and truth values, but here we find the schema S 
as a constituent of e0. Does this mean that schemata and event 
types, as well as being abstract objects that have a classificatory 
role in the semantics, are also actual objects in the world, to which 
agents can bear real world relations (eg. On the other hand, 
supposing S, E, and Br to be purely abstract theoretical entities, 
what is the entity e0 = {<1, <ar, a, S >, 1 > }, if not an abstract 
situation? 
I think Barwise and 'Perry are themselves confused about some of 
the abstract entities in their semantics. The use of concepts in 
situation semantics, talk about indirect and cross -classification 
notwithstanding, is just a reintroduction of modes of presentation, 
of ways of thinking of an object, of capturing the agent's or someone 
else's perspective on an object or state of affairs. 
Barwise and Perry peddle a subtle blend of innocent and non - 
innocent theorising in chapter ten of their book. The shift to 
talking of cognitive states ( "cognitive situations ") is motivated by 
the failure of the theory in chapter nine, namely viewing attitudes 
as relations to abstract situations. These relations, whose relata 
include proper classes, are not part of the causal order and must be 
supported by something else, so Barwise and Perry turn their 
attention to agents' cognitive states. 
Even then, the informal explication of the theory sometimes 
retains its innocence. For example, Barwise and Perry say: 
How can we describe minds by referring to situations that 
aren't mental, situations external to minds and brains, 
and those that may not even be real? (S &A, p. 225) 
The view is that, with reference to 
(18) Penelope fears that Odysseus will never return home. 
we are actually and definitely referring to Odysseus, not Penelope's 
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concept of Odysseus or a public concept of Odysseus, and it is this 
detail that Barwise and Perry point to when the innocence of their 
theory is challenged. The actual formal theory, on the contrary, 
does not involve Odysseus: the interpretation of an utterance of (18) 
relates Penelope to the schema containing the situation type 
E := at 1: returning -home, a; yes. 
In the interpretation the indeterminate a will be anchored to 
Odysseus and the indeterminate 1 to a location 1, where ld < 1. The 
reference of the embedded sentence in the utterance is not a 
situation external to minds, not even one that is unreal: the 
reference is the schema and innocence has been abandoned. 
One problem with relating Penelope to a situation containing 
Odysseus is that we do not want utterances of 
(19) Penelope fears that the beggar in the palace will never 
return home. 
where the description 'the beggar in the palace' is used 
referentially to refer to Odysseus, to come out true. Since the 
description is used referentially, the situation contains only the 
referent -- Odysseus himself -- and the interpretation of (19) would 
be indistinguishable from that of (18). 
Although concepts are given a role in the semantics, Barwise 
and Perry still claim to be working at the level of external 
significance. If this were so, however, then where Si and a2 are 
schemata and f1 and f2 total anchors such that S1[f1] = S2[f2], (ie. 
the external significance of these schemata when thus anchored is the 
same), how could a semantics grounded upon external significance make 
differential use of 
21 
and S2? Do schemata therefore have an 
irreducible semantic role? 
Consider the semantics for belief: 
d, ç ¡[believes that cp ]( á, to 
iff 
f 
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- S,f such that (i) <S,f> is a way of believing [ 
at 1 = c(believes), ie. á,1,f ([S]l e -> áßç ([ 
(ii) in e0: at 1: Br, á, S; yes 
of, x, f(x); yes. 
]I for a 
]I e. 
(S &A, p256) What is the status of the relation B,? Barwise and 
Perry say of the parallel relation Sr for perception: 
Thus the relation S is one the observer brings to the 
situation when shé characterises the agent á as having a 
certain type of perception. (S &A, p. 234) 
According to Barwise and Perry, when someone utters 
(20) Susan believes that John loves Mary. 
they are classifying Susan as being related to a state of affairs in 
a certain way; Susan could also be described, let us suppose, as 
related to the same state of affairs by 
(21) Susan believes that John loves her sister. 
There is a difference between (20) and (21) that semantic theory must 
capture. 
Innocent semantics, however, eschewing such entities as modes 
of presentation, is committed to operating with the external 
significance of expressions. In an attempt to alleviate our fears 
that they are giving up innocence, Barwise and Perry talk of the 
importance of indirect classification, cross -classification, and the 
fallacy of misplaced information in propositional attitudinal 
contexts. Does the deployment of these concepts salvage innocence? 
Among the criteria for a semantic theory proposed in the second 
chapter of Situations and Attitudes are the following two: the theory 
must account for the external significance of language; and it must 
account for the mental significance of language. Unlike Frege, who 
bifurcated the notion of meaning into sense and reference, Barwise 
and Perry, influenced by the Gibsonian, or ecological, metatheory 
they espouse, believe that one level of meaning (the interpretation) 
can be used for both these tasks. They want to have the actual 
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individuals, properties and locations of real situations there in 
their semantics, grouped into structures and related by the 
linguistic meaning of expressions, so that they get the state of the 
world right; and they want in addition to capture cognitive 
significance with these same structures. Their conviction that this 
is possible is supported by a doctrine of ecological psychology, the 
duality of organism and environment.14 
The basic idea is to use indexed event types to classify 
both what is seen and how it is seen. The indeterminates 
in the indexed event -type will be anchored to an agent, a 
location, and objects and relations through facts about 
the perceptual event. The event -type and the 
indeterminates in it will represent a perception suited 
to carry information about the type of event that is 
seen. The event -types get at two different kinds of 
uniformities, across mental events and across scenes. 
The possibility of using event -types in this dual way is 
a result of the duality discussed above. (S &A, p. 233) 
One is struck by the explicit statement that it is indexed event 
types that constitute the level that is supposed to capture both the 
uniformities, both kinds of significance. Indexed event types are 
not interpretations of any expression; in particular, they are not 
the references of embedded sentences in attitude reports. 
The classificatory behaviour in common sense psychology and 
thought to which Barwise and Perry have drawn our attention is a part 
of human linguistic behaviour, and as such is a part of the world. 
How can an innocent semantics handle this? The problem that has 
arisen for innocent situation semantics, operating with Barwise and 
Perry's distinction between the world and the theorist's 
classificatory apparatus for describing and representing the world, 
is that part of what is in the world is itself a classification of 
parts of the world. 
If these notions of indirect and cross -classification are not 
rebuilding modes of presentation into situation semantics, what are 
they doing? Indirect classification is the classifying of an agent's 
beliefs by comparing the external significance of those beliefs with 
the external significance of a sentence (the embedded sentence of a 
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report) at an utterance situation. Cross -classification seems to 
have a more subtle role in the semantics, having to do with capturing 
other uniformities than those that are supposed to have given rise to 
the ontology of individuals, properties and locations in the first 
place. Can an innocent semantics employ that ontology, and still 
talk of cross -classification? 
7.2.2 Innocent semantics and information 
Recourse to cross -classification implies that Barwise and Perry 
recognise that innocent semantics has to treat the cognitive 
significance of linguistic communication. The interpretation in 
situation semantics is under strain from being asked to perform the 
two tasks of representing external and mental significance. The 
fallacy of misplaced information is invoked to relieve the 
interpretation of this burden by using the notion of information to 
link the semantics with our intuitions and judgements about 
particular cases. The use of concepts to capture mental 
significance, and of anchors to tie schemata down to the real world, 
and thus to external significance, equivocates between these two 
kinds of significance. Barwise and Perry want to have their cake and 
eat it: the claim that the semantics is innocent rests upon the fact 
that when challenged about the schema S, one can point to the 
abstract situation S[f]. But it is the schema S, not the abstract 
situation S[f], that has the semantic role; moreover, at the level of 
the abstract situation S[f] one has lost the ability to make the 
necessary distinctions in capturing the uniformities involved in 
attitude reports. 
The fallacy of misplaced information is the mistake of thinking 
that all the information available to a hearer should be contained in 
the semantic value of the utterance (its interpretation). Barwise 
and Perry are surely right in regarding this as a fallacy. Their 
examples, however, are trite: the use of a name 'Cicero' conveys the 
15 information that someone is (or was once) called 'Cicero'. As 
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Barwise and Perry realise, one can ask how an innocent theory is 
supposed to be sensitive to the referring expression used, when it is 
only the individual object in question that is relevant to the 
interpretation. 
This objection contains an instance of the fallacy of 
misplaced information. The change in the report from 
TULLY to CICERO makes an enormous difference to the 
information made available by the report, and an innocent 
theory need not overlook this if it is combined with a 
relational theory of meaning. Part of the information 
you can get is the information that someone is called 
"Cicero ", and of course you do not get this information 
if "Tully" is used instead. This is so even though the 
interpretation of the report remains the same. (S &A, p. 
264) 
Of course they are right: one does get different information. The 
classical case here is that of Hesperus and Phosphorus. 
Suppose Harold knows Venus only by the names 'Venus' and 
'Hesperus'. Utterances of the two sentences 
(22) The astronomers intend to study Hesperus this month. 
(23) The astronomers intend to study Phosphorus this month. 
will therefore contain very different information for him. If Harold 
has heard of Phosphorus, but knows only that it is a planet, not 
realising that Phosphorus is Hesperus, he will come to believe that 
the astronomers intend to study a planet, without realising that the 
planet in question is Hesperus. If he has never heard the name 
'Phosphorus' before, he will know only that the astronomers intend to 
study something or other -- perhaps a comet, perhaps he might even 
think they intend to study the distribution of the element phosphorus 
in space. 
Barwise and Perry have sought to use the notion of information 
.to explain why they use concepts and schemata in their semantics. 
Their remarks that differential information is available to hearers 
are uncontroversial, but do not legitimise the use of schemata in 
interpretations of attitude reports. Having pointed out that 
differential information which is available from utterances of 
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sentences that are identical except for occurrences of coreferential 
terms is not reflected at the level of interpretation and should be 
sought elsewhere, Barwise and Perry immediately forget and dismiss 
their own observation by building schemata and anchors into their 
semantics for the attitudes, thus building sensitivity into their 
semantics in the wrong way.16 
A truly innocent semantics would require recasting situation 
semantics as follows. We throw out schemata and anchors, and a new 
relation Bel will relate the agent to an abstract situation (or 
alternatively, to a set of abstract situations). We confront the 
issue of cross -classification by relocating the information involved 
with this as inverse information, instead of trying to pack it into 
the interpretation. Thus, an utterance of 'Lynn believes her baby is 
hungry', describes any situation that contains 
<1, Bel, Lynn, e1, 1> 
where 
e1:= at 1: hungry, a; yes 
baby -of, á, Lynn; yes 
where 1 = ç(believes). In words, Lynn bears the relation Bel to a 
situation in which an individual which is her (Lynn's) baby is 
hungry. This is just the strategy Barwise and Perry pursued with 
names, applied to attitude reports. 
Early in the book there is a comment on the relation between 
information and the interpretation, which is the core semantic 
concept. 
Our theory ... does not provide a third realm, a realm of 
objects interacting with language, mind, and external 
world, but rather a classificatory scheme, a system of 
abstract objects that allow us to describe the meaning 
both of expressions and of mental states in terms of the 
information they carry about the external world. (p. 7; 
emphasis added) 
The notion of information is to be given a central role in situation 
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semantics. Importantly, information here means information in 
general, and all this information is to have a role in the theory. 
Barwise and Perry are constantly confused as to whether (what ends up 
as) inverse information should have a semantic role (thus 
interpretations will involve schemata) or whether it should not (thus 
the fallacy of misplaced information will be affirmed). They end up 
choosing both of these! Notice the difference between the treatment 
of names, where inverse information is held separate from 
interpretation, and the semantics of the attitudes, where the issue 
of cross -classification is confused. 
The fallacy of misplaced information does not imply that none 
of the information available in an utterance is carried by the 
interpretation. Rather, it is the doctrine that the latter is just a 
part of the information available, though an especially important and 
significant part. When someone truthfully utters 'John loves Mary', 
the utterance makes available the information that someone is called 
'John', etc. -- all the inverse information available. It also 
conveys the information that John loves Mary -- in fact, that is 
precisely what it says. 
The information contained in the interpretation, a part of the 
total information content of the utterance, has been designated 
semantic content and elevated to a special status relative to the 
inverse information. Thus, Barwise understands linguistic meaning 
within the context of meaning in general, and understands meaning and 
inference within a comprehensive theory of information.17 In writing 
about the multiplicity of things a situation can mean, he says: 
A given situation, be it ever so simple, is going to be 
of more than one type. And each of these types can play 
a role in one or more constraints. [...] In our book, 
Perry and I concentrate on what the utterance means about 
the described situation, because we are primarily 
interested in the straightforward use of language to 
convey information. Thus, we identify the linguistic 
meaning of declarative sentences with the specific 
constraint that holds between utterances of the sentence 
and situations described by such utterances. By picking 
out one constraint, the one that holds between the types 
of utterances of sentences [3] ['It's 4 p.m.] and the 
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types of situations it describes, and calling that the 
linguistic meaning of [3], we are betraying the fact that 
our primary concern is for the subject matter of the 
sentence, for finding out what it is talking about and 
what it is saying about that subject matter. (Barwise, 
1983, pp. 24,25) 
Barwise realises that semantic content is only a part of the 
information available, a part of the information singled out to play 
a special role. In the chapter to follow we consider how well this 
strategy works, by asking how situation semantics deals with some 
traditional puzzles posed by the attitudes. 
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Chapter Eight: Situation Semantics and the Attitude Puzzles 
8.0 Introduction 
In the analysis of situation semantics in preceding chapters, I 
have considered three features in particular: (i) partiality in the 
semantics; (ii) the role of information in the semantics and the 
consequences for semantic innocence; and (iii) the quasi -linguistic 
or representational status of the level of abstract semantic. 
entities. In considering the implications of situation semantics for 
a semantic treatment of the classical problems of the attitudes and 
asking what illumination the theory sheds, I shall concentrate 
attention mainly on these aspects. 
The treatment falls into three parts. Firstly, I shall 
formulate some puzzles with attitude reports (section 8.1); secondly, 
I shall look at partiality and the problem of logical omniscience 
(section 8.2). Thirdly, I shall consider all the puzzles in turn 
from the perspective of situation semantics, with particular emphasis 
on the notion of information and the view that the level of abstract 
situations is a quasi -linguistic level of representation (section 
8.3). Our concern is to investigate whether these may be factors in 
a solution to the propositional attitude problems. We shall on 
occasions consider developing or modifying the semantics to extend 
the ways in which these features might have a place in solving the 
problems within the framework of situation semantics. 
8.1 Some traditional puzzles 
The purpose of this section is to lay out and fix a formulation 
of some of the puzzles that have frustrated traditional theories of 
the attitudes. The problems may be grouped into three major kinds: 
the attribution of logical omniscience, substitutivity and 
referential opacity, and the exportation of quantifiers from attitude 
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contexts, the second of these containing a number of varieties. 
8.1.1 Logical omniscience 
A problem for referential semantics (which assigns semantic 
values to expressions in a compositional manner as part of how they 
explain language and meaning), is that the theory cannot distinguish 
semantically between different expressions that are assigned the same 
semantic value. Cases of a singular term denoting an object (or 
sometimes failing to denote), which have given rise to a lot of 
puzzles, are dealt with in section (7.3.2) below: In the present 
section I am concerned with the case of sentences. 
If the reference of a sentence is its truth value, the innocent 
position becomes simply untenable, because if John believes a true 
sentence Q, then from the truth of 'John believes that g', we could 
derive as true all sentences 
(1) John believes that g 
for any other true sentence g (and similarly for false sentences). 
This is so because the semantics is compositional and only the 
references of the constituents of (1), one of which is the embedded 
sentence g, are relevant to determining the referent (truth value) of 
(1). If g has the same truth value, and hence reference, as p., the 
reference and truth value of the sentence arising from the 
substitution of g for g will be identical to that of the original.1 
The Fregean reaction is to abandon innocence, and say that the 
references of the embedded sentences in attitudinal contexts are the 
thoughts associated with them, the ordinary senses of these 
sentences. The hope is that the level of sense will be capable of 
making the finer distinctions required to prevent substitution of 
unwanted instances. Now Frege did not say very much about precisely 
what senses are; however, since Carnap and Church, intensions have 
been used to represent Fregean senses of expressions. This move does 
not solve the problem, though in a way it "reduces" it: the semantics 
is more sensitive and can discriminate more finely: Cases still 
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remain that cannot be distinguished, but which we want to be 
distinguishable. Logically equivalent sentences have the same 
intension, and thus cause problems. From 'John believes p' we can 
derive, for any tautology t, the sentence 
(2) John believes Q & t. 
The typical example is where t is g v -g. 
It has proved difficult to find a satisfactory and motivated 
refinement of the notion of intension, one that would serve to 
distinguish a from a & t. Intensions discriminate among expressions 
down to the level of logical equivalence. This problem is known as 
the problem of logical omniscience, precisely because a semantics 
based on possible world semantics attributes to an agent who believes 
a sentence p., belief also in all sentences logically equivalent to p. 
8.1.2 Substitution of coreferential singular terms 
The problem of logical omniscience is a special case of the 
substitution of a coreferential expression; another case is that of 
terms, especially singular terms. The basic idea here is that if a 
person can be related to an object in more than one way, we may be 
able logically to derive contradictory beliefs on his part about that 
object. If he believes of the object, as related to it in one way, 
that it is such and such, we may also be able to say that he believes 
of the object, as related to it in another way, that it is not such 
and such.2 Examples help to fix ideas about what is going on here. 
Since the literature overflows with examples, we shall be selective 
and consider only some representative cases. 
I shall divide the examples into three groups: (i) cases where 
the agent is related to the object and has a relational (in the 
Quinean sense) belief -- the de re cases; (ii) cases where the object 
is the agent himself -- the de se cases;3 and (iii) cases where a 
problem arises when we try to explain someone's behaviour by the 
beliefs and desires he has (or that are attributed to him). 
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8.1.2.1 De re attitudes 
This section can be subdivided according to whether the 
relation that the agent bears to the object is physical (typically 
perceptual) or nominal, ie. the relation is via language, as with a 
proper name. The classical example where the agent of an attitude 
meets an individual under two guises without realising that they are 
the same is Quine's story of Ralph and Ortcutt: 
There is a certain man in a brown hat whom Ralph has 
glimpsed several times under questionable circumstances 
on which we need not enter here; suffice it to say that 
Ralph suspects he is a spy. Also there is a grey- haired 
man, vaguely known to Ralph as rather a pillar of the 
community, whom Ralph is not aware of having seen except 
once at the beach. Now Ralph does not know it, but the 
men are one and the same. Can we say of this man 
(Bernard J. Ortcutt, to give him a name) that Ralph 
believes him to be a spy? (Quinei 1956 , p. 103) 
Adding to Quine's story a little, that Ortcutt was wearing a brown 
hat and lurking around a military installation when Ralph saw him, we 
obtain as true both the sentences 
(3) Ralph believes that the man in the brown hat is a spy. 
(4) Ralph believes that the man seen at the beach is not a 
spy. 
Since Ortcutt is the man in the brown hat and the man seen at the 
beach, under the substitution of coreferential terms, we are 
licensed, if all these expressions refer to Ortcutt (as an innocent 
theory says they must), to derive both of 
(5) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy. 
(6) Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy. 
But we do not want both of (5) and (6); the question is which 
inference(s) to block, how to do so, and why. 
Another example that is found in the literature, a slight 
variation, is Stephen Boer and William Lycan's (1980) case of Wilfred 
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and Van. Van is a mirror image of Wilfred, a reflection of Wilfred 
which John takes to be a different person. Thus, when John sees a 
tiger about to spring upon Wilfred, (7) is true, but (8) is false, 
for, so the story goes, John cannot see the tiger in the mirror and 
does not think than Van is about to be jumped on. 
(7) John believes that Wilfred is in danger. 
(8) John believes that Van is in danger. 
The other kind of case is where one or both relations of the 
agent to the object are via language: an attitude report where the 
individual believed to be something or other by the agent, is 
referred to by a proper name. Most people today consider proper 
names to be singular terms that refer in a Millian fashion to the 
bearer of the name.4 Hence the contribution that the name makes to 
the reference of the whole sentence is just the individual who bears 
the name. In the examples: 
(9) Andrew knows Hesperus is closer to the sun than the 
earth is. 
(10) Andrew knows Phosphorus is closer to the sun than the 
earth is. 
(11) Andrew knows that celestial body [demonstrating Venus] 
is closer to the sun than the earth is. 
Venus is denoted twice by a name, and once by a demonstrative. 
Suppose Andrew has never heard the name Phosphorus, and has learned 
about Venus only from books (perhaps he is blind and has never even 
seen Venus), but he does know that 'Hesperus' is also a name for 
Venus. If (9) is true, then by substitutivity (10) should also be 
true, as should (11). These consequences of referential semantics, 
however, require defence or perhaps modification, for they take us to 
the limit of what we can tolerate. 
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8.1.2.2 De se attitudes 
David Lewis has used the term 'de se' for attitudes towards 
oneself under a particular conception of oneself, namely, when one 
thinks of oneself as 'I'. John Perry has written about three kinds 
of 'essential indexical', one of which is de se, though the others 
are related cases. Perry has an example of a messy shopper in a 
supermarket, who sees someone pushing a trolley in mirrors; sugar is 
spilling from the trolley onto the floor, without the shopper 
realising that he himself is responsible and that the sugar is 
spilling from his own trolley. Perry argues for the essentialness 
and ineliminability of the indexical 'I' in the shopper's eventual 
realisation that he is spilling the sugar, which he would express by 
(12) I am spilling the sugar. 
Only when the shopper understands that he is the one spilling the 
sugar by thinking of himself under the mode of presentation specified 
by 'I' will he take appropriate action (straighten the packet of 
sugar in his trolley rather than chasing the "person" he sees in the 
mirrors). 
The problem for a semantics of the attitudes is that one cannot 
substitute a coreferential term for 'I' in (12) and use the resulting 
sentence to explain why the messy shopper stopped running round the 
shelves, chasing the image in the mirror, and instead straightened up 
the bag of sugar in his trolley. This example brings us to the use 
of attitude reports in the psychological explanation of behaviour to 
highlight problems for semantic theory. 
8.1.2.3 Psvcholoaical explanation of behaviour 
By considering the role of attitude reports in accounts of 
behaviour, it is possible to exhibit and crystallise other puzzles 
posed by the attitudes which can be examined from a semantic 
viewpoint. It May be the case that a solution to the puzzle will 
involve a contribution from psychology as well as semantics, but 
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these puzzles are no less interesting for the semanticist. Lynn 
Rudder Baker presents and tackles a problem of this sort, which we 
shall consider, in her aptly titled article 'De re Belief in Action' 
(Baker) 1982b). 
An instance of the problem arises with respect to the following 
scenario. On a table are two objects, a carved jade dish and a 
painted porcelain basket; Jones, who believes the objects are of 
unequal value, is standing at the table and is asked to remove the 
more valuable object. 
After inspecting the dish and the basket, Jones says, as 
Smith had before him, 'I believe that this [demonstrating 
the basket], but not this [demonstrating the dish] is the 
more valuable.' On the basis of Jones' statement, we may 
ascribe to him the following de re beliefs: 
(13) Jones believes of the basket that it is the more 
valuable. 
(14) Jones believes of the dish that it is not the more 
valuable. 
(p. 368; numbering by the present author) 
However, before acting, Jones asks to handle the objects to confirm 
his judgement, which he is allowed to do blindfolded. Consenting to 
this condition, Jones says confidently, believing he is holding the 
basket, 'I believe that this [demonstrating the object he is holding] 
is the more valuable'. Of course, he is actually holding the dish, 
so we may ascribe to him the de re belief: 
(15) Jones believes of the dish that it is the more 
valuable. 
When the dish is replaced and the blindfold removed, Jones removes 
the basket. 
If the belief attributions are correct,5 Jones believes of the 
dish that it is the more valuable, but also believes of the basket 
that it is the more valuable. There is a problem here already, for 
we can suppose Jones has sufficient knowledge of logic to know that 
both items cannot each be the more valuable; but Baker's interest is 
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the problem of how to explain his action of removing the basket? She 
shows that there is no explanation of Jones' action that could employ 
his de re belief (14), for occurrences of (1) in any proposed 
explanation could be replaced by occurrences of (15) to produce an 
"explanation" of an action that never happened; hence the proposed 
"explanation" does not explain Jones' action. The outcome is that 
'de re beliefs concerning objects are deprived of the explanatory 
role they were assumed to have.' (pp. 379,380) 
Lynn Rudder Baker's reaction is to suggest an account in terms 
of 'basic actions', actions about which an agent cannot be mistaken, 
which an agent successfully performs if he intends to do so. Jones 
intended to remove the object which he thought the more valuable, 
which at one point he thought was the basket (the visual examination) 
and at another point he thought was the dish (tactile examination); 
in effect he removes the basket. Basic actions are sufficiently 
"primitive" that the agent cannot be mistaken about what he is doing. 
The explanation divides into two parts: firstly an intentional 
part which eschews de re belief ascriptions and instead identifies 
objects in a "primitive" way, one which captures the agent's point of 
view on objects -- his way of thinking of and identifying them. Thus 
(13) is replaced by 
* 
(16) Jones believes that the object he pointed to first is 
the more valuable. 
(The ' *' is Casteneda's symbol for attributing indexical reference.) 
We can ascribe beliefs that the object identified in such and such a 
way is identical to that identified in such and such another way, 
even if the objects thus identified are not identical. We can then 
formulate Jones' beliefs that all these objects (the one first 
pointed to, the one he held blindfolded secondly, etc.) are 
correlated with the two in front of him in a certain way. The second 
part of the explanation consists of statements of fact: that the 
object identified in such and such a way is in fact the basket (or 
the dish). 
Baker suggests, in other words, that an explanation of Jones' 
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action requires us not to ascribe de re beliefs and employ these in 
the explanation, for that would be "jumping out of" Jones' 
perspective on his environment too soon; rather, the explanation 
requires us to remain within Jones' perspective until the entire 
intentional part of the explanation has been completed, only then can 
we bring in the world, brings in facts about which object Jones is 
thinking about. As Baker remarks, her style of explanation is 
congenial to Fodor's (1980) methodologically solipsist approach to 
psychology.6 
This scenario therefore presents a challenge to situation 
semantics, to provide an explanation of Jones' action without 
retreating from its ecological stance to a methodologically solipsist 
position. 
8.1.3 Exportation from attitude contexts 
The final class of problem posed by the attitudes which we 
shall consider is that of exportation. When, if ever, can we 
logically derive (17b) from (17a) or (18b) from (18a)? 
(17) a. John believes a mouse is in the house. 
b. A mouse is such that John believes it is in the house. 
(18) a. John believes many people smoke. 
b. Many people are such that John believes they smoke. 
The relation between the 'a' sentences and the 'b' sentences is 
unclear; Quine concludes that quantifying in is an altogether dubious 
business and confesses that he does not know how to make sense of the 
'b' sentences. 
If we allow wholesale exportation (which is the latitudinarian 
view),7 the Ralph and Ortcutt story shows how we run into problems. 
From (19a) we derive (19c) by exporting the singular term and 
legitimately substituting a coreferential term in an extensional 
context: 
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(19) a. Ralph believes the man in the brown hat is a spy. 
b. The man in the brown hat is such that Ralph believes he 
is a spy. 
c. Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes he is a spy. 
Elaborating Quine's story demonstrates that we really do not want 
(19c): suppose Ralph has seen Ortcutt at the beach and around town -- 
he knows him quite well, and would never think he is a spy. 
Nonetheless, it is Ortcutt whom Ralph glimpses in suspicious 
circumstances, without recognising him. Does he therefore believe of 
Ortcutt that he is a spy? The consensus among theorists is that he 
does not. Thus we have 
(20) Ortcutt is such that Ralph believes he is not a spy. 
which, together with (19c), produces an inconsistency in Ralph's 
thinking, even although Ralph is quite rational. 
More forcefully, suppose there is no mouse in the house, but 
(17a) is true; then surely (17b) is false. Otherwise we would be 
committed to exhibiting a (unique) mouse that made the sentence true. 
Or suppose the attitude is one of desiring a certain event, which may 
or may not come to pass, as in 
(21) Publius seeks the fall of the Republic. 
Or suppose some early medieval explorer returns to Europe with tales 
of his adventures; suppose he believes he saw a unicorn: we do not 
want to allow exportation in the following instance: 
(22) a. Marco believes he saw a unicorn. 
b. A unicorn is such that Marco believes he saw it. 
Exportation must definitely be ruled out in cases of this sort. How 
does situation semantics deal with unicorns? 
We shall consider one other case of exportation. The examples 
above have in common that the exported term is an indefinite 
description; definite descriptions also provide instances where 
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exportation is problematical. However, we shall look at the 
exportation of a name. 
(23) a. The ancient Greeks believed Zeus lived on the summit 
of Mount Olympus. 
b. Zeus is such that the ancient Greeks believed he 
lived on the summit of Mount Olympus. 
If there is no such person as Zeus, nor ever was, then while we grant 
the truth of (23a), we shall regard (23b) as false. 
8.2 Partiality and the attitudes 
A stumbling block for possible world semantics is the fact that 
intensions are not fine enough to distinguish meanings, and hence one 
cannot distinguish semantically between certain sentences embedded in 
attitude reports which require to be distinguished. A case of this 
occurs with (24) and (25): 
(24) Andrew believes that Cp . 
(25) Andrew believes that Ce & (p y 
If Andrew believes that CP , then from the equivalence of the 
intensions of CP and Cp & (\) y -(0, (25) is also true, according to 
possible world semantics, for all sentences . If we grant the 
plausible principle that from 
x believes that 
7 
and )O 
we may infer both of 
x believes that cp 
x believes that elp 
then from (25) we obtain 
(26) Andrew believes that V v -It. 
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For many substitution instances, if not most, (26) will be false. 
The possibility which situation semantics extends to us is that 
this puzzle could be solved by using situations to distinguish y 
from (e & (11 y -1 ). In. fact, Barwise and Perry have explicitly 
claimed: 
Situation semantics, and semantics innocence, resolve the 
problem of logical equivalence. Logically equivalent 
sentences, even in the same discourse situation, are not 
assigned the same proposition; different subject matters 
give different sets of situation types. This is the 
dividend of using partial functions freely in the 
development of situation semantics. (Barwise and Perry, 
1981b, p. 677) 
Unfortunately, the problem is not solved by partial functions and 
situations, but reappears in cases involving strongly equivalent 
sentences, with which Barwise and Perry replace logical equivalence. 
The sentences and (p & (kp y -'y)) are not strongly equivalent. 
The result of having situations in the semantics has indeed been to 
make semantics more sensitive to subject matter, and to prevent the 
puzzle arising in such crude ways as in (25); but the same basic 
puzzle still arises in other instances:8 
(24) Andrew believes that 
T 
. 
(27) Andrew believes that (p & ( c v 
(28) Andrew believes that Cip v (p & 
interpretation of (P in an utterance of (24) is identical with 
the interpretation of (P & ( cp v 1p) in an utterance of (27) in the 
same discourse situation (with the speaker connections extended if 
necessary to cover expressions in 1). We have: 
d,c I[Y & )]l = d,c l[c]( u (d,C lice 31 n d,c ([Y]1 ) 
and clearly, whatever 1 may be, we have 
d,c ¡ET ]I d,c l[99 ]1U (d,c (ET ll ( ) d,c ([(0/ 
whence ([ & ( v P ) ]( = ([ 31 . Similarly for (28) . 
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Situation semantics has reduced the number of problematic 
cases, since (25) and many others no longer present puzzles; 
d,c I[I 
& (f y -15Q ([ ]( precisely because of the partiality in the 
semantics. Unfortunately, cases still remain which partiality in the 
semantics alone has not been able to prevent. (Indeed, one wonders 
what kinds of references are required for a semantics of the 
attitudes.) 
8.3 Information, the quasi - linguistic status of the semantics, and 
the attitudes 
Situation semantics is centred around the notion of information 
-- the word occurs many times in the first two chapters of Barwise 
and Perry (1983), where the authors lay out the philosophical 
background to their theory, and again in chapters nine and ten, where 
the attitudes are considered. The role of information makes 
situation semantics an attractive and exciting theory, for it means 
that working out and applying the theory entails studying traditional 
problems from a new and relatively unexplored perspective, and doing 
so within a formal framework. 
The basic notion of information in situation semantics is 
Gibson's idea of information as objectively out there in the world. 
Information in this sense is closely related to situation semantics 
meaning, relations between situations. Barwise and Perry want to 
extend the concept beyond Gibson's intentions to include also 
information in the intuitive, everyday sense: a person seeing a bear 
approaching has detected this information and can communicate it to 
another person, who cannot see the bear, by uttering, 
A bear is approaching. 
For Barwise and Perry, the information that a bear is approaching is 
present in the second person's environment, in the utterance, just as 
it is present for the first person (although the form the information 
takes is different). 
- 227 - 
Hitherto referential semantics has considered the puzzles of 
the attitudes in terms of the references of expressions, mostly from 
a non - innocent viewpoint; situation semantics holds out the prospect 
of solving these puzzles in an innocent manner through involving the 
concept of information, which will be given a place in semantics. 
Can the notion of information be used to give a semantics for 
attitude reports, through providing a finer mesh than that of brute 
extensional significance? A semantic solution to the attitude 
puzzles seems to require such a finer mesh; yet how might we achieve 
this without abandoning semantic innocence ?9 
How do we quantify information? How do we measure it or 
specify it? Dretske gives a de re account: information is always to 
the effect that a source s is F. Barwise and Perry agree 
substantially with Dretske, but they also invoke the Gibsonian or 
ecological notion of information. Their agreement with Dretske 
resides mainly in their common view that information is objective and 
prior to language, which makes it the key concept in an explanation 
of cognition. Dretske shows how we might understand knowledge and 
belief in terms of information; for Barwise and Perry, the 
fundamental property of language is that it can be used to convey 
information. From Gibson they adopt the idea that information arises 
out of animal /environment interaction. Fortunately, in semantics we 
need only concern ourselves with the information that humans glean in 
situations and that can be expressed in language. 
The concept of information is effectively a primitive notion in 
situation semantics; if we want to know more, we are referred to work 
in the ecological tradition (eg. Michaels and Carello, 1981; Gibson, 
1979) and to Dretske (1981). Information is prior to language, 
something out there in the world, but not simply the way the world is 
either. Suppose Jackie has a broken leg. There is this fact, that 
Jackie has a broken leg; there is the proposition that Jackie has a 
broken leg; and there is the information that Jackie has a broken 
leg. 
In earlier chapters, notably chapter five, I argued that the 
level of abstract situations is essentially a quasi -linguistic level 
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of representation, with abstract situations representing potential, 
partial states of the world. Our intent is to discover in the course 
of examining the traditional puzzles of attitude reports (as laid out 
in chapter seven) from the perspective of a representational view of 
abstract situations, whether situation semantics can advance us 
towards a solution of the puzzles. 
8.3.1 Logical omniscience 
The puzzle with logical omniscience is that possible world 
semantics cannot distinguish the meaning of p from the meaning of p & 
t, where p is a sentence and t is a tautology. This is so because 
possible world semantics identifies meaning with intension, ie. the 
meaning of p is the set of all possible worlds in which p is true, 
and, since t is always true, 
"(P & t) _ "p 
n 
"t = P 
We have already seen that the partiality of situation semantics 
reduces the magnitude of this problem, but the fundamental difficulty 
remains: sentences p and q can be syntactically distinct, yet be 
assigned the same interpretation. 
Referential semantics assigns a semantic value to expressions 
of the object language. however, if the language is efficient, this 
assignment will not be a function: a given syntactic expression may 
take distinct semantic values on different occasions. Moreover, 
distinct expressions can have identical semantic values on occasion, 
even in artificial logical languages, where one can often refer to an 
individual by means of any of several expressions. 
The situation is altered when semantics is fragmented into two 
levels, meaning and interpretation, in situation semantics 
terminology. The difficulties in relating syntax to semantics 
involved the semantic value or interpretation; the relation between 
syntax and interpretation is many -many. The meaning /interpretation 
structure of situation semantics proves extremely flexible, for we 
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now have a mapping between syntax and semantic meaning, and meaning 
is a function from discourse situation and speaker connections to 
interpretation. 
This is a case where the notion of information could play a 
significant role, by individuating the world more finely. The 
information that p is not identical to the information that p & t, 
even when t is a tautology. 
It is interesting to notice that this is a point at which 
Barwise departs from Dretske's view of information. In his 
commentary on Dretske (1983), Barwise raises just this point with 
regard to the probabilistic underpinings of Dretske's theory: 
[...] the probabilistic account misses the point when it 
comes to linguistic events. The issue is not whether the 
probability of your having the 'flu is 1, but whether the 
doctor has the information and intends to convey it to 
you in saying 'You have the 'flu'. Or suppose that 
Fermat's last theorem is false. On the probabilistic 
account, this information is carried by every situation. 
Yet surely there is a transfer of information in my 
telling you an explicit counterexample that is not in a 
situation like a sunset. (Barwise, 1983a, p. 65) 
In his reply, Dretske admits he has difficulty in dealing with 
necessary truths, which on his probabilistic approach do not generate 
any information, since if an event is necessary, there are no 
relevant alternative occurrences. Barwise, on the contrary, believes 
that an utterance of a counterexample to Fermat's last theorem 
contains information which is not in a sunset, and hence believes 
that information is associated with mathematical truths. If Barwise 
is right, the notion of information is suitable for discriminating 
among the sentences or utterances that neither possible world 
semantics nor a semantics with partiality can distinguish. 
Syntactically, the sentence y & (NI) is not identical to (J & 
(.19, yet semantically there is nothing to distinguish them in 
situation semantics: they have the same interpretations.10 Indeed, 
one would find it difficult to motivate a semantics which did not 
assign them identical references and in which one could be true 
without the other being true. If 
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(29) John believes that y . 
is true and Cip < => y (that is, cÇ and kp are strongly equivalent, 
they have the same interpretation), it does not follow that 
(30) John believes that '. 
is true, although the semantic theory cannot distinguish between 
their references. The syntactic difference between CD and (y) can be 
crucial, their semantic equivalence notwithstanding. I 
8.3.2 Substitution of coreferential singular terms 
This promises to be a fruitful area for the application of the 
notion of information, since as Barwise and Perry often point out, 
there is information associated with utterances which employ one 
referring expression which is not carried by utterances employing 
other referring expressions. 
The fact that situation semantics provides us with structured 
interpretations for utterances and for subsentential expressions 
within utterances, and that we are regarding these structures as 
representations of states of the world (or parts thereof), seems to 
offer a way of treating the puzzles with attitude reports. Our 
intuitive understanding of the various scenarios involved in the 
puzzles usually appeals to the idea that the agent of the attitude 
has different concepts or representations of the object. For 
example, Ralph has met Ortcutt twice in widely differing 
circumstances: once at the beach and once near a military 
installation, hence he has two representations of Ortcutt without 
realising that they represent the same individual. 
8.3.2.1 De re attitudes 
Consider the story of Ralph and Ortcutt. The information 
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potentially communicated by an utterance of (31) is distinct from 
that communicated by an utterance of (32), and distinct again from 
the information communicated by an utterance of (33). 
(31) Ralph believes the man in a brown hat is a spy. 
(32) Ralph believes the man seen at the beach is a spy. 
(33) Ralph believes Ortcutt is a spy. 
If the descriptions are used referentially, they designate Ortcutt 
and the interpretations of all three utterances are identical. Yet 
referential uses of definite descriptions, like names, convey inverse 
information -- that someone ( Ortcutt) is the man in the brown hat, 
that someone (Ortcutt) is the man seen at the beach, that he is 
called ' Ortcutt'; further inverse information which might be 
communicated is that the speaker knows that someone (Ortcutt) is the 
man in the brown hat, etc. 
We have established that the information associated with and 
conveyed by utterances of (31) to (33) is different, but is this 
information semantically relevant? On the narrow semantic view, the 
domain of semantics is confined to the interpretations of 
expressions; information as such is irrelevant, only the semantic 
value, or at most what the utterance says about the state of the 
world (the proposition expressed) matters. Valid inference is 
founded upon the the notion of truth, and the truth of an utterance 
depends upon the state of the world. As the puzzle arises because 
certain inferences which we do not want come out true in semantics, 
talk of information does not affect the semantic puzzle. If Barwise 
and Perry think they are altering the semantic status of the puzzle, 
they are thinking of semantics in a very wide sense indeed, for wide 
semantics as I defined it in chapter two involved the level of 
meaning only in so far as meaning was relevant to determining 
interpretation (reference). That definition does not imply that 
information has a role in fixing which inferences are true. 
The concept of information could be extremely useful in solving 
this puzzle, but if the solution is to be a semantic solution, 
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information must be given a semantic role. The question of whether 
we should adopt a narrow or wide semantics is irrelevant as far as 
any possible solution to the current puzzle based upon the notion of 
information is concerned. 
When we come to treat the puzzle of Ralph and Ortcutt from the 
perspective of regarding the level of abstract situations as 
representations, we are confronted with the fact that, although our 
intuitive understanding of Ralph's beliefs invokes different 
representations or ideas of Ortcutt, it is Ortcutt himself, the 
"bare" individual, that occurs in the abstract situation to which 
Ralph is belief -related. The abstract situation is constructed out 
of Ortcutt and the próperty of being a spy, both of which are real 
world entities, but the abstract situation itself is not a piece of 
the world; the representational status attaches to the situation. On 
the other hand, at the linguistic level, the difference between (31) 
and (32) seems to lie with the terms 'the man in the brown hat' and 
'the man seen at the beach'. The representational status of the 
abstract situation in which Ortcutt is a spy does not help here. 
As we noted above, referential uses of definite descriptions 
involve inverse information, which means that there is information 
available, but not as part of the interpretation. There is a 
resource situation er for an utterance of (31), such that Ralph is 
the unique man in a brown hat in el.. We pick out Ortcutt as a 
constituent for the interpretation of the entire utterance by finding 
him in e , where he is not a "bare" individual, desolate of 
properties. At the very least, he is the man in the brown hat, and 
quite likely possesses many more qualities. The mesh of relations 
into which Ortcutt is integrated is kept out of sight in the wings, 
as it were, and only Ortcutt himself appears in the interpretation. 
8.3.2.2 De se attitudes 
Perry's argument in his (1979) is that there is a difference 
between the propositions expressed by utterances of the following two 
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sentences that a semantic theory must attempt to capture. 
(34) That person [demonstrating the person in the mirror] is 
spilling the sugar. 
(35) I am spilling the sugar. 
Can the difference Perry is referring to be caught with the notion of 
information? The difference must lie in what is expressed by the 
expressions 'that person' and 'I'. Since Perry's point is that the 
referring expressions 'the person in the mirror', 'he [demonstrating 
the person in the mirror]', or 'the person spilling the sugar', share 
with 'that person' in(34) a lack of something that the expression 
'I' alone has. The difference has to do with the indexical 'I', 
which suggests that we look at the meaning of 'I' in situation 
semantics to see if this particular pronoun conveys some piece of 
information that sets it apart from all the others. 
The meaning of 'I' is given by 
d,ç j[I]l 6,e iff á = á 
and fixes as referent the speaker of the current discourse situation. 
Other referring expressions will identify him in a variety of ways 
(cf. the examples above, which include a demonstrative, an indexical, 
and a definite description). It is the method whereby the meaning of 
'I' fixes the referent which allows Barwise and Perry to talk of 
inverse information conveyed by uses of 'I': when Jim introduces 
himself to Melanie by saying 'Hi, I am Jim', the information that 
Melanie gets is that the person speaking to her (Melanie) is Jim 
(S &A, p. 200). This information contrasts with that which would be 
conveyed by Jim's uttering 'Hi, the youngest person in the room is 
Jim'. 
The messy shopper's use of (35) contains the information that 
the speaker is the person making the mess. If the shopper is Perry 
himself, the information is not simply that Perry is making a mess, 
for this information is also contained in utterances of (34) or 
utterances employing the other referring expressions mentioned above. 
Identifying the individual is not enough; it misses the point.11 The 
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point is what Perry was dealing with in Perry (1977, 1979, 1980). 
With regard to the messy shopper, he says: 
[...] the importance of the word 'I' in my expression of 
what I came to believe. When we replace it with other 
designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of 
my behavior and so, it seems, no longer an attribution of 
the same belief. It seems to be an essential indexical. 
(Perry, 1979, p. 3) 
In a later paper, the point is expressed more clearly: 
The importance of the word 'I' is not that everyone who 
has beliefs about himself must use it, or an indexical 
like it, to think of himself. Rather, it is that because 
its role in thinking is tied to its meaning, it can be 
used to characterise that cognitive role in a general 
way. To accept 'I am so- and -so,' a person need not 
understand the word 'I', but only be in a state that, 
were he to understand 'I', would lead him to use 'I am 
so- and -so'. (Perry, 1980, p. 540) 
In his paper on Frege, Perry (1977), it is claimed that the way a 
person has a thought -- the sense he entertains -- matters as well as 
the thought thus apprehended, because it is the former that connects 
with behaviour.12 The emphasisnPerry (1980) lies more with language 
and the way we use certain words; yet there is still a cognitive role 
that words characterise. The word 'I' involves the appropriate 
cognitive role; the other expressions, although designating the 
correct individual, do not. 
Returning to the example of Jim's introduction of himself to 
Melanie, Melanie learns information that she will find useful for her 
future behaviour, perhaps uttering 'Oh, hi, Jim!' The description 
'the youngest person in the room' might leave her wondering what her 
interlocutor was talking about. Consider an alternative situation: 
Imagine that you are my addressee, that we speak often 
about how outrageous James Watt, the Secretary of the 
Interior is, and that we are at a reception for the Queen 
of England at which Watt is present. Further imagine 
that Watt is speaking into a microphone while moving 
around the room, so that we can hear him, but have no 
idea where he is at the moment. After some particularly 
outrageous remark of Watts, I say 'That man is 
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outrageous.' Clearly, Watt is the referent, the 
reference certainly seems to be a straightforward 
demonstrative reference, and yet nothing like a spatial 
relation determines the reference. (Wettstein, 1984, p. 
77) 
Wettstein is concerned to argue against McGinn (1981) that reference 
is determined by spatial relations, and instead that it is determined 
by 'the very features [of the context of utterance] which make the 
reference available to the auditor'. (Wettstein, 1984, p. 64) In 
this example, the link between speaker and hearer one the one hand, 
and the referent on the other, is via the auditory channel, for that 
is how the pair are related to Watt. 
Information, certainly as Gibson employs the notion, is tied to 
action, and promises to prove a convenient basis for explicating our 
descriptive, explanatory, and predictive practices, and hence account 
for our intuitions about the puzzles. 
8.3.2.3 Psychological explanation of behaviour 
We presented of 
Jones' action of removing the basket from the table rather than the 
dish. The semantic component of the puzzle arises from attributing 
to Jones de re beliefs of both the basket and the dish. 
(36) Jones believes of the basket that it is the more 
valuable. 
(37) Jones believes of the dish that it is the more 
valuable. 
Lynn Rudder Baker traces the problem with attempted explanations in 
terms of de re belief attribution in (36) to the tendency to escape 
from the intentional sphere into the external world before completing 
the intentional part of the explanation. Her position embraces a 
separation of what is relevant for the agent's cognition and what is 
the state of affairs holding in the world, a position which some find 
acceptable (Fodor 1980), but which is strongly rejected by ecological 
theorists and which therefore Barwise and Perry might also be 
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expected to reject. 
The analysis of (36) and (37) that situation semantics provides 
already encapsulates the puzzle. The inverse information available 
in utterances of these sentences does not rescue the explanation in 
terms of de re beliefs, and is unable to resolve the puzzle.13 
8.3.3 Exportation from attitude contexts 
The problem with exportation is that in many cases the sentence 
which results from exporting a term from within the scope of an 
attitude verb simply is not entailed by the original sentence. The 
inference from (38a) to (38b) is not valid: 
(38) a. John believes a mouse is in the house. 
b. A mouse is such that John believes it is in the 
house. 
Situation semantics blocks this inference in an elegant and 
satisfying way. 
We can give the indefinite description 'a mouse' in (38a) 
either a referential, an attributive or an inner attributive reading 
(to use situation semantics terminology). On the referential reading 
there is only one mouse, a particular individual, which John believes 
is in the house. In this case the inference is fine, although 
utterances of (38a) would not normally involve this reading. On the 
attributive and inner attributive readings, there are many mice and 
John's belief is not of a certain mouse, so that the inference is 
invalid. In general, therefore, and especially with utterances of 
(38a) under ordinary circumstances, the inference is invalid. 
Each situation in the interpretation of an utterance of (38a) 
relates John to a schema, which consists of the event type 
(<1, <in, h, a>, 1>} 
where h is the house, 1 o ld, and a is an indeterminate which will be 
- 237 - 
anchored to various mice. When the indefinite description is 
intended referentially, all the situations in the interpretation of 
an utterance of (38a) contain a certain mouse which John believes is 
in the house, therefore a must be anchored in each case to the 
particular mouse in question. When the description is intended 
attributively or inner attributively, the interpretation is expanded 
to include situations relating John to this same schema, but in which 
the indeterminate a may be anchored to other individuals which are 
mice in either the situation designated by the entire utterance or 
the situation designated by the embedded sentence 'A mouse is in the 
house'. 
The indefinite description in utterances of (38b) is generally 
a referential use, but it may be used attributively. On the 
referential reading there is a certain mouse which John believes is 
in the house; on the attributive and inner attributive readings, 
there are again several mice, and the interpretation can be 
partitioned into subclasses Im indexed by the mouse which in question 
in each situation in I . The explanation situation semantics 
-m 
provides for the failure of the inference generally is that (38a) is 
typically given an attributive reading and (38b) is typically given a 
referential reading; in this event the interpretation of (38a) is not 
a subclass of the interpretation of (38b). 
With regard to the medieval traveller Marco, who returns to his 
native city believing that he saw a unicorn in a distant land, the 
sentence 
(39) Marco believes he saw a unicorn. 
poses a serious problem for situation semantics as an innocent 
theory. The embedded sentence 'He saw a unicorn' should have the 
same interpretation within (39) as outside, and consists of 
situations containing the constituents: Marco, seeing, and -- some 
unicorn. Since there are no unicorns, we have a problem in providing 
one as a constituent for the situation. 
There are two paragraphs in Barwise and Perry (1983) on 
fictional discourse and "fictional individuals" (pp. 284, 285). 
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Barwise and Perry suggest the use of indeterminates to stand for such 
creatures, so that utterances describe not situations, but situation 
types; the difference between instances of reference to real world 
individuals and instances of reference to "fictional individuals" is 
that there is no anchor for the indeterminates in the latter case. 
There is no Santa Claus. Still, there is objective 
content to our talk of Santa Claus, as when I say, 'Joe 
believed that Santa Claus gave him his bike,' and there 
are concepts that embody our ideas of Santa Claus; there 
are connective links across the culture between various 
uses of SANTA CLAUS. But the concepts that embody these 
ideas are not concepts of any real individual. (S &A, pp. 
284,285) 
This proposal means, however, that we have to be content with 
situation types as the interpretations of some utterances.14 
Such a proposal constitutes the basis for Barwise and Perry's 
response to the puzzle presented by an instance of a name being 
exported. In fact, since innocent semantics regards interpretations 
of expressions as independent of the linguistic context in which they 
occur, there is no problem with the exportation in the case: 
(40) a. The ancient Greeks believed Zeus lived on the summit 
of Mount Olympus. 
b. Zeus is such that the ancient Greeks believed that he 
lived on the summit of Mount Olympus. 
that is not already existent with (4.0() alone. 
The concept of information, if given a place in semantics, is 
helpful to Barwise and Perry's theory. The important property of 
information is that it is always veridical (Dretske, 1981, p. 45). 
Can we make use of this fact to solve the puzzle? As we saw the 
semantics as presently formulated (in which only a part of the 
information associated with an utterance is contained within the 
interpretation) can handle some cases of exportation satisfactorily. 
By distinguishing a variety of possible readings for descriptions, it 
can explain the failure of the inference from one sentence to 
another, in which a term has been exported. 
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However, consider the problem which arises with the inference 
from (39) to (41): 
(39) Marco believes he saw a unicorn. 
(41) A unicorn is such that Marco believes he saw it. 
The present proposal is that 'a unicorn' designates an unanchored 
indeterminate; the problem is that with this state of affairs we 
cannot obtain the result that (39) can be true and (41) false. If we 
say that (4) is false, because the indeterminate is not anchored to 
any real world individual, why should not (39) be false for the same 
reason? Or if we regard (39) as true, why should not (41) be true 
also? It is the problem of semantic innocence again. 
The semantic theory should declare (41) false; the notion of 
information, if radically incorporated into a semantics, can explain 
this result, for there being no unicorns means there is no 
information originating with unicorns. We have a principled, rather 
than arbitrary, decision for declaring (41) false. 
Sentence (39) presents more of a problem; here the 
representational aspect of the level of abstract situations is of 
help. It is quite possible for there to be a representation of 
something which does not exist; indeed, the abstract situation in 
which Jackie is biting Molly at a location 1, when actually at 1 
Jackie is not biting Molly, is precisely that. However, we do not 
have a unicorn with which to build a representation of Marco's seeing 
the unicorn. 
Marco, we shall suppose, is not credulous and is quite 
rational; he did see some strange, unknown animal on his travels, but 
it was not a unicorn. So far we have facts. The problem originates 
when Marco categorises his experience in terms of seeing a unicorn, 
thus creating a belief about his experience -- a belief that he saw a 
unicorn. Barwise and Perry's strategy for understanding what we mean 
when we attribute an attitude breaks down with fictional and 
mythological reference, simply because there is no external 
significance, in terms of which we might understand the mental 
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significance of these reports.15 In fact, with an attitude report 
such as (39), we are employing more than the external significance of 
the constituents, if the external significance of 'unicorn' amounts 
to the fact that there are none. We make reference to concepts of 
unicorns and a common lore (cf. the above quotation from Barwise and 
Perry, 1983 about Santa Claus). What is missing from Barwise and 
Perry's account is the fact that we can appeal to more than the 
veridical in categorising attitudes.16 
A combination of the representational status of abstract 
situations and the link with truth via information may provide a 
successful semantic theory for the attitudes within a situational 
framework -- certainly the question is worth exploring further. 
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Chapter Nine: General Conclusion 
9.1 Accomplishments 
One of the fundamental ideas of insights of situation semantics 
is that language is used primarily by finite agents to communicate 
information. Since information is regarded by the theory as existing 
in the world objectively, as Gibson and Dretske have argued, Barwise 
and Perry believe and claim that the meanings and interpretations of 
expressions are things, in the world, parts of reality which exist 
independently of the speaker or language community. We have 
questioned this claim and attempted to demonstrate that abstract 
situations are quasi -linguistic entities. 
The meaning of a sentence is a relation between situations, and 
its interpretation on an occasion is the described situation. The 
meaning of a basic expression is a relation between discourse 
situations and its interpretation, which is a part of the world: an 
individual or a property. However, as we saw in chapter five, 
abstract situations have displaced real situations as the references 
of utterances, because the latter do not have a suitable structure 
for semantic theory and because some utterances are false, so they do 
not describe the way the world is. The same problem demolished the 
early views of Moore and Russell, that propositions were parts of the 
world. Moreover, the combined role of the setting and distinguished 
indeterminates in compositionality demonstrates that the 
interpretations of the parts alone do not constitute the abstract 
situation, that is to say, situation semantics fails the principle of 
strong compositionality. Thus, the manner in which the parts are put 
together must be constrained. In effect, the setting binds together 
the internal structure of the abstract situation and the internal 
structure of the sentence uttered, which is the source of the 
constraints. 
The examination of the "classificatory" role abstract 
situations are said to have concentrated on the position of abstract 
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situations within the theory. It was demonstrated that in fact they 
do not have a classificatory role, but are themselves the objects of 
the theory. In this picture, the use of the set theory, which is 
employed to hold entities that have a semantic role together within 
abstract situations, becomes a crucial indicator of the status of 
abstract situations and other semantic entities. 
We showed how the semantic entities of Barwise and Perry's 
theory could be treated as expressions in a language, and the 
semantics as a whole recast within this framework, making the 
linguistic nature of abstract situations explicit by replacing the 
set theory with the operation of linguistic concatenation. The 
resulting picture is an extension of the one Richards (1974) 
proposed, in which propositions are composed of individuals and 
predicates held together linguistically. In the recast version of 
situation semantics, propositions or abstract situations are composed 
of individuals, properties and locations linguistically bound 
together (with polarity being explicitly signalled, rather than 
treated as an operator). Compared to Barwise and Perry's version of 
the theory, the formal equivalence of these two formulations shows 
that nothing has been lost in recognising the quasi- linguistic nature 
of propositions. (The recast version, however, contradicts some 
metatheoretical claims about the view of meaning proposed in 
situation semantics, but since these are not borne out, they are in 
need of revision in any case.) 
When once one has begun to introduce structured entities as 
sentential references into the semantics, it becomes difficult to 
know where to stop. Barwise and Perry have introduced abstract 
situations as the references of sentences; the assertion made by 
atomic sentences can be specified by a single relation holding among 
suitable individuals (at a location); the assertion of attitude 
reports, too, can be specified in this way, as the belief relation 
holding between an agent and a schema. But molecular sentences, such 
as conjunctions, disjunctions and sentential negation, cannot be 
specified in this fashion, unless additional machinery is introduced 
into the semantics. Why should we not do this then? Robin Cooper 
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has argued that it is necessary for an adequate treatment of 
negation, and I have extended his argument for introducing molecular 
situations (molecular facts) to "quantified facts ". The consequence 
of these additions is to add to and make more apparent the syntactic 
structure of abstract situations. 
Situation semantics was hailed as a radical new approach to the 
semantics of natural language (and the theory is now also being 
applied to programming languages at the Center for the Study of 
Language and Information, Stanford University). It appeared to be 
quite different in a number of respects: the use of situations as 
sentential references, the claim that meaning and information are in 
the world rather than in the head, and the allied assumption that 
predicates refer to (intensional) properties. The relations between 
these theories were investigated using the technique of Kaplan 
(1975), which is to reformulate the interrelationships among the 
entities in each theory which have a semantic role. For a more 
comprehensive analysis, we added a semantics for necessity and 
possibility to situation semantics, which brought out the parallels 
with possible world semantics. Detailed analysis of the relation of 
situation semantics to other theories shows that these differences 
are not differences at a deep level. Especially when compared to 
Russellian semantics and direct reference semantics, similarities 
come to the fore. 
The main task, then, was to examine the structure of the formal 
part of situation semantics with respect to the claim that meaning is 
in the world. By detaching this metatheoretical claim from the 
technical theory and analysing the latter in detail, we were able to 
show that situation semantics is formally equivalent to a recast 
version of the semantics which makes explicit the language -dependent 
character of propositions. It is clear, therefore, that when the 
situation semantics is considered apart from the metatheoretical 
claims, it is not quite so radical as first appears. 
To regard the theory in this way is, however, not to minimise 
the contribution which the theory makes to semantics. On the 
contrary, the theory provides crucial insights, among which is the 
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idea that the notion of information is a significant, but neglected 
one for semantics. Barwise and Perry have not succeeded in locating 
meaning in the world independent of language, and therefore have not 
broken with traditional theory in this respect, but they have drawn 
our attention to the important question of the place of information 
in semantic theory. 
We defined two views of the province of semantics, the narrow 
and wide approaches, and pointed out that situation semantics was a 
wide theory in this sense. Meaning has a crucial role, being a 
relation between discourse situations and described situations, and 
is the locus in the formal theory of the informational relations and 
constraints that are important for Barwise and Perry's view. The 
interpretation is only a part of the information available in an 
utterance of an indicative sentence, the remainder -- the inverse 
information -- being carried by the meaning of the sentence. 
What are the benefits that situation semantics has brought us 
in the semantics of the attitudes? We considered a number of puzzled 
which have resisted solution for some time, and if situation 
semantics permits some advance towards solving them, it will have 
made a substantial contribution. The partiality of situation 
semantics fails to solve the problem of logical omniscience, but it 
does reduce the number of problematical cases. The notion of 
information, however, can distinguish cases which partiality alone 
fails to separate. 
The concept of information and the representational status of 
abstract situations do seem to be useful in providing solutions for 
the other puzzles we looked at, or suggesting where solutions might 
be found. The properties of information which make it a valuable 
concept in this regard are its intensionality, the fact that it 
enables us to make finer distinctions than can be made at the level 
of interpretation, and the fact that it is veridical. The 
representational status of abstract situations provides them too with 
an intensionality which makes them useful tools for constructing a 
solution to the puzzles, while the facts that representations need 
not reflect reality makes them complementary to the notion of 
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information. 
9.2 Situation semantics and future research 
The intense interest shown in situation semantics since work 
first began to be published, if continued, indicates that the 
approach will be the centre of much activity and development. The 
theory embraces a relatively unexplored view of meaning and 
information, and provides structured interpretations for sentences; 
it is to be hoped that some results will be forthcoming from study 
within this framework. 
As I said in the preface, work at CSLI has already moved beyond 
the theory published in Barwise and Perry (1983). The more recent 
theory stands in the same position as that version with respect to 
the points that I have made about the language -dependent status of 
meaning and sentential interpretations, and about the role of 
information. If it is indeed the case, as seems likely, that 
linguistic meaning is irreducibly language- dependent, then no theory 
can ever escape this fact. (The kind of information and meaning 
which ecological psychologists have been studying, the information 
that is detected during perception by both humans and animals, is 
another matter. Gibson may be right that meaning and information of 
this kind -- concerned with physiological rather than cognitive 
functions -- are in the world. See Gibson, 1979; Lee, 1976, 1980; 
and especially Turvey et al., 1981.) There remains considerable 
scope for working out within the new version of situation semantics 
the place of information in semantics theory. 
One area in which situation semantics has something valuable to 
contribute is that of the relation between a language and those who 
speak it. The combined interest in natural language and programming 
languages at CSLI reflects this concern with finite agents using 
language. One response to the question of what the speaker knows 
when he knows the meaning of a sentence is that he knows its truth 
conditions. This response was prompted by classical model theory, 
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eg. possible world semantics, in which the meaning of a sentence is 
its intension, the set of all possible worlds in which the sentence 
is true. In situation semantics, to know the meaning of a sentence, 
it is sufficient to know which situation or situations it describes 
when uttered in a given discourse situation. Conspicuously, the 
classical answer lacks partiality, for it involves total states of 
the world being bound up with the meaning of every sentence. 
Partiality in situation semantics has valuable insights to offer in 
this area. 
We have considered the semantics of attitude reports, which is 
a part of the philosophy of language. It may be that situation 
semantics casts philosophical light on the ecological approach to 
cognition, in which case the theory will have consequences for the 
philosophy of psychology. These two disciplines have had 
considerable mutual influence in the past, and it is reasonable to 
suppose that the situation will not be different in the near future. 
Specifically, Fodor's (1980) rather pessimistic conclusions on the 
future of naturalistic psychology are rejected by the ecological 
school (see the commentary on Fodor's article by two ecological 
psychologists, Turvey and Shaw, 1980). 
Finally, mention should be made of the application of situation 
semantics to various natural language constructions. In this area 
one hopes that there will be more than a simple reformulation of old 
results in a new framework -- that is the danger. In this respect I 
would like to make a few remarks about research on prepositions which 
Mark Gawron has carried out (Gawron, 1984). Gawron contrasts 
situation semantics, where information about argument order is not 
encoded into meanings, with the alternative practice of building such 
information into meanings. The significance of this choice is that 
semantic meaning and grammatical function are held separate, and 
greater parsimony can be exercised among meanings. Thus, Gawron 
wants to claim that the verb 'to hit' has a single meaning in both 
the sentences: 
(1) John hit the fence with the stick. 
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(2) John hit the stick against the fence. 
(The sentences themselves are assigned different meanings in Gawron's 
system.) Of course, situation semantics is not the only possible 
theory that has this advantage; but applications of the theory must 
be examined and evaluated, and the theory judged with respect to its 
contribution relative to its rivals across a number of areas. 
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* 
Appendix 
The purpose of this appendix is to provide a rigorous 
definition of the algebra (G, *), various elements of which can be 
regarded as: interpretations of expressions, settings (on the 
original conception), and situations. The operation * represents the 
operation of the composition of interpretations, or the combination 
of an interpretation with a setting. As indicated in the main text, 
the elements of G will be represented as infinite matrices, but since 
we are interested only in a subset of M w we need firstly to define 
the set G. 
The elements of a matrix g = (g..) e G must be taken from the 
union of the following sets, which, except for the last, arise in the 
model theory of situation semantics: the set A of individuals, the 
set R = II Rn of relations, the set L of locations, and the set (1, 
-1, 0, j). The elements 1 and -1 are the truth values true and false 
respectively, 0 is a "blank" or an indeterminate element, and j is an 
element which signifies that a position in the matrix has become 
informationally corrupt. 
We shall complete the definition of G and define * by firstly 
defining a set G1 of vectors and an operation *R on G1. G1 is the 
set of all g = (gi.7 ) e M1,, satisfying the following five conditions: 
, 
(G1) For each element g in G1, g1 is either a location 1 e 
L, 0 or J. 
(G2) For each element g in G1, g2 is either 1, -1, 0 or j. 
(G3) For each element g in G1, g3 is either a relation r e 
R, 0 or j. 
(G4) For each element g in G1, the elements g. (j > 3) are 
either individuals a. e A, 0 or j. 
(G5) For each element g in G1, if g3 = r for some r e 
Rn, 
then the elements g. (j > n +3) are all 0 or j. 
We can now say that G is the set of all matrices g in M such that W,w 
each row gi of g (i e W) is in G1. 
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The operation *R is defined on the set G1 as follows. There 
are two cases we have to consider: 
Case (1): If g3, h3 e {0, 1), the elements (g * h)j are 
defined by: 
' gj if gj = hj or hj = 0 
For j = 1, 2, ..., (g *R h)j = hj if gj = 0 
i otherwise 
Case (2): If g3 = r e Rn and h3 = r' E Rn i, for some r, 
r', n, n', then let m = max {n,n'I. If either g 
3 
= r E Rn 
and h3 C (0, i), or h3 = r E Rn and g3 E {0, 1), then let 
m = n. The elements (g *R h)j are defined by: 
gj if gj = hj or hj = o 
For j = 1, 2, ..., 11+3, (g *R h)j = hj if gj = 0 
I otherwise 
For j > m +3, (g *R h)j = 
0 if gj = hj = O 
i otherwise 
This completes the definition of *R. 
The reader may easily check that (G1, *R) is a commutative 
semigroup with identity: G1 is closed under *R, *R is associative and 
commutative, and there is an identity element e such that ej = 0 for 
each j C W . 
We want the operation *'to be defined so that, intuitively, the 
matrix g * h (g, h e G) consists of the products of combining every 
row gi of g with every row h. of h according to *R. To do this, we 
must choose an enumeration of all pairs <i,j> of natural numbers (for 
example, an enumeration may be obtained by diagonalisation). Given 
our chosen enumeration and a natural number n, we shall suppose there 
are two functions n1 and n2 such that n1(n) = i and a2(n) = j, where 
<i,j> is the nth member of the enumeration. The operation * can now 
be defined: for each n, with g, h E G, 
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(g * h)n = 
*R 4P2(a) 
The closure of G under * follows immediately from the closure of *R. 
At this stage some remarks on our use of matrices to represent 
interpretations, settings and situations are in order. We are really 
only interested in equivalence classes of the matrices defined here. 
The matrices themselves carry too much information; that is, they 
make distinctions we do not actually want. The unwanted information 
must therefore be factored out by an equivalence relation. 
As a first approximation, two elements of G are in the same 
equivalence class if there is a permutation of the rows of one to 
make it identical with the other. However, defining the equivalence 
classes in terms of permutations on the rows of the matrices still 
leaves a too strong restriction on which matrices are in the same 
equivalence class, because it ignores possible repreated rows. Given 
the intuitive motivation, if two matrices arer such that one results 
from the other by, say, repeating the first row and shifting all 
other rows down one, we want them to be equivalent; but this is not 
necessarily the case when the equivalence relation is defined by 
permutations. hence we shall adopt the following definition for the 
equivalence relation, denoted by e : 
g = h (mod e) if (Vi)(37)(gi = hi) & (Vi )(37)(hi = J]) 
Notice that if h is obtained from g by permuting rows, g = h (mod 
e 
). In the sequel we shall think of (G, *) as implicitly filtered 
through this equivalence relation. Strictly speaking, however, the 
intended algebra is (G /e , *), where G/e = {[g]Ig e G} and * is now 
defined on the equivalence classes [g] in the manner that one would 
expect: 
[g] * [h] = [g * h] 
Because we need only these equivalence classes of matrices, in 
choosing matrices as the representation of interpretations, settings 
and situations, we are invoking a much more powerful mathematical 
apparatus than we actually need. Representing the interpretations, 
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etc. as sets of vectors from G1 would have been more appropriate in 
terms of the mathematical structure we are seeking; however, the two 
dimensional representation that we obtain with matrices provides us 
with an intuitive pictorial form for exhibiting abstract situations, 
and I have therefore chosen to use it here. 
Properties of * that we shall check are its associativity, 
commutativity, and the existence of an identity element. Thus (G, *), 
like (G1, *R), is a commutative semigroup with identity. 
ASSOCIATIVITY: Let us adopt the convention that (g * h) <i,j> 
means the nth row of (g * h), where <i,j> is the nth pair in the 
enumeration. The associativity of * can be demonstrated as follows. 
For fixed n, let <i,j> be the nth member of the enumeration of pairs. 
((q * h) * k)n 
_ (g * h)i *R kj 
_ (gp1(i) *R *R kj 
= 
gp1(i) *R (hp2(ì) *R kj) 
= gp1(i * ) (h * k)<p2(i),7> 
= (g * (h * k))m 
where m = <p1(i),<R2(i),j ». 
Now m is uniquely defined, given n, and as n takes in 
succession the values 1, 2, ..., so m ranges over all the natural 
numbers, and the mapping from n to m is a permutation. These 
properties follow from our adoption of diagonalisation for 
enumeration of all pairs. We have shown, therefore, that the matrix 
g * (h * k) is obtained by permuting the rows of (g * h) * k, hence 
that (g * h) * k _ g * (h * k) (mod e ), and thus that the operation 
* is associative on G when factored through the equivalence relation. 
COMMUTATIVITY: We require 
g * h = h * g 
This follows easily from the properties of the enumeration: each row 
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of the left hand side is identical to one row of the matrix on the 
right hand side. Again let <i,j> be the nth pair of the enumeration: 
(g * h)i 
gi *R hj 
= hj *R g. 
_ * 
- g <j,i> 
and so g * h is equivalent to h * g, and * is commutative when 
factored through the equivalence relation. 
IDENTITY ELEMENT: We must show that there is an element 1 e G 
such that 
g * 1= g= 1* g 
The element 1 is simply the matrix containing only 0's: 1.. = 0 for 
ij 
all i, j e w . Since we have just shown that * is commutative, we 
need only show that g * 1 = g. Again, let <i,j> be the nth pair of 
the enumeration: 
(g * 1)n 
gi *R 1j 
gi 
and so each row of g * 1 is identical to one of g and vice versa. 
Finally, I want to point out which members of G we are 
interested in from the semantic point of view. It is simplest to 
describe first those elements of G which represent situations. An 
element g e G corresponds to an abstract situation if for each row gi 
of g, gi is either a row of 0's or the following conditions are met: 
gi1 = 1 
gil 
=1 or -1 
g. 
gi3 = 
r e Rn for some n 
gij 
= áj A (4 < j< n+3) 
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gij 
= 0 (j > n+3) 
In particular, if for any i, j, gij = 1, g fails to represent a 
situation. 
Settings and interpretations are represented by elements of G 
which correspond to situations with "holes ". A hole is just a 0 
where there should be an individual, a relation, a location or a 
truth value. There are, however, restrictions on where holes can 
occur, originating with the syntax of the object language. Within 
the framework defined by Aliass, 
/10r20ó00 ... 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.:. 
is not a setting, since no expression of Aliass has an interpretation 
consisting of both an individual and a truth value. Nor is the 
matrix exhibited above an interpretation. Discovering which 
positions can contain holes so that a matrix is either an 
interpretation or a setting within the framework of either English or 
a version of Aliass that displayed an interesting range of 
grammatical constructions would be an interesting task, but not one 
that shall be pursued here. 
I am indebted to Charles McCarty for helpful criticism of earlier 
versions and a number of suggestions, from which this appendix has 
benefited greatly. 
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Notes to Chapter One 
1 
This claim is made explicitly by Dummett: 
A theory of meaning is a theory of understanding; that 
is, what a theory of meaning has to give an account of is 
what it is that someone knows when he knows the language, 
that is, when he knows the meanings of the expressions 
and sentences of the language. (Dummett, 1975, p. 99) 
[...] philosophical questions about meaning are best 
interpreted as questions about understanding: a dictum 
about what the meaning of an expression consists in must 
be construed as a thesis about what it is to know its 
meaning. ( Dummett, 1976, p. 69) 
2 
See Hintikka (1962) and van Fraassen (1971). 
3 In Barwise and Perry (1980) the authors set up the correspondence 
between sets of possible worlds and situation types, and so make no 
reference to locations. Nonetheless, it seems to me that if the aim 
were seriously to attempt a reconstruction of situation semantics 
within the possible worlds framework, the latter would have to be 
extended to include locations, and that the correct correlation is 
between sets of possible worlds and situations. 
4 
We do not have to admit all possible valuations -- we can choose 
which ones we want in fixing what the semantics is to be. Hence VL 
is to be the set of admissible valuations. In particular, since the 
definition is very general and embraces many "uninteresting" 
languages, one restriction we would want to place on a valuation v_ 
for it to be an admissible valuation for a language L, is that the 
truth value that v assigns to molecular sentences such as A & B 
should be a function of the truth values assigned to the constituent 
sentences A and B: 
v(A & B) = T iff v_(A) = v_(B) = T 
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In fact van Fr_aassen's definition of a valuation is so general that 
it includes functions which assign entities other than 1 and 0 to 
sentences (van Fraassen, 1971 , p. 31). 
See van Fraassen (1971), p. 95. Van Fraassen remarks that a 
supervaluation for L is in general not an admissible valuation for L. 
In the context of a tradition of total interpretations and bivalent 
logics, admitting partiality by studying a language for which the 
admissible valuations include partial valuations is not much 
considered. 
6 
S &A, in the preface, page x. 
7 Dretske takes de re informational content to be basic. He also 
considers that de re beliefs and knowledge are more fundamental than 
their de dicto counterparts, and that de re attitudes can be 
explained in terms of his theory of a signal's de re informational 
content. See Dretske (1981), pp. 66 -68. 
8 
Strictly, it is the sequence of relation and individuals that is 
the constituent of a situation <1, <rn, a1, ..., all >, i >; individuals 
themselves are not constituents, but this loose expression of the 
matter does not affect our point here. I shall at times speak of 
individuals as constituents of situations. Cf. chapter five, note S 
9 
A version of innocence -- proto- innocence we might call it -- is 
found in the writing of Gilbert Ryle: 
We do not and cannot describe haystacks in terms of this 
or that set of sensations. We describe our sensations by 
certain sorts of references to observers and things like 
haystacks. (Ryle, 1949, p. 193) 
10 
Actually, since these expressions belong to our language, we 
should not fault the ancient Egyptians for lack of this knowledge. 
Rather, what they failed to realise (to discover), in Fregean terms, 
was that the object presented by the sense of our expression the 
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Morning Star' (for which they had their own expression) is identical 
to the object presented by the sense of our expression the Evening 
Star' (for which, again, they had their own expression). 
11 
The question is treated in chapter two. 
12 
The distinction between ecological information and linguistic 
information that I am trying to draw is perhaps the same as the 
distinction recently made by some ecological psychologists between 
specificational and indicational information (see Turvey and Kugler, 
1984). An example of linguistic information would be the information 
that a is F, while ,specificational information is, following the 
ecological psychologists, the kind of information that an organism 
picks up during perception. It is extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to articulate all of this information in language; it is 
more susceptible to mathematical description, but even then the 
problem is still formidable. 
The distinction also seems to be related to Dretske's 
distinction between information in analog and in digital form 
(Dretske, 1981, pp. 136 -139). 
13 
In the non -sentential case the interpretations may be considered 
not parts of situations, but uniformities across situations. 
14 
The tension that arises because the two conceptions of 
information are being forced together is a symptom of an underlying 
malaise, of a fundamental problem at the heart of the semantics, for 
Barwise and Perry's assimilation of linguistic meaning, which is 
conventional, and linguistic information to meaning and information 
conceived ecologically -- natural meaning and specificational 
information -- is, I believe, just not possible. It is the root 
cause of many of the problems they face; it is that point at which I 
believe they take the wrong turning on the road to constructing a 
theory of meaning for the ecological approach. Is it really possible 
to treat the linguistic, conventional case analogously to the natural 
one? I do not think so. The real theory of meaning implicit in 
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ecological realism will require a lot more effort to work out and may 
well look very different from situation semantics. 
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Notes to Chapter Two 
1 
More recent work in the philosophy of language from this 
perspective is that of Schiffer (1972) and Loar (1981). 
2 
Thus: 'We treat [the distinction between a transparent and an 
opaque reading] as a scope distinction involving singular terms and 
formula modifiers, a distinction exemplified by the different 
relative scopes of his mother and willingly in (134) and (135). 
Since it is reflected at the level of logical form, we say that it is 
a semantic distinction. In contrast, the difference between definite 
and attributive reference is a pragmatic distinction, which is to say 
that it is not reflected in logical form.' (Richards, 1976, p. 359) 
Richards considers the sentence 
(132) Oedipus willingly married his mother. 
understood as having either narrow 
or wide scope, which Richards represents respectively as: 




where 'o' stands for Oedipus, I*: 
X 
' for willingly, 'm' for his mother 
and 'W' for married. 
3 We have already considered such a correspondence in chapter one, 
section (1.2.1). 
4 
The issue of a semantic role for information is taken up again in 
chapter seven. 
5 Note that 1[(,0 does not have its "standard" meaning as used 
here by Barwise and Perry. They write d,ç ([ /]ßá,e, whereas I would 
prefer to write d, c I[ (3]i 6, e, with e/G- = ac. For a detailed 
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statement of this point, see chapter three. 
6 
In the text, to avoid too much confusion, I have employed Barwise 
and Perry's non- standard notation for the meaning of names; I would 
prefer to write: 'Jim' refers to j iff d,ci[Jim]lef,e and e/c _ _j 
(see chapter three). 
7 Barwise and Perry raise this question in S &A, and point out that 
the name chosen affects the information conveyed, and that an 
innocent theory need not overlook this (p. 264). However, they miss 
the point, which is whether information has a semantic role. 
8 
Again Barwise and Perry are using meaning -- in this case the 
meaning of the description I[-z]J -- in a non -standard manner. 
9 
Note that in situation semantics, on the definition of truth that 
Barwise and Perry give us, viz. 
4711-=-d,c 
CP iff 
(-3P-)(t e MO (Ì l[4° ]l ) 
bivalence holds; a sentence uttered in a discourse situation d with 
speaker connections c is false if it is not true. 
10 
The status of Donnellan's referential /attributive distinction 
(is it semantic or pragmatic ?) has been the subject of debate. 
Donnellan himself is not altogether clear on the matter: there is a 
difficulty in just what "the statement" is when the referent does not 
satisfy the description, but is drawn to the conclusion that the 
speaker 'may have stated something true or false' (Donnellan, 1966, 
p. 64). Kripke (1979) expresses disagreement with Donnellan's 
preference for a semantic ambiguity. Kripke distinguishes speaker's 
reference from semantic reference and believes that 'the problems 
Donnellan handles by semantic ambiguity should instead be treated by 
a general theory of speech acts'. (Kripke, 1979, p. 22) 
11 
Barwise and Perry's adherence to the view that the referent must 
satisfy the conditions in the resource situation may be called in 
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question because of this lack of symmetry. Their adherence is 
motivated by their general theory of descriptions: there must always 
be some situation in which the referent satisfies the conditions 
associated with the description: for attributive uses, it is the 
described situation, for referential uses it is the resource 
situation. The only way to preserve this feature of their general 
theory and restore the symmetry with names would be to say that the 
resource situation for the referential case is not the one that the 
speaker thinks, but a similar one which differs minimally and where 
the referent does possess the requisite properties. 
12 
This does not contradict the principle that Dretske espouses, 
that information is always veridical, that misinformation is not 
information. 
13 We should not respond to this difficulty by analysing the 
sentence differently, as 'I am called "Jim "', which would at least be 
clearly false; for then we would be committed to this analysis each 
time a sentence containing a name is uttered, including those cases 
when it is uttered truly. This is contrary to almost everything 
Barwise and Perry say about names: when Lee says 'I'm Lee', he has 
not mentioned his name, and so on. 
- 261 - 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1 
This step of associating individuals with a name simpliciter is 
taken in Aliass despite the belief that it is a mistake; it helps to 
simplify the semantics of Aliass by going against the view of the 
main text on a point that is not crucial for Aliass, which is mainly 
concerned with showing how the semantics works out with regard to the 
issue of compositionality and related issues, such as pronominal 
anaphora. Barwise and Perry pointed out in the main text that names 
do not uniquely identify individuals: in the general case, many 
individuals have the same name at any one time, so that more needs to 
be said on the semantics of names than we are told in the appendices 
on Aliass. 
2 
However, in Singular Aliass sentences can have event 
indeterminates e or e0 in their SCat, but these must be discharged 
when the sentence is used to make a statement. The indeterminate e 
is moved to AF(q ), cp a sentence, by rule S4, and e0 is moved to 
RS(06, OC an expression of any category, by the resource situation 
rule. (See S &A, pp. 313,316.) 
3 The rule (b) in full is: 
NP2: If D( is an NP with assigned semantic features, 
and xi is a variable, then xi can be added to the AF of 
p( The SCat and Tense of oC are unchanged. We 
represent the expression with its new semantic features 
by p(i. The meaning of the NP with its new associated 
features is 
d,c [ oCi]16 -,e 
iff d, c C406-,e and if c (xi) is defined, then c(xi) = 
a . 
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Strictly, there is a slight difference between the meaning of the NP 
and that of the IT, since there is the condition that ç(xi) = 
However, this is not relevant to the concerns of the text. 
Considered extensionally, the meaning of the NF is a subset of the 
meaning of the IT, for those quadruples <d,ç,cr ,e> where c(xi) ac 
are filtered out. But the possible referents are the same: the 
referential "reach" is the same. 
4 
Notably, the situation itself is not a real but an abstract 
entity; however, this is not the issue just at the moment. 
I use 'components' to refer to all the entities that are used 
to construct abstract situations, the term 'constituents' being 
reserved for those which are set theoretic members of abstract 
situations. Thus, the constituents of the abstract situation 
<1, <r,a,b >,1> are 1, the sequence <r,a,b >, and 1, but its components 
are 1, r, á, b, and 1. The distinction may be thought of in terms of 
ultimate constituents and immediate constituents. 
5 In a more recent version of the theory than occurs in Barwise and 
Perry (1983), a distinction is made between located and unlocated 
situations. More precisely, an abstract located circumstance is a 
sequence of the form <1,r,x1,...,xn,po1 >, and an abstract unlocated 
circumstance is a sequence <r,x1,...,xn,pol >, where 1 is a location, 
r an n -ary relation, the xi (j = 1, ..., n) individuals, and pol E 
{0,1 }. See Barwise (1984). 
6 This latter conception of the interpretation of a relation symbol 
is the one adopted when the theory is formulated rigorously so that 
it can serve as the semantic component to a formal generative 
grammar. Thus, Robin Cooper, who has spent much of the spring and 
summer of 1984 working on ELIUSS represents the interpretations of 
relation symbols in this way (cf. note 23 and chapter five). 
There is a problem with NPs in the semantics in Aliass. For an 
NP ¿( , the relevant indeterminate is a; but if the NP is in object 
position, the really important indeterminate is b . See section 
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(3.3.2) below for a discussion of this issue, which I have caltuation 
Object NP Problem. 
8 
The rationals would also be available to us if we wanted them, 
but the reals are a different matter, given the constructive nature 
of the underlying set theory, KPU. If we use Dedekind cuts to define 
them, we are dealing with classes of rationals, which cannot be parts 
of situations. 
9 
Strictly, there is provision in Aliass only for one- or two -place 
predicates (relation symbols). I shall sometimes proceed as if this 
were already generalised -to n -place predicates, for arbitrary n. 
10 
The general problem of this section is not so acute in a first 
order language for the predicate calculus. Usually the atomic 
sentences are just composed of an n -place predicate followed by n 
terms, for variable n. Terms, simple and complex, designate 
individuals, sentences designate a truth value (and, supposing we are 
dealing with an extensional language, the truth value of a molecular 
sentence is a function of the truth values of its parts), so the only 
possible problem would come from the references of the predicates. 
These are usually taken to be sets of individuals. We can ask 
whether these sets are parts of the world, or correspond to anything 
in the world, or whether they are just artifacts of the theory. The 
answer is that the extension assigned to a predicate P is just the 
set of all individuals that have the property associated with P. In 
a theory founded on an ontology which sees only individuals in the 
world, and not properties,, classification of individuals under 
certain predicates is the action of a cognitive agent, so there would 
not be something in the world independent of the agent. However, 
there is something outside the theory -- the agent's classificatory 
activity -- that the set is intended to represent. In any case, 
predicates are themselves basic expressions, not members of a 
compound, intermediate category. 
11 
The independence of the primitives and of meaning, for both 
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lexical and therefore compound expressions, from the situation 
structure is an important distinction between the two theories. Of 
course, we could expand the role of the situation structure in 
situation semantics to include not just which subclass Ho of the 
class of all situations is to be the class of actual situations in 
'(, but also the definition of 1?_ itself, via setting out which are 
to be the classes A of individuals, R of relations and L of locations 
for the situation structure 'Lj, and to include also the definition of 
the meanings of the basic expressions (and via these, because of the 
compositionality of meaning, of compound expressions). Barwise and 
Perry, however, take the primitives as fixed and meaning as 
independent of the situation structure. Their reason for doing so is 
probably to distance themselves from possible world semantics by 
fixing the individuals that there are in the world: 
We do not believe that there are other possible worlds in 
the sense demanded of them by this theory, only other 
ways this world of ours might have been and might be. 
(S &A, p. xiii) 
They distance themselves by fixing meaning too. 
12 
In this section I shall talk of sets when strictly I should 
sometimes say classes. To place this talk on firm ground, I would 
need to use a different set theory from Barwise and Perry, but we 
gain in not having to make the, at times, tedious distinction between 
set and (proper) class. 
13 
Compare this result with the similar one obtained with respect 
to the semantics for necessity and possibility in chapter six, 
section (6.2.2). 
14 
This is a slight, but unimportant modification to the 
formulations of the meaning of tensed VPs as found both in the main 
text of S &A, (p. 129) and in the appendix on Aliass (p. 303). Notice 
that a' itself is not the individual required; rather it is a 
function which provides the individual. 
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' John McDowell has argued for this explicitly in McDowell (1978). 
McDowell distinguishes the level at which language contacts the world 
within semantic theory (at the level of the axioms of a Tarskian 
truth theory) from the level at which language actually "hooks up to" 
the world (at the level of of sentences). See the discussion of 
McDowell's article in chapter two, section (2.1.1). 
16 
Cf. S &A, pp. 128,129. Note that for Barwise and Perry the third 
relatum is the individual, not the setting. More on this below. 
17 
The operation "plus" is not specified exactly at this point; 
clearly it will have a lot in common with the way the constituents of 
an abstract situation are held together in that situation. The 
reader is asked to think of the operation intuitively for the 
present; more is revealed below, and a detailed exposition of the 
operation is given in the appendix. 
18 
I say tentatively because of the assumption that meaning can be 
represented in this set -theoretic way. 
19 
The reader should not be worried that the operation * is defined 
over individuals as well as settings; when explicated below, it is 
intended to apply to all the pieces that can be put together in the 
construction of abstract situations. However, see the following 
note. 
20 
For a rigorous treatment of these matters, see the appendix. 
Here I shall remark that just as courses of events need to be 
regarded as matrices, so too individuals, relations and locations x 
will need to be transformed to matrices [x] before * can operate on 
them. 
21 
I ignore any difficulty there may be in representing in the 
matrix notation situations which specify an uncountably infinite 
number of relations to hold: KPU set theory does admit infinite 
entities as sets, therefore these situations are possible (Barwise, 
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1975). These set theoretic entities, of course, are not capable of 
being exhibited in Barwise and Perry's informal notation either. 
22 
The matrix notation is helpful in displaying the similarities. 
23 
Robin Cooper, however, does show us what the interpretations of 
the entities which assume this role (verbs or predicates) look like. 
I discuss his work in chapter five; for the present suffice it to say 
that his interpretation for a relation symbol D( is <(), s, o, 1 >, 
where rn(o() is the relation denoted by the relation symbol. 
24 
I am grateful to Mark Gawron for pointing out this problem, and 
to the informal group on situation semantics at the School of 
Epistemics for discussion about it. 
25 
The problem is more general than this, for we consider only 
direct objects. If one considered verbs which take an indirect 
object in addition to the subject and direct object, the problem is 
multiplied, for now three NPs have to be correlated. 
26 
Indeed, this is their opinion. Robin Cooper speaks of ' Barwise 
and Perry's view of syntax as part of the utterance situation' 
(abstract of a seminar, as printed in the CSLI NEWSLETTER, August 2, 
1984). 
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Notes to Chapter Four 
1 
Russell gives as an example of a particular fact: that this is 
white (holding up a piece of chalk); as is well known, Socrates would 
not have been a particular for Russell, and hence the fact that 
Socrates is mortal is a complex fact for him. However, we need not 
follow Russell on this point; we can accept the basic idea he is 
presenting without supposing that the particulars which the view 
refers to are sense data rather than individual objects as we 
normally think of them. The causal theory of reference (Kripke, 
1971, 1972) would support this course, for it teaches that the name 
'Socrates' refers causally to Socrates as an individual, and if one 
accepts the existence of singular propositions, the individual enters 
into the proposition expressed by a sentence containing the name, 
rather than the proposition having the more complex structure the 
descriptive theory of names accords to it. I have therefore chosen 
Socrates' mortality as a suitable candidate for a particular fact, 
being appropriate for contrasting with the mortality of all mankind, 
the exemplar of a general fact. 
2 
See Russell (1956), p. 209 for a statement about disjunction and 
pp. 211 -214 for a discussion of negative facts. 
3 
Russell's reasoning here, as in other places, bears traces of his 
early affinity with G. E. Moore. The latter, as has already been 
remarked, once identified true proposition and reality -- proposition 
and fact. False propositions proved problematic for this idea; false 
beliefs proved problematic for propositions. John Passmore 
summarises the point very well: 
The case of the false belief led Moore to this 
conclusion. On the propositional theory, there must be a 
proposition for us falsely to believe in, even although 
this proposition has the peculiar property of being 
false. In fact, however, so Moore argues, it is the very 
essence of a false belief that we believe what is not. 
As Russell put the same point in The Problems of 
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Philosophy (1912), when Othello falsely believes that 
Desdemona loves Cassio his belief is false just because 
there is no such object as Desdemona loves Cassio; if 
there were such an object, as on the propositional theory 
there has to be, Othello's belief would be true, not 
false. Once we come to realize that a false belief is 
not a belief in a proposition, it seems natural to deny, 
also - - or so both Moore and Russell thought - --- that a 
true belief has a proposition as its object. 'Belief', 
so Moore sums the matter up, 'never consists in a 
relation between ourselves and something else (the 
proposition) which is believed.' In fact, 'there are no 
propositions'. (Passmore, 1966, pp. 205,206) 
4 
For statements of their position on this point, see Barwise 
(1981), p. 389; Barwise and Perry (1981b), pp. 668,669; and S &A, pp. 
7,8. 
5 I am ignoring details that complicate the picture here, such as 
anaphoric pronouns, which involve constraints on the references of 
expressions in the subsentences of both conjunctive and disjunctive 
compound sentences. See S &A, pp. 136 -138. Cf. chapter eight, note 
3. 
6 
Interesting! Do we have an intuitionist strand to the underlying 
logic of situation semantics? Robin Cooper's extension of the 
theory, to be discussed in the next chapter, does allow situations 
(facts, as he calls them) like <or, f, g, 1 >, which regains the 
symmetry between conjunction and disjunction, but he retains this 
putative intuitionist strand, since he imposes structural constraints 
which require either f or g to be in actual situations containing the 
disjunctive fact <or, f, g, 1 >. 
7 More recently still the word 'proposition' has begun to be used 
for these objects, which Barwise calls circumstances (CSLI 
NEWSLETTER, October 4, 1984). 
8 
The more recent theory found in Barwise (1984) represents a 
return in spirit to realistic propositions without violating the 1983 
metatheory, by making situation type the central notion of the 
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theory, rather than situation. The type of all the situations in a 
realistic proposition is a finite object, a set, and yet contains all 
the information in the realistic proposition. 
9 
In fact, a restriction of .L is needed, so the members of 
cannot quite be just anything. Prohibited from membership of ,Q, are 
sequences y,..., yn when y. for some i between 1 and n inclusive is 
a primitive symbol (the primitive symbols for a language L(6) ,4-,) 
are: the sets e , * , ; the variables of the language; the 
punctuation, sentence connectives ->, -, and the quantifier V). See 
Richards (1974), p. 433. 
10 
This definition seems to be defective: what is meant in the 
second clause is surely that S (t) is the value of V(F) at <S (t1), 
* 
..., S (t11) >, to cover for the iterated case (ie. where ti (1 4 i 4 
n) is itself a closed term, consisting of a function letter and a 
suitable number of closed terms. 
11 
Richards does not follow Russell in allowing only sense data as 
individuals, of course. Russell would apparently have allowed these 
other singular propositions containing Socrates, etc. as 
propositions, only he would have said that we cannot grasp them (cf. 
Russell, 1956, p. 56). 
12 
I am using the exclamation mark in the quantifier 'g!x' to 
abbreviate the uniqueness condition, as spelled out according to 
Russell's (1905) analysis. 
13 
This situation too has changed with the more recent versions of 
the theory, eg. Barwise (1984). The use of situation types permits 
general propositions to be represented directly by a type. The 
general proposition .!xFx is the type of situations in which a unique 
thing is F; the general proposition VxFx is the type of situations in 
which all things are F. 
14 
This avenue will be explored in the next chapter, following up 
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Robin Cooper's ideas on extending the theory. Cf. the preceding 
note. 
- 271 - 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1 
I wish to acknowledge m g y gratitude to Mary Tait and Barry 
Richards for making suggestions which led to the writing of this 
section. 
2 
Although in Barwise and Perry (1981b) the authors still consider 
that there is a world, in that paper they display how they think of 
and work with the internal structure of situations; they have already 
made at this stage the transition to abstract situations as the 
interpretations of utterances. 
3 Cf. also the discussion of false propositions in connection with 
Russell in chapter four, as a reason why real situations cannot 
retain a semantic role. 
4 
See Goldblatt (1984), pp. 14 -16. 
5 
Strictly, the location is the only constituent of abstract 
situations that is in the world; individuals and properties are not 
constituents of abstract situations, only the constituents sequence 
of property and individuals is a constituent, and this sequence is 
not in the world. However, this is beside the point in the text, 
since we could reformulate the representation of abstract situations, 
changing 
to 
<1, <rn, á1, ..., án>, i> 
<1, rn, a1, ..., át,1, i> 
thus making individuals, properties, and locations each constituents. 
Sometimes I shall speak of components of an abstract situation, 
meaning individuals and properties are components of abstract 
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situations as currently represented. 
6 
In Kaplan (1975), which we shall consider in the following 
chapter, Kaplan says, prior to his examination of the position of the 
two theories -- Russell's and Frege's -- with respect to haecceitism, 
When we construct a model of something, we must 
distinguish those features of the model which represent 
features of that which we model, from features which are 
intrinsic to the model and play no representational role. 
The latter are artifacts of the model. (Kaplan, 1975, p. 
722) 
We are presently applying this advice to the nature or role of the 
set theory in situation semantics. 
7 We have said nothing thus far to prevent formation of the 
sentence S & S, which, as a sentence, is of course distinct from S 
itself. If S corresponds to the abstract situation e, then S & S 
corresponds to e U e = e. Hence we do not have an isomorphism from 
sentences of L to abstract situations, but a many -one mapping. One 
response to this problem is to regard & as associative: (S & S') & S" 
is the same sentence as S & (S' & S "), and to define the 
correspondence between L and abstract situations not in terms of 
sentences, but of equivalence classes of sentences, as generated by 
an equivalence relation based on a notion of reduction of one 
sentence to another. Intuitively, one sentence reduces to another by 
elimination of contained copies of atomic sentences. Thus, using (i), 
V) and c as variables over molecular sentences and S as an atomic 
sentence, a sentence of the form CP & a & & S & W reduces to y & 
S & & w. The equivalence relation is then defined by: for any 
two sentences S and S', S = S' if either S reduces to S' or S' 
reduces to S. 
An alternative response is not to be worried by the problem, 
since if situation semantics is extended along the lines suggested by 
Robin Cooper (see section 5.3), there will be a situation 
corresponding to the sentence S & S, namely 
8 
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{<and, is is, 1>} 
Barry Richards pointed out to me that the disjointness condition 
in the sets 1, and needs to be stated. 
9 
Provision is therefore made for relation variables (relation 
indeterminates), although, as with Barwise and Perry in situation 
semantics, we shall not be concerned with them after the definition. 
10 
Another legacy of Russell: compare this with Richards' 
understanding of Russellian propositions in terms of an object P- 
ing: 
If u utters C (Ix 4) x) and t and Ix (p x *does not occur 
inside a modal context, then if ( -c1), (ç2) and (ç3) 
obtain then e (Ix x) at <u,t> expresses the proposition 
that there is exactly one q:5 and it G's. 
11 
At the end of chapter nine of S &A (pp. 220 -223), Barwise and 
Perry give four reasons for the failure of the idea that attitudes 
are relations to situations; the reasons come under the headings: 
Folk Psychology; Missing the Mental; Capturing the Constraints; and 
Foundational Problems. 
12 
Sometimes Barwise and Perry have Br relate the agent directly to 
E, particularly when, as here, there is only one event type involved. 
This is just not bothering to write out the semantics in full. I 
shall adhere to the strict form of the semantics, and so in the 
example I have Br, relate John to S = { E }. 
13 
This state of affairs is due to a confused use of event types 
and schemata in abstract situations: briefly, abstract situations 
were originally supposed to represent real world relations between 
real world individuals; although we find relations like Br holding 
among agents and schemata, the latter is not a piece of the world. 
For further discussion of this issue see chapter seven. 
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14 
Rather than adopt Barwise and Perry's notation of bold 
characters (and a dot above the character) for indeterminates, I 
prefer to employ different letters of the alphabet as variables. 
Hence a, b, ... are elements of ,20; x, y, ... are individual 
variables; 1 is a location in h, k, are location variables; etc. 
15 
If the interpretation were, in the formalism introduced in 
chapter three, a suitable matrix [j] rather than Jackie, then 
interpretations would be dependent on the grammatical role of the 
expressions in object language sentences. Thus, the interpretation 
of 'Jackie' in 
(1) Jackie is biting Molly. 
would be 
...` 
and the interpretation of 'Jackie' in 
(2) Molly is biting Jackie. 
would be 
/0000 j 0 ...1 
Of course, this makes explicit the fact that meaning is not 
language- independent. 
16 
There is no mention of facts of these kinds in the main text. 
Nonetheless, this move is forced by the introduction of conjunctive 
and disjunctive facts (and is needed in any case to justify his 
argument in the main text), not by any peculiarity of the formal 
language that Cooper defines in his appendix. 
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17 
Anthony Kenny says in his book on Wittgenstein: 
According to the Tractatus there must be something which 
any picture, of whatever kind, must have in common with 
what it depicts, if it is to be able to depict it even 
incorrectly. This irreducible minimum is called by 
Wittgenstein 'logical form'. (Kenny, 1973, p. 5) 
Pictures can be more or less abstract, more or less like 
what they picture: their pictorial form can be more or 
less rich. But there is a minimum which must be common 
between reality and picture if the picture is to be able 
to portray even incorrectly: this minimum, Wittgenstein 
says, is logical form (TLP 2.18).' What this amounts to 
is that the elements of the picture must be capable of 
some combination with each other in a pattern 
corresponding to the relationship of the elements of what 
is pictured (cf. TLP 2.0141). (Kenny, 1973, p. 57) 
18 
Although I speak of the logical form' of a proposition, it is 
not correct to think of propositions as having a unique logical form; 
the representation of logical form in the predicate calculus will 
depend on how much structure is uncovered. Thus we may say that a 
proposition has the logical form A -> B, but uncovering more 
structure we realise that the more detailed logical form is, say, V 
xFx -> .;xFx (which is true in a nonempty domain). 
19 
There are one and a half pages on the matter in the final 
chapter of S &A (pp. 290 -292) and a few lines in the appendix to 
chapter seven (p. 315). 
20 
This formulation of the semantics of general NPs follows Barwise 
and Perry (the 1983 theory), who prefer that notion of settings which 
is developed in the semantics for Aliass, which I have called the 
alternative conception of a setting. To reformulate the semantics of 
general NPs using the original conception of a setting would involve 
extensive revision, for example to the semantics of VPs, and I have 
therefore decided to retain Barwise and Perry's alternative 
conception in this section. The amount of revision required is less. 
21 
More precisely, following Barwise and Cooper (1981), 'some' is a 
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logical determiner, and 'some X', X a set term, is a noun phrase, or 
equivalently, a quantifier. Nonetheless, I shall use the word 
'quantifier' loosely for expressions such as 'some' in the sequel, 
since I do not follow Barwise and Cooper's strategy of having a 
quantifier Q designate a family of sets, a set term t3 designate a 
set, and where a sentence is true if the set designated by cij is in 
the family designated by Q. rQ I 
Wat.4 
22 
The condition X. Xis. seems redundant; however, we must have X e 
SCat(no) so that the meaning and compositional rules can be defined 
for quantifiers generally. 
23 
The treatment in Singular Aliass (S &A, Appendix to chapter 
seven) takes up Austin's suggestion, or rather supposition, that 
utterances are correlated with states of affairs by demonstrative 
conventions (Austin, 1961, pp. 121ff) and incorporates a situation 
indeterminate e0, which can be associated with a particular abstract 
situation c( e0) that the speaker intends to refer to by the speaker 
connections. 
24 
See Robin Cooper (1979). His translation of the indefinite 
article into Montague's intensional logic is ÀaK3u[J(u) & K(u)], so 
that 'aG' would translate as ÀK3u[G(u) & K(u)], and the sentencera G 
F's) would be - 3u[G(u) & F(u)]. 
2 (Cotf . 
My treatment differs from Barwise and Cooper's in that the general NP 
designates a set of individuals (Y6.,), not a family of sets. When the 
quantifier 'some' combines with the noun 'dog', X cr is constrained to 
be the set of dogs in the described situation, the set Yam thereby 
being constrained to be some of these dogs (see rule (13) in the 
text). The situation e in the meaning of the NP, d,ç I[some dog]I 6,e, 
is also functioning as a resource situation, determining exactly the 
set of dogs from which the some dogs will be chosen. This case is 
similar to the attributive use of definite descriptions, in that 
resource situation and described situation are identical. 
- 277 - 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1 
From Kaplan (1978), p. 223. See Charles Taylor's review of 
Evans' book (Taylor, 1983) for an interpretation of Evans' work that 
views it as trying to break down the Cartesian distinction between 
subject and object, between thought and meanings on the one hand, and 
the world on the other. 
2 
Some readers may consider the concept of haecceitism meaningful 
only when we already presuppose the possible worlds framework. 
Kaplan's definition: 
The doctrine that holds that it does make sense to ask -- 
without reference to common attributes and behavior -- 
whether this is the same individual in another possible 
world, that individuals can be extended in logical space 
(ie. through possible worlds) in much the way we commonly 
regard them as being extended in physical space and time, 
and that a common "thisness" may underlie extreme 
dissimilarity or distinct thisnesses may underlie great 
resemblance, I call Haecceitism. (Kaplan, 1975, pp. 
722 -723) 
makes reference to possible worlds and possible individuals in 
worlds. However, making sense of the notions of necessity and 
possibility, which we must do before we can provide a semantics for 
the modal operators 'necessarily' and 'possibly' of natural language, 
raises the question of haecceitism or anti --haecceitism. Even if one 
agrees with Barwise and Perry that there are no other possible 
worlds, only ways this world of ours might have been and might be, 
one is effectively entertaining alternative possible situations. 
Actually, Kripke seems to reject the idea that there is a 
problem with "transworld identity ": 'A possible world isn't a distant 
country that we are coming across, or viewing through a telescope. 
[...] 'Possible worlds' are stipulated, not discovered by powerful 
telescopes. There is no reason why we cannot stipulate that, in 
talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain 
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counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have 
happened to him. (Kripke, 1980, p. 44) 
3 
Kaplan remarks on the qualifications to his analysis in section 
II of his paper, so I shall not say anything more about them. 
4 
So Kaplan claims. Barry Richards has pointed out in conversation 
that truth values are not actually part of the ontology, since they 
are not quantified over. 
5 I have not included basic indeterminates in the ontology of 
situation semantics for -two reasons. Firstly, they are not regarded 
as things in the world. Secondly, and more importantly, although 
they are urelements of the set theory as formulated in S &A, they need 
not be in other representations of situation semantics; as Barwise 
and Perry point out, situation types could alternatively be 
constructed as equivalence classes of situations (S &A, p. 71). 
6 
I shall often speak of properties, when more precisely I mean 
intensional relations -- relations in the world as understood in 
situation semantics; properties, which are usually understood as 
one -place intensional relations, are being taken as representative of 
intensional relations in general. Understanding properties in this 
sense means that we do not constantly have to distinguish between the 
intensional and extensional senses of relations. 
7 The exact, formal, set theoretic representation of situations 
varies. In the book Barwise and Perry write: 
state of affairs = <1,s> = 
...}> (pp. 53,54) 
course of events = { <l,y,i >, <1',y',i' >, ...} (p. 56) 
where the Y are constituent sequences. Consequently, a situation is 
not equal to the set theoretic union of the singleton of all the 
states of affairs it makes reference to, or contains. They also 
think of situations as partial functions (Barwise and Perry, 1981b, 
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p. 669; S &A, p. 56). I shall generally employ the representation of 
situations as sets of triples <1, y, i >, where Y is a constituent 
sequence. 
8 
'We regard truth values as slipping ilin into the universe in the 
process of abstraction from situations to objects standing or not 
standing in relations.' From Barwise and Perry (1981b) p. 669, 
footnote. 
9 
For an account of this shift, see chapter five, section 5.1.1. 
10 
The propositions I refer to are those expressed by utterances of 
these sentences for which the speaker connections determine Jackie 
and Molly, ie. a particular Jackie (Barwise's dog) and a particular 
Molly (Perry's dog). 
11 
Cf. the treatment of partiality in chapter eight. 
12 
Of course, in doing so we are brushing aside all the meta -theory 
of situation semantics: ecological realism and the view that 
properties are real constituents of the world. Kaplan does the same 
with respect to Russell's and Frege's meta -theoretical views. 
13 This point particularly strikes the reader of the appendices to 
S &A where Aliass is defined. The meanings of expressions are 
fundamental: at each compositional stage, it is the meaning of the 
compound expression that is defined, and this is done in terms of the 
meanings of the parts. 
14 
am grateful to Ewan Klein, who, when confronted with the 
possible worlds proposal, suggested to me the use of possible options 
as a method for adding necessity and possibility to situation 
semantics. 
15 
More explicitly, it is a sextuple <A,R,L,M,l¢{,R >, but I omit 
the first three entities, since Barwise and Perry omit mention of 
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them in their. definition (S &A, p. 60). Yet it seems to me that we 
should not forget these classes in defining the model: specification 
of the domain is an integral part of the traditional definition in 
model theory. Perhaps Barwise and Perry are again rebelling against 
the tradition for being so abstracted from the real world -- they 
think that A, R, and L are given to us in reality, so that we do not 
need to specify them. 
16 
Perhaps the reason why we find it much easier to accept that 
various singular terms designate a single individual (rather than 
several "individuals ") than to accept that there should be canonical 
properties in the world with several natural language verbs denoting 
one property, is because of how we conceive the world to be: 
individuals are very concrete inhabitants of it, whereas properties 
are rarefied inhabitants which appear and disappear (if they exist in 
the universe at all). 
17 
Of course, 'moves' does not mean exactly the same thing as 
'orbits'; but in the context in which it is uttered here, let us 
grant that the meaning is essentially the same in the two cases, and 
hence the pragmatic component might regard them as deserving to be 
assigned the same predicate G of L. 
18 
This point has been made with respect to situation semantics by 
Robin Cooper. His remark is found in Cooper (1983), p. 2. 
19 
Almog states in the preface to Almog (1983) that he does not 
consider all the variants of Neo- Fregeanism; in particular, he does 
not deal with the Evans -Peacocke theory, but hopes to rectify this in 
a later version. Compare the remark in the text with my discussion 
of what I call the Evans -McDowell version of Fregean theory in the 
next chapter (section 7.1.2). 
20 
Michael Devitt (1974, 1981) importantly points out that a name 
can be multiply grounded: thus Devitt on his family's pet cat Nana: 
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Nana is involved in the causal network for her name at 
more points than its beginning at her naming ceremony; 
the network is multiply grounded in her. (Devitt, 1981, 
p. 56) 
When Devitt passes the ability to use 'Nana' as a name for the cat by 
uttering 'This is Nana' and pointing to the cat, the name is further 
grounded in Nana; 
Nana will be both mediately and immediately causally 
involved in this passing on. She will be mediately 
involved via the ability I exercise in using her name, an 
ability grounded in her at the naming ceremony. She will 
be immediately involved because 'this' is a designational 
demonstrative: she is present at the utterance, and her 
presence leads to my use of the demonstrative. (Devitt, 
1981, p. 56) 
21 
Almog is reluctant to speak in terms of possible worlds: 
My belief is that as long as we leave "worlds" as some 
sort of primitives, we run the risk of reifying the 
problem of "trans -world- identification" all over again. 
My reasons are very general: ultimately, I would like to 
claim that possible worlds cannot be left as primitives 
even when we give a semantics to an object language with 
modal operators. Even then, I would like to claim, the 
modal idioms come first and we should treat them in terms 
of properties of propositions. (Almog, 1983, p. 45) 
However, I shall continue to employ the possible worlds framework on 
occasions when it is convenient; we need to see how Almog intends to 
work without it before dropping it altogether. Nevertheless, we must 
use the idiom carefully: I share his dissatisfaction with the whole 
possible worlds framework. 
22 
Almog's paper, 'Sinnless Reference', is available to me at 
present only in draft form, and is not always explicit. In 
particular, there is no complete specification of his system. This 
is why there are points in my account of his view that may appear 
vague and where the reader may wish that I had been more explicit 
about Almog's system. For example, while some properties are taken 
to be basic (notably those deriving from natural kinds), others 
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presumably would not be. But it is not clear that for every sentence 
Fa, the property denoted by F must be either basic itself, or 
analysable or decomposable into other expressions, terms and 
predicates, that are basic, so that each singular proposition would 
contain at least one individual and at least one property. Almog 
does say, however, that he wants to extend the directly referential 
view from natural kind terms to all single- word -predicate 
expressions. 
23 
Naturally, on the Fregean view, the proper names 'Achilles' and 
'Priam' would themselves determine their referents via mediating 
senses, but I ignore this detail here in making the main point. 
24 
It is worth noting that Wittgenstein held that the logical 
constants do not denote or. represent. Although part of the 
proposition, they do not correspond to anything in the world, 
anything in the level pictured. Instead they indicate that 
operations have been performed upon elementary propositions 
(Wittgenstein, 1929). 
25 
Actually, Almog does not explicitly say that these are all the 
constituents; he also speaks of the kind membership relation, but 
adding this in as a constituent still leaves us with a set of 
entities, not a proposition: Russell's ultimate notion of assertion 
is lacking. Because of this, it is not important for the point in 
question whether we consider the kind membership relation a 
constituent or not: if we do, the representation of the proposition 
will be <eK, Bagheera, pantherhood, 1 >. 
26 
Since I have not seen Almog's full system, I am only presuming 
that his propositional function maps the constituent propositions to 
a proposition. Another possibility is that the propositional 
function acts on the linguistic constituents. 
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Notes to Chapter Seven 
1 
Barwise and Perry prefer to call these simply 'attitudinal 
contexts', thereby not committing themselves to regarding the 
attitudes as relations to propositions. In an interesting section in 
S &A (Shaken Attitudes, pp. 177 -179) they comment on why they have 
dropped the adjective 'propositional'. Their reason is that 
propositions, if they are identified with the interpretations of 
utterances, are proper classes, and Barwise and Perry interpret this 
as implying that propositions are not a part of the causal order, 
since as proper classes, propositions cannot be elements of any set 
and thus are not part of any situation. This chain of reasoning 
inverts the proper relationship between the theory and what the 
theory is about. Barwise and Perry's conclusions about the role of 
propositions is based on a property of the theoretical representation 
of propositions. In fact, according to the 1984 theory, which 
assigns situation types to utterances as interpretations, 
propositions are sets and can be constituents of situations -- hence 
are perhaps part of the causal order. 
2 
For those unfamiliar with Leibniz' Law, I cite the following 
formulation: 
Given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms 
may be substituted for the other in any true statement 
and the result will be true. (Quine, 1953, p. 17) 
3 Quine, in his article (Quine)1956), draws a distinction between 
the relational and notional senses of belief. Stephen Stich 
questions the distinction between de re and de dicto belief. See his 
(1983), chapter six. 
4 
See Barwise and Perry's Maxim A (S &A, p. 288), cited above on p 
50. 
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5 This assumes a rather simplistic view of the speaker's motives -- 
that he is sincere and intends to communicate as fully and accurately 
as possible. I,n real situations, the speaker often has other 
motives, and we can safely say that the choice of expression is 
determined by the complex interaction of a number of factors. 
6 Field (1977) gives a semantics for the predicate calculus based 
on the notion of subjective probability, a purely epistemic notion 
contrasting with the usual truth conditional semantics. Field argues 
that we should regard the probabilistic semantics as constituting a 
layer corresponding to Fregean sense on top of a truth conditional 
semantics, which would fix the referential meaning of expressions. 
Referential meaning does not distinguish the meanings of 
Hesperus = Hesperus 
Hesperus = Phosphorus 
so Field claims that conceptual role, as explicated by the 
probabilistic semantics, must be a part of meaning and that these 
sentences differ in conceptual role. Meaning, therefore, has two 
components: 
My view rather is that truth- theoretic semantics and 
conceptual -role semantics supplement each other: truth - 
theoretic semantics cannot account for certain 
differences in sense unaccompanied by differences in 
reference; and conceptual -role semantics, though it deals 
nicely with questions of intra- speaker synonymy, cannot 
properly answer questions about inter -speaker synonymy or 
about relation between language and the world. But, 
taken together, I claim, truth -theoretic semantics and 
conceptual -role semantics provide an account of all the 
facts about meaning that there are. (Field, 1977, p. 380) 
7 McGinn (1982) also takes the view that there are two components 
to meaning, and indeed considers Field's ideas in (Field, 1972, 1978) 
'close to the truth' (McGinn, 1982, p. 225). McGinn begins by asking 
what the notion of sentential meaning is designed to do, and replies 
that one influential and appealing answer is that it is tied to the 
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explanation of the use of language. The problem is that reference 
drops out of theories of meaning shaped by the idea that meaning is 
use (Putnam, 1978). Mc_Ginn's own summary of his ideas is: 
I agreed with those writers who tie meaning to use, and 
introduced the idea of cognitive role as what determines 
use. But I did not agree that meaning is exhausted by 
use, since this leaves out reference. I then motivated 
reference in a different way, as the means by which 
language conveys the condition of the world. It emerges, 
then, that the notion of meaning, like that of belief - 
content, is structurally duplex: it comprises two 
distinct components, each component introduced to serve a 
different purpose and each to be theorized in 
conceptually different ways. (McGinn, 1982, p. 229) 
8 
Saarinen (1982) would agree with the point made by Kripke (1971, 
1972) that one must distinguish metaphysical and epistemological 
factors (in fact Kripke argues for the clear distinction of 
metaphysical, epistemological and logical or analytic factors). What 
Saarinen proposes additionally is that epistemic modality, not 
metaphysical modality, is the relevant one for semantics. A crucial 
role in the semantics is given to the notion of how an individual is 
individuated: de re propositional attitudes concern individuals as 
individuated in a certain way, not individuals simpliciter. The 
direct reference theory, which speaks of "bare" individuals, ignores 
how individuals are individuated and is, Saarinen says, an effort to 
do semantics without any epistemology' (Saarinen, 1982, p. 271). 
Saarinen thus rejects the possible worlds framework for semantics, 
because it can only deal with metaphysical possibilities. 
Haecceitism may be retained in metaphysics, if we so desire; but it 
is utterly inappropriate in semantics. The terrible price Saarinen 
is willing to pay is the detachment of realist semantics from 
(metaphysical) reality. 
9 
The theory of reference is unfit to serve this role. There are 
constraints on the theory of sense originating with the goal of the 
theory -- to make sense of speakers, -- which exclude most 
formulations of the theory of reference; speakers would sometimes 
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simply not be intelligible if we used the theorem 
'Hesperus is visible' is true iff Phosphorus is visible. 
in the theory of sense. What the speaker is alleged to have said 
must mesh appropriately with the propositional attitudes we ascribe 
to him. See the next two paragraphs in the text. 
10 For a fuller discussion of this question, see McDowell (1977), 
especially sections IV and IX. 
11 
See, for example, Evans (1981), p. 281 note, where Evans says 
that Frege is committed -Co this notion of sense. 
12 
See notes 4, 5, and 6. 
13 
I shall use X as a variable or parameter in representing 
attitude relations; thus we shall have both Kr and X0. 
14 
Barwise and Perry do not explain very well exactly what this 
means; they say: 
While the organism's environment is real, independent of 
the organism, the organism /environment pair has a richer 
structure, for the needs and abilities of the organism 
are correlated with certain uniformities that the 
organism recognizes. That is, there are structural 
features of the organism that correspond to structural 
features of its environment. (S &A, p. 233) 
Michaels and Carello, in their book on ecological psychology talk of 
'dual complementation': 
If the organization of the animal were indifferent to the 
organization of the environment, the problem of control 
would be immensely complicated. Rather, the relationship 
must be of a special kind so that each component 
constrains or tailors the other. This dual 
complementation (Turvey, Shaw, & Mace, 1978) is the 
source of the complex coordinations exhibited by 
individual components of ecosystems. (Michaels and 
Carello, 1981, p. 145) 
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The basic idea seems to be an emphasis of the integrated relationship 
of animal and environment. 
15 
This information that is not part of the interpretation of an 
utterance of the name in situation semantics, but for the information 
to be available to anyone who understands the language, it must be 
part of the meaning of the name. Notice that a descriptive theory of 
names would contain the information that someone was once a Cicero in 
the semantic value. Let C(x) abbreviate the descriptions associated 
with 'Cicero'; then an utterance of 'Cicero Ce's' would express the 
proposition 
( -x) (Ç(x) & T(x)) , 
from which it is an easy matter to infer -3xC(x). 
16 What follows is only an outline of the treatment suggested. 
17 
See Barwise (1984), from which the quotation in the text is 
taken. 
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Notes to Chapter Eight 
1 
This problem arises in cases of sentence embedding operators 
other than attitude verbs, for example, the modal operators n and 
O. The problem is that if y is true and, moreover, necessarily 
true, then 'my is true. But substitution of another true sentence 
for Q does not mean that the truth of the whole sentence will be 
preserved: rly will sometimes be false, because )2, although true, 
is not necessarily true. 
The solution adopted by referential semantics has been Frege's: 
the the doctrine that the reference of a sentence in the context 
il_ is not its ordinary reference, but its ordinary sense and the 
consequent abandonment of innocence. Frege's proposal has been 
worked out within the possible worlds framework, with intensions 
representing intensions. The details are familiar and I shall not go 
into them here. 
2 
Just what conditions are required on the agent's relation to the 
object is uncertain. There are clear cases on the extremes and a 
large vague area inbetween. For example, if Ralph clearly sees 
Ortcutt lurking near a military installation, his belief that Ortcutt 
is a spy is de re, it is of Ortcutt. "Physical contact" is 
sufficient in this case, but how close must the agent be, how much 
must he see of the object? If Ralph, a guard at the installation 
sees a distant object through binoculars only for a moment before it 
is occluded, but believes it was a spy that he saw, is his belief 
still a belief of Ortcutt, if it was indeed Ortcutt? On the other 
hand, if Ralph is told that the richest man in town is a spy, and 
believes this, without knowing who is the richest man in town, his 
belief is not of the richest man in town. 
The question has received much attention in the literature: 
Kaplan (1969) introduces the notions of vividness and standard names 
in an attempt to distinguish the two cases. Boer and Lycan (1975) 
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ask what is required for the agent to know who someone is. Burge 
(1977) is an excellent article on this point: 
On seeing a man coming from a distance in a swirling fog, 
we may plausibly be said to believe of him that he is 
wearing a red cap. But we do not see the man well enough 
to describe or image him in such a way as to individuate 
him fully. Of course, we could individuate him 
ostensively with the help of the descriptions that we can 
apply. But there is no reason to believe that we can 
always describe or conceptualize the entities or 
spatiotemporal positions that we rely on in our 
demonstration. [...] Even perception under optimal 
conditions is subject to the point. The perceived object 
(say, a book) may not be inspected in sufficient detail 
to distinguish it from all other objects except by 
reference to spatiotemporal position. And this, as 
before, will often not be individuatable by the perceiver 
except by context -dependent, nonconceptual methods. 
(Burge, 1977, pp. 351,352) 
Finally, I shall just mention that Evans (1982) also discusses the 
matter (see especially chapter four). 
3 
The terminology derives from David Lewis (1979). 
4 
The causal theory of reference and the theory of direct reference 
(Kripke, 1971, 1972; Kaplan, 1977) have displaced the descriptive 
view. Kaplan's view (Kaplan, 1977, section XXII On Proper Names, pp. 
93 -99) is that proper names are not indexical, but ambiguous. Which 
Jon the speaker refers to by uttering 
Jon researches in formal semantics. 
is not determined by the character of 'Jon' and a feature of the 
context (which is the case with indexical expressions, eg. 'I'). 
Instead, the context determines which 'word' was uttered. 'Jon' is 
ambiguous, let us suppose, between Jon1 = Jon Barwise and Jong = Jon 
Oberlander. Once the context has disambiguated pre -semantically 
between Jon1 and Jong, the referent is decided. 
The causal theory of reference tells us, in terms of 
contextual features (including the speaker's intentions) 
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which word is being used in a given utterance. Each such 
word is directly referential (thus it has a fixed 
content), and it also has a fixed character. Therefore, 
in the case of proper name words, all three kinds of 
meaning -- referent, content and character -- collapse. 
(Kaplan, 1977, pp. 97,98) 
This collapse of the level of meaning means that in oblique contexts 
the Fregean sense of a name, the content of the name on Kaplan's 
scheme, is also the referent, the bearer of the name, and the Fregean 
solution fails. The informativeness of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is 
unexplained. Kaplan says, 'Proper names do not seem to fit into the 
whole semantical and epistemological scheme as I have developed it'. 
(Kaplan, 1977, p. 98) 
5 Lynn Rudder Baker says, 'On every classical [Baker's terminology 
for non -latitudinarian] account of de re belief I know of, (32) -(34) 
are justifiable ascriptions of de re belief.' (Baker, 1982b, p. 369) 
6 
Baker's remark is found early in the paper, in a footnote on p. 
381. 
7 See Lynn Rudder Baker (1982b), pp. 364 -368. 
8 
I am grateful to Barry Richards for pointing this out to me. 
9 
How might the notion of information be given a semantic role? 
The following is a sketch of a possible method. Our point of 
departure is the perspective that Barwise has recently taken (1983b), 
that information is the crucial concept for understanding meaning and 
that our theories of language and cognition should be worked out 
within an informational framework. Consequently, a great deal of 
information will be involved with meaning, though only some of this 
is actually part of the interpretations of utterances at present. 
The level of interpretation reflects what is said about the world and 
this is specified in terms of objects having properties and standing 
in relations to one another. but there is much more to the notion of 
information than this. If we could expand our concept of the 
interpretation to include more, perhaps all, of the (inverse) 
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information associated with utterances, then we would have given 
information a semantic role. This view breaks radically with the 
usual conception of the world in semantic theory, even with Barwise 
and Perry's view that the world consists of objects standing in 
relations. It is more akin to Gibson's conception of what the world 
is like. 
10 
A complication arises in natural language on the identification 
of & with English 'and' if there are pronouns in one of the 
subsentences, ) say, which can take an antecedent in Cip when the 
conjunction is formed as cp & y, but cannot be coreferential with 
that singular term when the conjunction is formed in the other way, 
as 1 & p. Thus, with regard to the sentences 
(1) Peter has a lot of talent and he should go far. 
(2) He has a lot of talent and Peter should go far. 
the pronoun 'he' may be coreferential with 'Peter' in utterances of 
(1), but cannot be so in utterances of (2). We are not used to this 
phenomenon in logic: our understanding of the meaning of the logical 
constants of formal languages is worked out against a background of 
non -efficient expressions. 
Other syntactic structures are affected by this issue of 
potentially coreferential pronouns. For example: 
(3) Realising that Oscar was unpopular didn't disturb him. 
(4) Realising that he was unpopular didn't disturb Oscar. 
See Radford (1981), chapter eleven, for a range of other 
constructions. 
11 
The puzzle is more acute for that view of semantics which I have 
called narrow. The problem, which is shared with direct reference 
semantics, is that if there is only Perry himself in the proposition 
expressed by both 'Perry is making a mess' and by 'I am making a 
mess' (said by Perry), then there can be no semantic solution to the 
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puzzle. The wide approach at least allows more factors within the 
domain of semantics, from which a solution may be possible. (I do 
not think that direct reference theory is committed to narrow 
semantics, although it embraces singular propositions; on the 
contrary, Almog's work, which invokes causal chains at the level of 
meaning, is 'wider' that Kaplan's.) 
12 
The passage is worth quoting in full: 
Why should we have a special category of self locating 
knowledge? Why should we care how someone apprehends a 
thought, so long as he does? [...] We use senses to 
individuate psychological states, in explaining and 
predicting action. It is the sense entertained, not the 
thought apprehended, that is tied to human action. When 
you and I entertain the sense of 'A bear is about to 
attack me,' we behave similarly. We both roll up in a 
ball and try to be as still as possible. Different 
thoughts apprehended, same sense entertained, same 
behavior. When you and I both apprehend the thought that 
I am about to be attacked by a bear, we behave 
differently. I roll up in a ball, you run to get help. 
Same thought apprehended, different sense entertained, 
different behavior. (Perry, 1977, p. 494) 
Evans (1981) defends Frege's identification of sense and thought, and 
criticises Perry's proposal that we need to distinguish them. In the 
terminology of Perry (1979), the distinction is between belief state 
and object of belief. 
13 
Of course, Barwise and Perry can mimic Baker's proposed solution 
in situation semantics using schemata and anchors. We formulate the 
intentional part of the explanation with schemata and we make 
connections with the actual state of affairs with anchors. Schemata 
will be used to capture Jones' identification of the objects in the 
various ways. His belief state is represented by the situation: 
e:= at 1: Br, j, S; yes 
where 1 o ld, j is Jones, and S = {E }; E is defined by: 
E:= at 1: basket, a; yes 
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more- valuable, a; yes 
dish, b; yes 
more -valuable, b; no 
holding, i, c; yes 
more -valuable, c; yes 
where f(a) = the basket, f_(b) = the dish, and f( c ) = the dish. 
Jones thinks that the object he is holding is the basket, but his 
belief that it is the more valuable is erroneous. 
14 
This is one of several points in the book where the authors are 
already thinking in terms of utterances designating situation types 
(cf. Barwise, 1984). 
15 
Or if there is, external significance -- stories, etc. -- it is 
not what we were expecting. 
16 
Even knowledge may involve an appeal to the non- veridical in its 
characterisation. Thus, one may know that there are no unicorns, 
even, in a certain sense, that Zeus was married to Hera, or that 
Gabriel Oak eventually married Bathsheba Everdene in Thomas Hardy's 
Far from the Madding Crowd. 
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